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Introduction
The analysis of contractual arrangements between two or more parties has a long
tradition in economics, since the “game-theoretic” revolution. Questions among this
line are: In which way should the wage of an employee depend on his own or the firm’s
performance? 1 What is the optimal selling contract for a given good or service? 2
For instance, a telecommunication service provide may ask how should the invoice of a
customer vary with his consumption patterns within a month? This dissertation aims
at contributing to the strands of theoretical literature in economics investigating the
above mentioned questions.
Next to the orthodox theories on contract design and optimal selling strategies, there
is a recent and growing literature investigating how rational firms respond to consumer
or employee biases. During the last decade the field of economics that modifies the
“standard preferences” by incorporating findings from psychological research has made
a significant progress. Now, there exist reasonable and tractable frameworks for model-
ing agents with reference-dependent preferences, time-inconsistent discounting, fairness
concerns and many other behavioral motives. These “workhorse”models not only allow
to investigate the “old” questions for a richer class of the agent’s preferences, they also
raise new questions. For instance, if an employee’s behavior is time inconsistent, this
raises the question how often should there be meetings between supervisors and sub-
ordinates where the subordinates report on the progress they made on given projects.
An interim deadline, i.e. a meeting with the supervisor, would impose an undesirable
restriction on the choice set of a time-consistent employee. If the employee has time-
inconsistent preferences, however, such an interim deadline may help to increase the
employee’s work input.
In three of the four main chapters of this dissertation, I follow this new “behavioral”
approach and investigate contractual situations by allowing for biased consumers or
employees to provide possible explanations for observed contractual arrangements that
are puzzling from the perspective of standard orthodox economics.
1Classic contributions who investigate this question are Holmstro¨m (1979, 1982), Shavell (1979),
Gjesdal (1982), and Grossman and Hart (1983).
2One of the first papers that formally analyzes more sophisticated pricing schemes is Oi (1972), who
derives the optimal two-part tariff for a monopolistic seller. A fully nonlinear tariff schedule is
derived by Mussa and Rosen (1978).
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Chapter I, which is based on a joint project with Daniel Mu¨ller and Philipp Wein-
schenk, analyzes the well-known principal-agent problem with hidden actions. In these
models the principal (firm) seeks to contract with an agent (potential employee). If
the agent accepts the contract, he can undertake an action (provide effort) which is
costly to him. The chosen action is unobservable for the principal but stochastically
influences her profit. The principal can make the compensation payment (wage) of
the agent depending on a performance measure which is imperfectly correlated with
the agent’s action choice (for instance the firm’s profit). By making the compensation
payment depending on performance, the principal can motivate the agent to provide
a desired level of effort. By doing so, however, the principal imposes some risk on
the agent since the performance measure is only a noisy signal of the agent’s effort
choice. Since human beings typically dislike to be confronted with risky situations, the
principal faces a tradeoff between providing incentives and optimal risk sharing. With
the tradeoff between incentive provision and risk sharing being at the heart of moral
hazard, allowing for a richer description of the agent’s risk preferences seems a natural
starting point to obtain deeper insights into contracting.
Orthodox economic theory models risk aversion by assuming a strictly concave utility
function. This approach, however, can only inadequately describe the risk preferences of
human beings, see for instance Rabin (2000). In their seminal contribution, Kahneman
and Tversky (1979) expose the prospect theory which is an alternative to describe
risk preferences based on psychological findings. A main module of this theory is
the concept of loss aversion. This concept suggests that a person’s preferences are
determined by changes in outcomes relative to his reference level, and not merely by
absolute levels of outcomes. Moreover, this concept posits that losses loom larger than
gains of equal size. In particular, prospect theory assumes loss aversion even for small
stakes. A “standard” agent is locally risk neutral, i.e., his degree of risk aversion is
only of second order. The drawback of the original prospect theory is that it does not
provide a satisfying approach how to determine a decision maker’s reference point. In
two recent articles, Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) provide a loss-aversion theory where
the reference point is fully determined by the decision maker’s rational expectations
about outcomes. We consider a principal-agent model with moral hazard, framed as
an employer-employee relationship, which is completely standard but for one twist:
the agent is assumed to be loss averse in the sense of Ko˝szegi and Rabin. The main
finding is that a simple (lump-sum) bonus contract is optimal when loss aversion is the
predominant determinant of the agent’s risk preferences. If the employee’s performance
is below a certain threshold he receives only his base wage, whereas for performances
above this threshold he receives the base wage plus a fixed performance independent
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bonus payment. This is in stark contrast to the finding for a “purely” risk averse agent
who is not loss averse and thus exhibits local risk neutrality, which implies that paying
slightly different wages for different signals improves incentives at negligible costs (see
Holmstro¨m, 1979). Thus, standard theory predicts fairly complex performance-based
wage schemes which are rarely observed in practice. Simple bonus contracts, however,
are commonly utilized in practice.3
Chapter II, which is based on a joint paper with Daniel Mu¨ller, investigates the
behavior and in particular the performance of a decision maker who faces self-control
problems. What are self-control problems? Self-control problems in our sense arise from
time-inconsistent preferences. A person’s preferences are time consistent if he feels the
same about a given intertemporal tradeoff no matter when he is asked. A person is time
consistent if and only if he discounts streams of utility over time exponentially, which
is traditionally assumed in economics since this concept was introduced by Samuelson
(1937). The concept of exponential discounting was originally proposed merely for pur-
poses of formal tractability since it compresses all behavioral concerns into one single
parameter. Psychological researches as well as casual observations suggest that the
assumption of exponential discounting and thus time-consistent preferences is prob-
lematically.4 As is familiar probably to everyone, the short term tastes for immediate
gratification (eating a chocolate bar) are inconsistent with our long-run preferences
(subsisting healthier).
To capture these preferences one needs a discount function with declining discount
rates, such preferences are called “hyperbolic discounting”. The first formal model
of such time-variant preferences is Strotz (1955). Now, established in economics is a
tractable two-parameter model that slightly modifies Samuelson’s discounting model.
This model, which was originally introduced by Phelps and Pollak (1968) to study in-
tergenerational altruism, is often referred to as quasi-hyperbolic discounting and cap-
tures the essence of hyperbolic discounting. Seminal contributions who apply this
concept to model decision makers with self-control problems are Laibson (1997, 1998)
and O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b). We also apply this concept of quasi-hyperbolic
discounting to analyze the performance of agents with self-control problems, and in
particular we investigate how interim deadlines can help to improve performance.
Former research has shown that procrastination can be explained by quasi-hyperbolic
discounting, see for instance O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b). We develop a model of
continuous effort choice over time that shifts the focus from completion of to per-
3Bonus contracts are widely used for instance in sales force compensation plans, see Joseph and
Kalwani (1998).
4For a review of the psychological literature on time-inconsistent discounting see Frederick et al.
(2002).
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formance on a single task. Besides showing that procrastination induced by time-
inconsistent preferences in general hampers performance, we mainly ask two questions:
First, does sophistication about the own self-control problems increase performance and
overall well-being? Secondly, do interim deadlines enhance performance? In contrast
to the existing literature on procrastination, we find that being aware of the own self-
control problems can reduce a person’s performance as well as his overall well-being.
With regard to the second question, we show that being exposed to an interim deadline
increases the performance as well as the overall well-being of a hyperbolic discounter,
irrespectively of his awareness of own self-control problems. These findings suggest
that there is also scope for the employer of such an agent to benefit from imposing
interim deadlines. Therefore, Chapter II provides a theoretical underpinning for the
frequent observation of interim deadlines in working environments.
In Chapter III, which presents a non-behavioral model, I analyze the effect of a
larger contract space on firms’ decisions to produce differentiated products. Since
Bertrand’s (1883) article, it is well-known that if firms produce homogeneous products
price competition leads to prices equal to marginal costs. Thus, if firms produce with
the same constant returns to scale technology, in the Bertrand equilibrium all firms
make a zero profit. This finding, which is also known as the Bertrand-Paradox, does
not seem to fit to the vast majority of industries. Since typically firms engage in price
and not in quantity competition a` la Cournot (1838) many economists augmented the
Bertrand model to allow for product differentiation.5
If firms produce differentiated products, price competition is softened which in turn
increases industry profits. The theories of product differentiation can roughly be sub-
divided into two categories: horizontal and vertical differentiation. For horizontally
differentiated products, consumers have different ordinal rankings over the products.
Thus, if there are two products, say A and B, which are priced equally, then some
consumers purchase product A while others purchase product B.6 If products are ver-
tically differentiated, all consumers have the same ordinal ranking over these products.
The best example for a vertical product feature is quality. If all products have the
same price, each consumer purchases the good with the highest quality.
In a classic contribution on vertical differentiation, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979)
show that price competition is relaxed if firms produce different qualities. The qualities
the firms produce are fixed exogenously in their model. Shaked and Sutton (1982)
extend the Gabszewicz-Thisse model by endogenizing quality levels. The main result
5Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) show that if firms first choose capacities and than compete in prices,
under mild assumptions about demand, the unique equilibrium outcome is the Cournot outcome.
6The linear city model of Hotelling (1929) is probably the most frequently applied model for hori-
zontally differentiated products in industrial organization.
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is that in equilibrium of a two-stage game, where firms first choose quality levels and
afterwards compete in prices, firms produce distinct qualities and thereby relax price
competition. The fact that firms can relax competition via quality differentiation is
possible due to heterogeneity of consumers with regard to their tastes for quality. All
consumers prefer a higher quality, however, the willingness to pay for an improved
quality differs across consumers. Thus, by selecting different qualities at the first stage
the firms attract different types of consumers at the second stage which in turn relaxes
competition.
In contrast to these earlier findings, Chapter III shows that firms may have incentives
for quality differentiation even when consumers do not differ in their tastes for quality
but differ in their preferences for quantity. It is shown that quality differentiation can
relax competition when firms can offer two-part tariffs. If firms are restricted to linear
pricing, however, quality differentiation does not relax competition. The intuition is
that selecting different qualities may facilitate market segmentation in which different
classes of consumers are also served different quantities. Without quality differentiation
the firms produce perfect substitutes and thus compete in a Bertrand fashion. Thus,
the novel contribution of this chapter to the theory of product differentiation is to
identify differences in consumers’ preferences for quantity as a reason for strategic
quality differentiation by firms.
Chapter IV investigates the widespread use of flat-rate tariffs. With a flat-rate tariff
a consumer pays a fixed amount which is independent of his usage, the basic fee, to
obtain unlimited access to a good or service. Nowadays, flat-rate contracts are common
in many industries, e.g., telephone services, Internet access, car rental, car leasing, DVD
rental, amusement parks, health clubs, and so on. Besides these examples that come
immediately in one’s mind, all-you-can-eat buffets, flat-rate parties, and a season ticket
for a sports team are examples for flat-rate contracts.
The fact that flat-rate tariffs are such favorable pricing schemes is hard to reconcile
with orthodox economic theory, in particular for industries where marginal costs are
non-negligible. If marginal costs are positive, a marginal payment of zero leads to
an inefficiently high level of consumption which hardly can be optimal. Usage-based
pricing, however, may cause positive transaction costs for measuring the actual usage
of a consumer. In many of the examples provided above marginal costs of production
or service provision are positive but transaction costs for measuring usage are close to
zero. For instance, the price for a rental car typically is fixed per day and does not
depend on the mileage. The costs for the rental car company are clearly higher if the
car is used more heavily, due to for instance a higher wear of the tires. To ascertain
how many miles a customer drove with the car is relatively easy and not very costly
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for the company. Is there any other reason, maybe outside standard economics, that
can explain the prevalence of flat-rate contracts?
There is evidence that people like the idea of paying one fee for unlimited access.7
A common phenomenon among those consumers who prefer unlimited access is the
tendency to pay a fixed fee that costs more than measured service would have cost,
given their demonstrated demand. Put differently, consumers facing the choice between
several tariffs often do not select the optimal one given their consumption patterns.
In particular, consumers often prefer a flat-rate tariff even though they would save
money with a measured tariff. Train (1991) referred to this phenomenon as “flat-rate
bias”. Evidence for tariff-choice biases and in particular for the flat-rate bias was first
documented for U.S. households among telephone service options. Notable works on
this topic are Train et al. (1987), Hobson and Spady (1988), and Train et al. (1989).
Already these papers point out, that consumers are uncertain about their demand when
selecting a tariff and that they choose tariffs on the basis of the“insurance”provided by
these contracts. Thus, the flat-rate bias is a consequence of customers’ risk preferences
in the face of uncertain consumption patterns. Since variations in the monthly billing
rates are small compared to a consumer’s income, standard risk aversion cannot capture
this insurance motive.
Therefore, to capture first-order risk aversion I posit that consumers are loss averse.
A loss averse consumer dislikes even small deviations from his reference point. In my
model, the consumer’s demand is uncertain when he selects a tariff. I assume that a
consumer forms rational expectations about his invoice, which determine his reference
point. The consumer feels a loss if his actual invoice amount is above his reference
point, and he feels a gain if it is below his reference point. I follow Ko˝szegi and Rabin
(2006, 2007) in assuming that the reference point is a full distribution of the possible
billing rates. I show that a consumer with these preferences is biased in favor of flat-
rate tariffs, since flat rates insure against the risk of losses in periods of greater than
average usage.
Because observed tariffs are the result of strategic interactions of firms and con-
sumers, I set an oligopoly model up where firms compete for loss averse consumers.
Moreover, I allow for consumer heterogeneity with respect to their degree of loss aver-
sion. The timing is as follows: (i) Firms offer a menu of two-part tariffs to consumers;
(ii) Each consumer selects either one tariff or none; (iii) The consumer observes the
realization of the state of the world which determines his preferences for the good and
chooses a demanded quantity. I analyze the symmetric information case in which firms
observe a consumer’s degree of loss aversion, as well as the asymmetric information
7Cf. Lambrecht and Skiera 2006.
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case in which the degree of loss aversion is private information. In the benchmark case
of symmetric information, in equilibrium firms offer a flat-rate tariff to those consumers
whose degree of loss aversion compared to marginal costs exceeds a certain threshold.
Consumers with a lower degree of loss aversion are assigned to a metered tariff, i.e., a
two-part tariff with a strictly positive unit price. These findings turn out to carry over
likewise to the asymmetric information case.
Before moving to the main part of this dissertation, a few words to the use of the
first person plural in the following chapters may be in order. Chapter I and Chapter
II have been developed in collaboration with other PhD students. The use of the
plural in Chapter IV is due to the advice by Thomson (1999) to use this form even
for single-authored articles in economics. Unfortunately, while I was writing my first
paper, which is contained in Chapter III, I was unaware of Thomson’s guidelines.
The next four chapters are each devised as independent self-contained units. More-
over, for notational convenience, the number of the chapter is often suppressed when
referring to a proposition, lemma, or corollary. For instance, if it is referred to Propo-
sition 2 in Chapter III, then it is meant Proposition III.2.
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I. The Optimality of Simple
Contracts: Moral Hazard and
Loss Aversion
This chapter extends the standard principal-agent model with
moral hazard to allow for agents having reference-dependent pref-
erences according to Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). When loss
aversion is the predominant determinant of the agent’s risk pref-
erences, the principal optimally offers a simple bonus contract,
i.e., when the agent’s performance exceeds a certain threshold,
he receives a fixed bonus payment. Also when risk aversion be-
comes more important, the optimal contract displays less com-
plexity than predicted by orthodox theory. Thus, loss aversion
introduces an endogenous complexity cost into contracting.
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1. Introduction
The recent literature provides very strong evidence that contractual forms have large effects
on behavior. As the notion that “incentive matters” is one of the central tenets of economists
of every persuasion, this should be comforting to the community. On the other hand, it raises
an old puzzle: if contractual form matters so much, why do we observe such a prevalence of
fairly simple contracts?
— Bernard Salanie´ (2003)
A lump-sum bonus contract, with the bonus being a payment for achieving a certain
level of performance, is probably the most simple incentive scheme for employees one
can think of. According to Steenburgh (2008), salesforce compensation plans provide
incentives mainly via a lump-sum bonus for meeting or exceeding the annual sales
quota.1 Simple contracts are commonly found not only in labor contexts but also in
insurance markets. A prevalent form of insurance contracts is a straight-deductible
contract, widely used, for example, in automobile insurance. The observed plainness of
contractual arrangements, however, is at odds with predictions made by economic the-
ory, as nicely stated in the above quote by Salanie´. While Prendergast (1999) already
referred to the discrepancy between theoretically predicted and actually observed con-
tractual form, over time this question was raised again and again, recently by Lazear
and Oyer (2007), and the answer still is not fully understood.2
Beside this gap between theoretical prediction and observed practice, both theoretical
as well as empirical studies demonstrate that these simple contractual arrangements
create incentives for misbehavior of the agent that is outside the scope of most standard
models. As Oyer (1998) points out, facing an annual sales quota provides incentives for
salespeople to manipulate prices and timing of business to maximize their own income
rather than firms’ profits. For insurance markets, Dionne and Gagne´ (2001) show
that “deductible contracts can introduce perverse effects when falsification behavior is
1Incentives for salespeople in the food manufacturing industry often are solely created by a lump-sum
bonus, see Oyer (2000). Moreover, in his book about designing effective sales compensation plans,
Moynahan (1980) argues that for a wide range of industries lump-sum bonus contracts are optimal.
For a survey on salesforce compensation plans see Joseph and Kalwani (1998).
2For evidence on deductibles in the automobile insurance, see Puelz and Snow (1994) or Chiappori et
al. (2006). As was shown by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), the use of deductibles can theoretically
be explained if the insurance market is subject to adverse selection. Besides adverse selection,
however, moral hazard plays an important role in automobile insurance. Deductibles were found
to be optimal under moral hazard by Holmstro¨m (1979) if the insured person’s action influences
only the probability of an accident but not its severity. As pointed out by Winter (2000), however,
“[d]riving a car more slowly and carefully reduces both the probability of an accident and the
likely costs of an accident should it occur.” Thus, existing theories cannot explain the prevalence
of deductibles in these markets.
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potentially present”.3 These observations raise “the interesting question of why these
[...] contracts are so prevalent. [...] It appears that there must be some benefit of these
contracts that outweighs these apparent costs” (Lazear and Oyer, 2007).
To give one possible explanation for the widespread use of these contractual ar-
rangements, we consider a principal-agent model with moral hazard, framed as an
employer-employee relationship, which is completely standard but for one twist: the
agent is assumed to be loss averse in the sense of Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007).
With the tradeoff between incentive provision and risk sharing being at the heart of
moral hazard, allowing for a richer description of the agent’s risk preferences that goes
beyond standard risk aversion seems a natural starting point to gain deeper insights
into contract design. Our main finding is that a simple (lump-sum) bonus scheme is
optimal when loss aversion is the driving force of the agent’s risk preferences.4 This is in
stark contrast to the findings for a standard risk-averse agent. An agent who is risk but
not loss averse exhibits local risk neutrality, which implies that paying slightly different
wages for different signals improves incentives at negligible cost. A loss-averse agent,
on the other hand, is first-order risk averse. Since losses loom larger than equally-sized
gains, in expectations the agent suffers from deviations from his reference point. With
the reference point being multidimensional under the concept of Ko˝szegi and Rabin,
the agent is first-order risk averse at all possible wage levels. In consequence, paying
even slightly different wages reduces the agent’s expected utility, for which in turn he
demands to be compensated. Thus, by offering a simple contract, that specifies only
few different wage levels, the principal can lower the expected payment necessary to
compensate the agent for the induced losses.
We present our model of a principal-agency that is subject to moral hazard in Sec-
tion 2. The principal, who is both risk and loss neutral, does not observe the agent’s
effort directly. Instead, she observes a measure of performance that is correlated with
the agent’s effort decision. Following Ko˝szegi and Rabin, we posit that a decision
maker – next to intrinsic consumption utility from an outcome – also derives gain-loss
utility from comparing the actual outcome with his rational expectations about out-
comes. More precisely, the sensation of gains and losses is derived by comparing a
given outcome to all possible outcomes. To illustrate this point, consider an employee
who receives a wage of $5000 for good performance, a wage of $4400 for mediocre per-
formance, and a wage of $4000 for bad performance. If the employee’s performance
3For evidence on fraudulent claims being a major problem in the car insurance market see Caron
and Dionne (1997), who estimated the cost of fraud in the Que´bec automobile insurance market in
1994 at $100 million, just under 10% of total claims. For an estimation of the costs of fraudulent
claims in the United States, see Foppert (1994).
4In the following, we will use the terms bonus contract and bonus scheme interchangeably to refer to
a contract that specifies exactly two distinct wage payments, a base wage and a lump-sum bonus.
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is mediocre, this generates mixed feelings, a loss of $600 and a gain of $400.5 The
key feature of the Ko˝szegi-Rabin model is that expectations matter in determining the
reference point.6 While mainly based on findings in the psychological literature,7 evi-
dence for this assumption is provided also by two recent contributions to the economic
literature. In a real-effort experiment, Abeler et al. (2009) find strong evidence for
individuals taking their expectations as a reference point, rather than the status quo.8
Similarly, analyzing decision making in a large-stake game show, Post et al. (2008)
come to the conclusion that observed behavior “is consistent with the idea that the
reference point is based on expectations.” Regarding applications, the Ko˝szegi-Rabin
concept is used by Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2005, 2008a) to introduce consumer loss
aversion into otherwise standard models of industrial organization. While the former
paper explains why monopoly prices react less sensitive to cost shocks than predicted
by orthodox theory, the latter provides an answer to the question why non-identical
competitors charge identical prices for differentiated products.
As a benchmark, in Section 3 we reconsider the case of a purely risk-averse agent:
Under the optimal contract, signals that are more indicative of higher effort are re-
warded strictly higher, thereby giving rise to a strictly increasing wage profile. We
then turn to the analysis of a purely loss-averse agent who does not exhibit risk aver-
sion in the usual sense. After providing sufficient conditions for the first-order approach
to be valid, we establish our main result: when the agent is loss averse, it is optimal
to offer a bonus contract. No matter how rich the set of possible realizations of the
performance measure, the optimal contract comprises of only two different wage pay-
ments. We already touched on the intuition underlying this finding: With the agent’s
action being unobservable, the necessity to create incentives makes it impossible for
the principal to bear the complete risk. With losses looming larger than equally sized
gains, this ex ante imposes an expected net loss on the agent, which equals the sum over
the ex ante expected wage differences weighted by the product of the corresponding
probabilities. To illustrate, let us return to the example introduced above. Suppose
the agent expects to perform well, moderately, or poorly with probability pG, pM and
pB, respectively. Then, ex ante, the agent expects a wage difference – or net loss –
of $600 with probability pMpG, a net loss of $400 with probability pBpM , and a net
loss of $1000 with probability pBpG. The agent demands to be compensated for his
5For at least suggestive evidence on mixed feelings, see Larsen et al. (2004).
6The feature that the reference point is determined by the decision maker’s forward-looking expec-
tations is shared with the disappointment aversion models of Bell (1985), Loomes and Sugden
(1986), and Gul (1991).
7For instance, Mellers et al. (1999) and Breiter et al. (2001) document that both the actual outcome
and unattained possible outcomes affect subjects’ satisfaction with their payoff.
8The status quo was most often assumed as reference point in the wake of Kahneman and Tversky’s
(1979) original formulation of prospect theory.
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overall expected net loss, which the principal therefore seeks to minimize. Consider, for
the sake of argument, a principal who wants to strengthen incentives to provide effort,
starting out from a not fully differentiated wage scheme. There are two ways to do so.
First, the principal can introduce a new wage spread, i.e., pay slightly different wages
for two signals that were rewarded equally in the original wage scheme, while keeping
the differences between all other neighboring wages constant. Secondly, the principal
can increase an existing wage spread, holding constant all other spreads between neigh-
boring wages. Both procedures increase the overall expected net loss by increasing the
size of some of the expected losses without reducing others. Introducing a new wage
spread, however, additionally increases the overall expected net loss by increasing the
ex ante expected probability of experiencing a loss. Therefore, in order to improve
incentives, it is advantageous to increase an existing wage spread without adding to
the contractual complexity in the sense of increasing the number of different wages. In
this sense, reference-dependent preferences according to Ko˝szegi and Rabin introduce
an endogenous complexity cost into contracting based on psychological foundations.
Thereafter, we establish several properties displayed by the optimal contract. Let a
signal that is the more likely to be observed the higher the agent’s effort be referred to
as a good signal. We find that the subset of signals that are rewarded with the high
wage contains either only good signals, or all good signals and possibly a few bad signals
as well.9 When abstracting from integer-programming problems, it is optimal for the
principal to order the signals according to their relative informativeness (likelihood
ratio), i.e., the agent receives the high wage for all signals that are more indicative of
high effort than a cutoff signal. Last, we show that an increase in the agent’s degree of
loss aversion may allow the principal to use a lower-powered incentive scheme in order
to implement a desired level of effort. The reason is that a higher degree of loss aversion
may be associated with a stronger incentive for the agent to choose a high effort in
order to reduce the probability of incuring a loss. The overall cost of implementation,
however, increases in the agent’s degree of loss aversion.
In the last part of Section 3, we analyze the general case in which the agent is both
risk and loss averse. It is shown that our results are robust towards a small degree of
risk aversion. Moreover, we give a heuristic reasoning why a reduction in the complexity
of the contract is also to be expected to be optimal for a non-negligible degree of risk
aversion, and confirm our conjecture by means of a numerical example.10
9The theoretical prediction that inferior performance may also well be rewarded with a bonus is
in line with both Joseph and Kalwani (1998)’s suggestion that organizations tend to view the
payment of a bonus as a reward for good or even acceptable performance rather than an award for
exceptional performance, and Churchill et al. (1993)’s prescription that bonuses should be based
on objectives that can be achieved with reasonable rather than Herculean efforts.
10This finding also relates to the observation that, within a firm, pay for individuals often seems to
be less variable than productivity, as recently surveyed by Lazear and Shaw (2007). Our model
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Returning to the case of a purely loss-averse agent, in Section 4 we relax the assump-
tions that guaranteed validity of the first-order approach. Here, to keep the analysis
tractable, we focus on binary measures of performances. If the agent’s degree of loss
aversion is sufficiently high and if the performance measure is sufficiently informative,
then only extreme actions – work as hard as possible or do not work at all – are incen-
tive compatible. Put differently, the principal may face severe problems in fine-tuning
the agent’s incentives. These implementation problems, however, can be remedied if
the principal can commit herself to stochastically ignoring the low realization of the
performance measure, i.e., by turning a blind eye from time to time. Besides alleviating
implementation problems, turning a blind eye may also lower the cost of implementing
a certain action. Thus, the sufficiency part of Blackwell’s theorem does not hold when
the agent has reference-dependent preferences.
After briefly summarizing our main findings, Section 5 concludes by discussing ro-
bustness of our results with respect to imposed assumptions. All proofs are given in
the appendix.
Related Literature Before presenting our model, we relate our paper to the small
but steadily growing literature that analyzes the implications of loss aversion on incen-
tive design.11 With reference-dependent preferences being at the heart of loss aversion
on the one hand, but with no unifying approach provided how to determine a decision
maker’s reference point on the other hand, it is little surprising that all contributions
differ in this particular aspect. While Dittmann et al. (2007) posit that the reference
income is exogenously given by the previous year’s fixed wage, Iantchev (2005), who
considers a market environment with multiple principals competing for the services
of multiple agents, applies the concept of Rayo and Becker (2007). Here, an agent’s
reference point is endogenously determined by the equilibrium conditions in the mar-
ket. When focusing on a particular principal-agent pair, however, both the principal
and the agent take the reference point as exogenously given. An exogenous reference
point does not always seem plausible. Starting out from the premise that the reference
point is forward looking and depends on the distributions of outcomes, as suggested
suggests an alternative explanation for this pay compression outside the realms of inequity aversion,
tournament theory, and influence activities.
11Beside loss aversion there are other behavioral biases that are incorporated into contracting problems
with moral hazard. Non-standard risk preferences in a moral hazard framework are analyzed by
Schmidt (1999), who applies Yaari’s (1987) concept of dual expected utility theory. Englmaier
and Wambach (2006) characterize the optimal contract for the case of an inequity-averse agent in
the sense of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). A multi-agent contracting problem in which agents care
about their own status is investigated by Besley and Ghatak (2008) in a static context, and by
Auriol and Renault (2008) in a dynamic setting. By introducing worker overconfidence into a
multi-agent moral-hazard problem, Fang and Moscarini (2005) show that it can be optimal not to
screen workers according to their skills. For a review of behavioral economics of organizations see
Camerer and Malmendier (2007).
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by ample evidence, De Meza and Webb (2007) consider both exogenous as well as
endogenous formulations of the reference point. Concluding that the disappointment
concept of Gul (1991), which equates the reference point with the certainty equivalent
of the income distribution, does yield some questionable implications,12 De Meza and
Webb propose that the reference income is the median income, which captures the idea
that the agent incurs a loss at all incomes for which it is odds-on that a higher income
would be drawn. Taking median income as reference income, however, suffers from the
drawback that it is discontinuous in the underlying probability distribution.13
All of the aforementioned contributions explore questions of both empirical impor-
tance as well as theoretical interest: Dittmann et al. (2007) find that a loss aversion
model dominates an equivalent risk aversion model in explaining observed CEO com-
pensation contracts if the reference point is equal to the previous year’s fixed wage.
Iantchev (2005) finds evidence for his theoretically predicted results in panel data from
Safelite Glass Corporation. Last, by explaining why bonuses are paid for good perfor-
mance rather than penalties for poor performance, De Meza and Webb (2007) provide a
theoretical underpinning for the frequent usage of option-like incentive schemes in CEO
compensation. The contractual form predicted by these papers, however, is rather com-
plex: while the optimal contract typically displays a range where pay is independent of
performance, for performance above this range payment varies with performance in a
fairly complex way, depending crucially on the underlying distribution of signals. The-
oretical predictions differ in whether or not the optimal contract includes punishment
for very poor performance or where in the wage schedule the optimal contract features
discontinuities. Thus, none of these papers provides a rationale for the prevalence of
fairly simple contracts, bonus contracts in particular.14
To the best of our knowledge, Daido and Itoh (2007) is the only paper that also
applies the concept of reference dependence a` la Ko˝szegi and Rabin to a principal-agent
setting. The focus of Daido and Itoh, however, greatly differs from ours. Assuming
that the performance measure comprises of only two signals, two types of self-fulfilling
prophecy are explained, the Galatea and the Pygmalion effects.15 While sufficient to
12De Meza and Webb consider two otherwise identical agents who differ only in their degree of loss
aversion. They point out that with the certainty equivalent as reference point, there are situations
where the less loss-averse agent experiences a loss, but the more loss-averse agent does not.
13For example, suppose that with a probability of .51 a manager earns $1m and with a probability
of .49 he earns $2m. With median income as reference point the manager will never suffer a loss
because his reference income is $1m. A small shift in probabilities, however, makes the median
income equal to $2m. Now, the agent suffers a loss in almost 50% of all cases.
14De Meza and Webb (2007) find conditions under which a simple bonus contract is optimal. For this
to be the case, however, they assume that the reference point is exogenously given and that all
wage payments are in the loss region, where the agent is assumed to be risk loving.
15Roughly speaking, the former effect refers to empirical findings that an agent’s self-expectation
about his performance is an important determinant of his actual performance, whereas the latter
effect refers to the phenomenon that a principal’s expectation about the agent’s performance has
an impact on the agent’s actual performance.
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capture these two effects, the assumption of a binary measure of performance does not
allow one to inquire into the form that contracts take under moral hazard.
2. The Model
There are two parties, a principal and an agent.16 The principal offers a one-period
employment contract to the agent, who has an outside employment opportunity (or
reservation utility) yielding expected utility u¯. If the agent accepts the contract, then
he chooses an effort level a ∈ A ≡ [0, 1]. The agent’s action a equals the probability
that the principal receives a benefit B > 0. The principal’s expected net benefit is
pi = aB − E[W ] ,
whereW is the compensation payment the principal pays to the agent.17 The principal
is assumed to be risk and loss neutral, thus she maximizes pi. We wish to inquire into
the form that contracts take under moral hazard and loss aversion. Therefore, we focus
on the cost minimization problem to implement a certain action aˆ ∈ (0, 1).18
The action choice a ∈ A is private information of the agent and unobservable for
the principal. Furthermore, the realization of B is not directly observable. A possible
interpretation is that B corresponds to a complex good whose quality cannot be deter-
mined by a court, thus a contract cannot depend on the realization of B. Instead the
principal observes a contractible measure of performance, γˆ, with s ∈ S ≡ {1, . . . , S}
being the realization of the performance measure, also referred to as signal. Let S ≥ 2.
The probability of observing signal s conditional on B being realized is denoted by γHs .
Accordingly, γLs is the probability of observing signal s conditional on B not being re-
alized. Hence, the unconditional probability of observing signal s for a given action a is
γs(a) ≡ aγ
H
s +(1−a)γ
L
s . For technical convenience, we make the following assumption.
Assumption (A1): For all s, τ ∈ S with s 6= τ ,
(i) γHs /γ
L
s 6= 1 (informative signals),
(ii) γHs , γ
L
s ∈ (0, 1) (full support),
(iii) γHs /γ
L
s 6= γ
H
τ /γ
L
τ (different signals).
Assumption (i) guarantees that any signal s is either a good or a bad signal, in the
16The framework is based on MacLeod (2003), who analyzes subjective performance measures without
considering loss-averse agents.
17The particular functional form of the principal’s profit function is not crucial for our analysis. We
assume this specific structure since it allows for a straight-forward interpretation of the performance
measure.
18The second-best action maximizes the principal’s expected benefit, aB, minus the minimum cost
of implementing action a. The overall optimal contract exhibits the same characteristics as the
contract that minimizes the cost of implementing an arbitrary action aˆ.
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sense that the overall probability of observing that signal unambiguously increases
or decreases in a. Part (ii) ensures that for all a ∈ A, all signals occur with positive
probability. Last, with assumption (iii) signals can unambiguously be ranked according
to the relative impact of an increase in effort on the probability of observing a particular
signal.19
The contract which the principal offers to the agent consists of a payment for each
realization of the performance measure, {ws}
S
s=1 ∈ R
S.20
The agent is assumed to have reference-dependent preferences in the sense of Ko˝szegi
and Rabin (2006): Overall utility from consuming x = (x1, . . . , xK) ∈ R
K – when
having reference level r = (r1, . . . , rK) ∈ R
K for each dimension of consumption – is
given by
v(x|r) ≡
K∑
k=1
mk(xk) +
K∑
k=1
µ(mk(xk)−mk(rk)).
Put verbally, overall utility is assumed to have two components: consumption utility
and gain-loss utility. Consumption utility, also called intrinsic utility, from consuming
in dimension k is denoted by mk(xk). How a person feels about gaining or losing in
a dimension is assumed to depend in a universal way on the changes in consumption
utility associated with such gains and losses. The universal gain-loss function µ(·)
satisfies the assumptions imposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1991) on their “value
function”.21 In our model, the agent’s consumption space comprises of two dimensions,
money income (x1 = W ) and effort (x2 = a).
22 The agent’s intrinsic utility for money
is assumed to be a strictly increasing, (weakly) concave, and unbounded function.
Formally, m1(W ) = u(W ) with u
′(·) > ε > 0, u′′(·) ≤ 0. The intrinsic disutility
from exerting effort a ∈ [0, 1] is a strictly increasing, strictly convex function of effort,
m2(a) = −c(a) with c
′(0) = 0, c′(a) > 0 for a > 0, c′′(·) > 0, and lima→1 c(a) =∞. We
assume that the gain-loss function is piece-wise linear,
µ(m) =
{
m , for m ≥ 0
λm, for m < 0
.
The parameter λ characterizes the weight put on losses relative to gains.23 The weight
19Formally, for all a ∈ [0, 1], (γHs − γ
L
s )/γs(a) > (γ
H
τ − γ
L
τ )/γτ (a) ⇐⇒ γ
H
s /γ
L
s > γ
H
τ /γ
L
τ .
20Restricting the principal to offer non-stochastic wage payments is standard in the principal-agent
literature and also in accordance with observed practice. In a later section we comment on this
assumption.
21Roughly speaking, µ(z) is strictly increasing, continuous for all z, twice differentiable for all z 6= 0
with µ(0) = 0, convex over the range of losses, and concave over the range of gains. For a more
formal statement of these properties, see Bowman et al. (1999).
22We implicitly assume that the agent is a “narrow bracketer” in the sense that he ignores that the
risk from the current employment relationship is incorporated with substantial other risk.
23Alternatively, one could assume that µ(m) = ηm for gains and µ(m) = ηλm for losses, where
η ≥ 0 can be interpreted as the weight attached to gain-loss utility relative to intrinsic utility.
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on gains is normalized to one. When λ > 1, the agent is loss averse in the sense that
losses loom larger than equally-sized gains.24
Following Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007), the agent’s reference point is determined
by his rational expectations about outcomes. A given outcome is then evaluated by
comparing it to all possible outcomes, where each comparison is weighted with the ex-
ante probability with which the alternative outcome occurs. With the actual outcome
being itself uncertain, the agent’s ex ante expected utility is obtained by averaging
over all these comparisons.25 We apply the concept of choice-acclimating personal
equilibrium (CPE) as defined in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007), which assumes that a
person correctly predicts his choice set, the environment he faces, in particular the
set of possible outcomes and how the distribution of these outcomes depends on his
decisions, and his own reaction to this environment. The eponymous feature of CPE
is that the agent’s reference point is affected by his choice of action. As pointed out by
Ko˝szegi and Rabin, CPE refers to the analysis of risk preferences regarding outcomes
that are resolved long after all decisions are made. This environment seems well-
suited for many principal-agent relationships: Often the outcome of a project becomes
observable, and thus performance-based wage compensation feasible, long after the
agent finished working on that project. Under CPE, the expectations relative to which
a decision’s outcome is evaluated are formed at the moment the decision is made and,
therefore, incorporate the implications of the decision. More precisely, suppose the
agent chooses action a and that signal s is observed. The agent receives wage ws and
incurs effort cost c(a). While the agent expected signal s to come up with probability
γs(a), with probability γτ (a) he expected signal τ 6= s to be observed. If wτ > ws, the
agent experiences a loss of λ(u(ws)−u(wτ )), whereas if wτ < ws, the agent experiences
a gain of u(ws)−u(wτ ). If ws = wτ , there is no sensation of gaining or losing involved.
Our implicit normalization η = 1 is without loss of generality due to the applied concept of choice-
acclimating personal equilibrium (CPE). Carrying η through the whole analysis would only replace
(λ− 1) by η(λ− 1) in all formulas.
24The assumption of a piece-wise linear gain-loss function is not uncommon in the literature on
incentive design with loss-averse agents, see De Meza and Webb (2007), Daido and Itoh (2007).
In their work on asset pricing, Barberis et al. (2001) also apply this particular functional form,
reasoning that“curvature is most relevant when choosing between prospects that involve only gains
or between prospects that involve only losses. For gambles that can lead to both gains and losses,
[...] loss aversion at the kink is far more important than the degree of curvature away from the
kink.”
25Suppose the actual outcome x and the vector of reference levels r are distributed according to
distribution functions F andG, respectively. As introduced above, overall utility from two arbitrary
vectors x and r is given by v(x|r). With the reference point being distributed according to
probability measure G, the utility from a certain outcome is the average of how this outcome feels
compared to all other possible outcomes, U(x|G) =
∫
v(x|r) dG(r). Last, with x being drawn
according to probability measure F , utility is given by E[U(F |G)] =
s
v(x|r) dG(r)dF (x). Since
we use choice acclimating personal equilibrium, F = G.
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The agent’s utility from this particular outcome is given by
u(ws) +
∑
{τ |wτ<ws}
γτ (a)(u(ws)− u(wτ )) +
∑
{τ |wτ≥ws}
γτ (a)λ(u(ws)− u(wτ ))− c(a).
Averaging over all possible outcomes yields the agent’s expected utility from choosing
action a:
E[U(a)] =
S∑
s=1
γs(a)
{
u(ws) +
∑
{τ |wτ<ws}
γτ (a)(u(ws)− u(wτ ))
+
∑
{τ |wτ≥ws}
γτ (a)λ(u(ws)− u(wτ ))
}
− c(a).
Note that since the agent’s expected and actual effort choice coincide, there is neither
a gain nor a loss in the effort dimension.
We conclude this section by briefly summarizing the underlying timing.
1) The principal makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the agent.
2) The agent either accepts or rejects the contract. If the agent rejects the game
ends and each party receives her/his reservation payoff. If the agent accepts the
game moves to the next stage.
3) The agent chooses his action and forms rational expectations about the mone-
tary outcomes. The agent’s rational expectations about the realization of the
performance measure determine his reference point.
4) Both parties observe the realization of the performance measure and payments
are made according to the contract.
3. The Analysis
Let the inverse function of the agent’s intrinsic utility of money be h(·), i.e., h(·) :=
u−1(·). Thus, the monetary cost for the principal to offer the agent utility us is h(us) =
ws. Due to the assumptions imposed on u(·), h(·) is a strictly increasing and weakly
convex function. Following Grossman and Hart (1983), we regard u = {u1, . . . , uS} as
the principal’s control variables in her cost minimization problem to implement action
aˆ ∈ (0, 1). The principal offers the agent a contract that specifies for each signal a
monetary payment or, equivalently, an intrinsic utility level. With this notation, the
agent’s expected utility from exerting effort a is given by
E[U(a)] =
∑
s∈S
γs(a)us − (λ− 1)
∑
s∈S
∑
{τ |uτ>us}
γτ (a)γs(a)(uτ − us)− c(a). (I.1)
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For λ = 1 the agent’s expected utility equals expected net intrinsic utility. Thus, for
λ = 1 we are in the standard case without loss aversion. Moreover, from the above
formulation of the agent’s utility it becomes clear that λ captures not only the weight
put on losses relative to gains, but (λ−1) also characterizes the weight put on gain-loss
utility relative to intrinsic utility. Thus, for λ ≤ 2, the weight attached to gain-loss
utility is below the weight attached to intrinsic utility. For a given contract u, the
agent’s marginal utility of effort
E[U ′(a)] =
∑
s∈S
(γHs − γ
L
s )us
− (λ− 1)
∑
s∈S
∑
{τ |uτ>us}
[γτ (a)(γ
H
s − γ
L
s ) + γs(a)(γ
H
τ − γ
L
τ )](uτ − us)− c
′(a). (I.2)
Suppose the principal wants to implement action aˆ ∈ (0, 1). The optimal contract
minimizes the expected wage payment to the agent subject to the usual incentive
compatibility and individual rationality constraints:
min
u1,...,uS
∑
s∈S
γs(aˆ)h(us)
subject to E[U(aˆ)] ≥ u¯ , (IR)
aˆ ∈ argmax
a∈A
E[U(a)] . (IC)
As a first benchmark, consider the case where the agent’s action choice is observable
and contractible, i.e., the incentive constraint (IC) is absent. In order to implement
action aˆ in this first-best situation, the principal pays the agent uFB = u¯ + c(aˆ) irre-
spective of the realization of the performance measure if the agent chooses the desired
action, thereby compensating him for his outside option and his effort cost. In the
presence of moral hazard, on the other hand, the principal faces the classic tradeoff
between risk sharing and providing incentives: When the agent is anything but risk
and loss neutral, it is neither optimal to have the agent bear the complete risk, nor to
fully insure the agent.
At this point we simplify the analysis by imposing two assumptions. These assump-
tions are sufficient to guarantee that the principal’s cost minimization problem exhibits
the following two properties: First, there are incentive-compatible wage contracts, i.e.,
contracts under which it is optimal for the agent to choose the desired action aˆ. Ex-
istence of such contracts is not generally satisfied with the agent being loss averse.
Second, the first-order approach is valid, i.e., the incentive constraint to implement
action aˆ can equivalently be represented as E[U ′(aˆ)] = 0. The first assumption that
we introduce requires that the weight attached to gain-loss utility does not exceed the
weight put on intrinsic utility.
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Assumption (A2): No dominance of gain-loss utility, λ ≤ 2.
As carefully laid out in Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007), CPE implies a strong notion of
risk aversion, in the sense that a decision maker may choose stochastically dominated
options when λ > 2.26 The reason is that, with losses looming larger than gains of equal
size, the person ex ante expects to experience a net loss. In consequence, if reducing
the scope of possibly incuring a loss is the decision maker’s primary concern, the person
would rather give up the slim hope of experiencing a gain at all in order to avoid the
disappointment in case of not experiencing this gain. In our model, if the agent is
sufficiently loss averse, the principal may be unable to implement any action aˆ ∈ (0, 1).
The reason is that the agent minimizes the ex ante expected net loss by choosing one
of the two extreme actions. The values of λ for which this behavior is optimal for the
agent depend on the precise structure of the performance measure. Assumption (A2)
is sufficient, but not necessary, to ensure that there is a contract such that aˆ ∈ (0, 1)
satisfies the necessary condition for incentive compatibility. Moreover, the tendency
to choose stochastically dominated options seems counterintuitive.27 Next to ensuring
existence of an incentive compatible contract, (A2) rules out that our findings are driven
by such counterintuitive behavior of the agent. It is worthwhile to emphasize, that our
main findings (Propositions 2 and 6) still hold for λ > 2 as long as existence and
validity of the first-order approach are guaranteed. In Section 4 we relax Assumption
(A2) and discuss in detail the implications of higher degrees of loss aversion.
To keep the analysis tractable we impose the following assumption.
Assumption (A3): Convex marginal cost function, ∀ a ∈ [0, 1] : c′′′(a) ≥ 0.
Given (A2), Assumption (A3) is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the
first-order approach to be applicable.28 Alternatively, it would also suffice to have λ
sufficiently small, or the slope of the marginal cost function sufficiently steep. In fact,
our results only require the validity of the first-order approach, not that Assumption
(A3) holds. In Section 4 we consider the case in which the first-order approach is
invalid.
26Suppose a loss-averse person has to choose between two lotteries: lottery 1 pays x for sure; lottery
2 pays x+ y with probability p, where y > 0, and x otherwise. Then, for each λ > 2, the decision
maker prefers the dominated lottery 1 if p < (λ− 2)/(λ− 1). For further details on this point, see
Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007).
27The “uncertainty effect” identified by Gneezy et al. (2006) refers to people valuing a risky prospect
less than its worst possible outcome. While this may be interpreted as experimental evidence for
people having preferences for stochastically dominated options, this finding crucially relies on the
lottery currency not being stated in purely monetary terms. Therefore, we believe that in the
context of wage contracts most people do not choose dominated options.
28The validity of the first-order approach under assumptions (A1)-(A3) is rigorously proven in the
appendix. The reader should be aware, however, that the proof requires some notation introduced
later on. We therefore recommend to defer reading the proof until having read the preliminary
considerations up to Section 3.1.
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Lemma I.1: Suppose (A1)-(A3) hold, then the constraint set of the principal’s cost
minimization problem is nonempty for all aˆ ∈ (0, 1).
The above lemma states that there are wage contracts such that the agent is willing
to accept the contract and then chooses the desired action. Moreover, we will show
that a second-best optimal contract exists. This, however, is shown separately for the
three cases analyzed in this section: pure risk aversion, pure loss aversion, and the
intermediate case.
Sometimes it will be convenient to state the constraints in terms of increases in
intrinsic utilities instead of absolute utilities. Note that whatever contract {uˆs}s∈S the
principal offers, we can relabel the signals such that this contract is equivalent to a
contract {us}
S
s=1 with us−1 ≤ us for all s ∈ {2, . . . , S}. This, in turn, allows us to write
the contract as us = u1+
∑s
τ=2 bτ , where bτ = uτ −uτ−1 ≥ 0 is the increase in intrinsic
utility for money when signal τ instead of signal τ −1 is observed. Let b = (b2, . . . , bS).
Using this notation allows us to rewrite the individual rationality constraint as follows:
u1 +
S∑
s=2
bs
[
S∑
τ=s
γτ (aˆ)− ρs(γˆ, λ, aˆ)
]
≥ u¯+ c(aˆ) , (IR′)
where
ρs(γˆ, λ, aˆ) := (λ− 1)
[ S∑
τ=s
γτ (aˆ)
][ s−1∑
t=1
γt(aˆ)
]
.
Let ρ(γˆ, λ, aˆ) = (ρ2(γˆ, λ, aˆ), . . . , ρS(γˆ, λ, aˆ)). The first part of the agent’s utility,
u1 +
∑S
s=2 bs(
∑S
τ=s γτ (aˆ)), is the expected intrinsic utility for money. Due to loss
aversion, however, the agent’s utility has a second negative component, the term
b′ρ(γˆ, λ, aˆ). Where does this term come from? With bonus bs being paid to the
agent whenever a signal higher or equal to s is observed, the agent expects to receive
bs with probability
∑S
τ=s γτ (aˆ). With probability
∑s−1
t=1 γt(aˆ), however, a signal below
s will be observed, and the agent will not be paid bonus bs. Thus, with “probability”
[
∑S
τ=s γτ (aˆ)][
∑s−1
t=1 γt(aˆ)] the agent experiences a loss of λbs. Analogous reasoning im-
plies that the agent will experience a gain of bs with the same probability. With losses
looming larger than gains of equal size, in expectation the agent suffers from devia-
tions from his reference point. This ex ante expected net loss is captured by the term,
b′ρ(γˆ, λ, aˆ), which we will refer to as the agent’s “loss premium”.29 A crucial point is
that the loss premium increases in the complexity of the contract. When there is no
wage differentiation at all, i.e., b = 0, then the loss premium vanishes. If, in contrast,
the contract specifies many different wage payments, then the agent ex ante considers a
29Our notion of the agent’s loss premium is highly related to the average self-distance of a lottery
defined by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2007). Let D(u) be the average self-distance of incentive scheme
u, then [(λ− 1)/2]D(u) = b′ρ(γˆ, λ, aˆ).
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deviation from his reference point very likely. Put differently, for each additional wage
payment an extra negative term enters the agent’s loss premium and therefore reduces
his expected utility.30
Given the first-order approach is valid, the incentive constraint can be rewritten as
S∑
s=2
bsβs(γˆ, λ, aˆ) = c
′(aˆ), (IC′)
where
βs(γˆ, λ, aˆ) :=
(
S∑
τ=s
(γHτ − γ
L
τ )
)
− (λ− 1)
[(
s−1∑
t=1
γt(aˆ)
)(
S∑
τ=s
(γHτ − γ
L
τ )
)
+
(
S∑
τ=s
γτ (aˆ)
)(
s−1∑
t=1
(γHt − γ
L
t )
)]
.
Here, βs(·) is the marginal effect on incentives of an increase in the wage payments
for signals above s − 1. Without loss aversion, i.e., λ = 1, this expression equals
the marginal probability of observing at least signal s. If the agent is loss averse,
on the other hand, an increase in the action also affects the agent’s loss premium.
The probability of bearing a loss of size bs is a quadratic function of the probability of
observing at least signal s. The agent’s action balances the tradeoff between maximizing
intrinsic utility and minimizing the expected net loss. Depending on the precise signal
structure and the action to be implemented, loss aversion may facilitate as well as
hamper the creation of incentives. Let β(γˆ, λ, aˆ) = (β2(γˆ, λ, aˆ), . . . , βS(γˆ, λ, aˆ)).
As in the standard case, incentives are created solely by increases in intrinsic utilities,
b. In consequence, (IR′) is binding in the optimum. If this was not the case, i.e.,
if b satisfies (IC′) but (IR′) holds with strict inequality, then the principal can lower
payment u1 up to the point where the (IR
′) is satisfied with equality. Thus, reducing u1
while holding b constant lowers the principal’s expected wage payment while preserving
incentives.
It is obvious that (IC′) can only be satisfied if there exists at least one βs > 0. If, for
example, signals are ordered according to their likelihood ratios, then βs(·) > 0 for all
s = 2, . . . , S. More precisely, for a given ordering of signals, under (A2) the following
equivalence follows immediately from the fact that
∑s−1
t=1(γ
H
t −γ
L
t ) = −
∑S
τ=s(γ
H
τ −γ
L
τ ):
βs(γˆ, λ, aˆ) > 0 ⇐⇒
S∑
τ=s
(γHτ − γ
L
τ ) > 0 . (I.3)
30While the exact change of the loss premium from adding more and more wage payments is hard
to grasp, this point can heuristically be illustrated by considering the upper bound of the loss
premium. Suppose the principal sets n ≤ S different wages. It is readily verified that the loss
premium is bounded from above by (λ− 1)[(uS − u1)/2]× [(n− 1)/n], and that this upper bound
increases as n increases. Note, however, that even for n→∞ the upper bound of the loss premium
is finite.
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3.1. Two Polar Cases: Pure Risk Aversion vs. Pure Loss Aversion
In this part of the paper we analyze the two polar cases: The standard case where
the agent is only risk averse but not loss averse, on the one hand, and the case of a
loss-averse agent with a risk-neutral intrinsic utility function, on the other hand.
Pure Risk Aversion
First consider an agent who is risk averse in the usual sense, i.e., h′′(·) > 0, but does
not exhibit loss aversion. As discussed earlier, the latter requirement corresponds to
the case where λ = 1. With the agent not being loss averse, the first-order approach is
valid even without Assumption (A3).
Proposition I.1 (Holmstro¨m, 1979): Suppose (A1) holds, h′′(·) > 0, and λ = 1.
Then there exists a second-best optimal contract to implement aˆ ∈ (0, 1). The second-
best contract has the property that us 6= uτ ∀s, τ ∈ S and s 6= τ . Moreover, us > uτ if
and only if γHs /γ
L
s > γ
H
τ /γ
L
τ .
Proposition 1, restates the well-known finding by Holmstro¨m (1979) for discrete
signals: Signals that are more indicative of higher effort, i.e., signals with a higher
likelihood ratio γHs /γ
L
s , are rewarded strictly higher. Thus, the optimal wage scheme
is complex in the sense that it is fully differentiated, with each signal being rewarded
differently.
Pure Loss Aversion
Having considered the polar case of pure risk aversion, we now turn to the other
extreme, a purely loss-averse agent. Formally, intrinsic utility of money is a linear
function, h′′(·) = 0, and the agent is loss averse, λ > 1. As we have already reasoned,
whatever contract the principal offers, relabeling the signals always allows us to repre-
sent this contract as an (at least weakly) increasing intrinsic utility profile. Therefore
we can decompose the principal’s problem into two steps: first, for a given ordering
of signals, choose a nondecreasing profile of intrinsic utility levels that implements the
desired action aˆ at minimum cost; second, choose the signal ordering with the lowest
cost of implementation. As we know from the discussion at the end of the previous sec-
tion, a necessary condition for an upward-sloping incentive scheme to achieve incentive
compatibility is that for the underlying signal ordering at least one βs(·) > 0. In what
follows we restrict attention to the set of signal orderings that are incentive feasible in
the afore-mentioned sense. Nonemptiness of this set follows immediately from Lemma
1.
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Consider the first step of the principal’s problem, i.e., taking the ordering of signals
as given, find the nondecreasing payment scheme with the lowest cost of implemen-
tation. In what follows, we write the agent’s intrinsic utility in terms of additional
payments, us = u1+
∑S
τ=2 bτ . With h(·) being linear, the principal’s objective function
is C(u1, b) = u1 +
∑S
s=2 bs(
∑S
τ=2 γτ (aˆ)). Remember that at the optimum, (IR
′) holds
with equality. Inserting (IR′) into the principal’s objective allows us to write the cost
minimization problem for a given order of signals in the following simple way:
Program ML:
min
b∈RS−1
+
b′ρ(γˆ, λ, aˆ)
subject to b′β(γˆ, λ, aˆ) = c′(aˆ) (IC′)
The minimization problem (ML) has a simple intuition. The principal seeks to minimize
the agent’s expected net loss subject to the incentive compatibility constraint. Similar
to the case of pure risk aversion, where the principal would like to cut back the agent’s
risk premium, here she is interested in minimizing the agent’s loss premium. Due to
the incentive constraint, however, this loss premium has to be strictly positive.
We want to emphasize that solving Program ML also yields insights for the more
general case with a concave intrinsic utility function. Even though the principal’s
objective will not reduce to minimizing the agent’s loss premium alone when intrinsic
utility is non-linear, this nevertheless remains an important aspect of the principal’s
problem. Since the solution to Program ML tells us how to minimize the agent’s loss
premium irrespective of the functional form of intrinsic utility, one should expect its
properties to carry over to some extent to the solution of the more general problem.
The principal’s cost minimization problem for a given order of signals is a simple
linear programming problem: minimize a linear objective function subject to one linear
equality constraint. Since we restricted attention to orderings of signals with βs(·) > 0
for at least one signal s, a solution to (ML) exists. Due to the linear nature of problem
(ML), (generically) this solution sets exactly one bs > 0 and all other bs = 0. Put
differently, the problem is to find that bs which creates incentives at the lowest cost.
So far we have seen that, for a given ordering of signals, the principal considers it
optimal to offer the agent a bonus contract: pay a low wage for signals below some
threshold, and a high wage for signals above this threshold. What remains to do for
the principal, in a second step, is to find the signal ordering that leads to the lowest
cost of implementation. With the number of different orders of signals being finite, this
problem clearly has a solution.
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Before summarizing the above discussion more concisely, we want to relate our finding
to the benchmark case of pure risk neutrality. As is well-known, with both contracting
parties being risk (and loss) neutral a broad range of contracts – including simple
bonus schemes – is optimal. With the agent being loss averse even to a negligible
degree, however, the unique optimal contractual form is a bonus scheme.31
Proposition I.2: Suppose (A1)-(A3) hold, h′′(·) = 0 and λ > 1. Then there exists a
second-best optimal contract to implement action aˆ ∈ (0, 1). Generically, the second-
best optimal incentive scheme {u∗s}
S
s=1 is a bonus contract, i.e., u
∗
s = u
∗
H for s ∈ B
∗ ⊂ S
and u∗s = u
∗
L for s ∈ S \ B
∗, where u∗H > u
∗
L.
According to Proposition 2, the principal considers it optimal to offer the agent a
bonus contract which entails only a minimum degree of wage differentiation in the sense
that, no matter how rich the signal space, the contract specifies only two different wage
payments. This endeavor to reduce the complexity of the contract is plausible, since a
high degree of wage differentiation increases the agent’s loss premium: With the em-
ployment contract she offers to the agent, the principal determines the dimensionality
of the agent’s reference point. The higher the dimensionality of the reference point is,
the more likely it is that the agent incurs a loss in a particular dimension. Therefore,
with the concept of reference-dependent preferences developed by Ko˝szegi and Rabin,
it truly pains a person to be exposed to numerous potential outcomes. This disutility
of the agent from facing several possible (monetary) outcomes, which he demands to
be compensated for, makes it costly for the principal to offer complex contracts. In
consequence, the optimal contract entails only a minimum of wage differentiation. To
provide a more intuitive explanation for this finding, consider a principal who – starting
out from a given wage scheme – has to improve incentives. There are basically two
ways to do so. On the one hand, the principal can introduce a new wage spread, i.e.,
pay slightly different wages for two signals that were rewarded equally in the original
wage scheme, while keeping the differences between all other neighboring wages con-
stant. On the other hand, the principal can increase an existing wage spread, holding
constant all other spreads between neighboring wages. Both procedures increase the
loss premium by increasing the size of some of the the expected losses without reducing
others. Introducing a new wage spread, however, additionally increases the loss pre-
mium by increasing the ex ante expected probability of experiencing a loss. Therefore,
in order to improve incentives for a loss-averse agent, it is advantageous to increase a
31If, in addition to both the principal and the agent being risk neutral, the agent is protected by
limited liability, Park (1995), Kim (1997), Oyer (2000), and Demougin and Fluet (1998) show that
the optimal contract is a bonus scheme. These findings, however, immediately collapse when the
agent is somewhat risk averse as is demonstrated by Jewitt et al. (2008). Our findings, on the
other hand, are robust towards introducing a slightly concave intrinsic utility function, as we will
illustrate in Section 3.2.
Essays in Industrial Organization and Behavioral Economics 27
particular existing wage spread without adding to the contractual complexity in the
sense of increasing the number of different wages. Under the standard notion of a
risk-averse agent, however, one should not expect to encounter this tendency to reduce
the complexity of contracts. The reason is that increasing incentives by introducing a
small new wage spread is basically costless for the principal because locally the agent
is risk neutral. Therefore, under risk aversion different signals are rewarded differently.
Up to now, however, we have not specified which signals are generally included in the
set B∗. In light of the above observation, the principal’s problem boils down to choosing
a binary partition of the set of signals, B ⊂ S, which characterizes for which signals the
agent receives the high wage and for which signals he receives the low wage. The wages
uL and uH are then uniquely determined by the corresponding individual rationality
and incentive compatibility constraints. The problem of choosing the optimal partition
of signals, B∗, which minimizes the principal’s expected cost of implementing action
aˆ is an integer programming problem. As is typical for this class of problems, and
as is nicely illustrated by the well-known “0-1 Knapsack Problem”, it is impossible to
provide a general characterization of the solution.32
Next to these standard intricacies of integer programming, there is an additional
difficulty in our model: the principal’s objective behaves non-monotonically when in-
cluding an additional signal into the “bonus set” B. This is due to different – possibly
conflicting – targets that the principal pursues when deciding how to partition the set
S. From Program (ML) it follows that, for a given “bonus set” B, the minimum cost
of implementing action aˆ is given by
CB = u¯+ c(aˆ) +
c′(aˆ)(λ− 1)PB(1− PB)
[
∑
s∈B γ
H
s − γ
L
s ][1− (λ− 1)(1− 2PB)]
, (I.4)
where PB :=
∑
s∈B γs(aˆ). The above costs can be rewritten such that the principal’s
problem amounts to
max
B⊂S
[∑
s∈B
(γHs − γ
L
s )
]{
1
(λ− 1)PB(1− PB)
−
1
PB
+
1
1− PB
}
. (I.5)
This objective function illustrates the tradeoff that the principal faces when deciding
how to partition the signal space. The first term,
∑
s∈B(γ
H
s − γ
L
s ), is the aggregate
marginal impact of effort on the probability of the bonus b := uH − uL being paid out.
In order to create incentives for the agent, the principal would like to make this term
32The “0-1 Knapsack Problem” refers to a hiker who has to select from a group of items, all of which
may be suitable for her trip, a subset that has greatest value while not exceeding the capacity of
her knapsack. Suppose there are n items, each item j has a value vj > 0 and a weight wj > 0.
Let the capacity of the knapsack be c > 0. The 0-1 Knapsack Problem may be formulated as the
following maximization problem: max
∑n
j=1 vjxj subject to
∑n
j=1 wjxj ≤ c and xj ∈ {0, 1} for
j = 1, . . . , n.
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as large as possible, which in turn allows her to lower the bonus payment. This can be
achieved by including only good signals in B. The second term, on the other hand, is
maximized by making the probability of paying the agent the high wage either as large
as possible or as small as possible, depending on the exact signal structure and the
action to be implemented. With the loss premium being given by (λ− 1)PB(1− PB)b,
this is intuitive: By making the event of paying the high wage very likely or unlikely,
the principal minimizes the scope for the agent to experience a loss that he demands to
be compensated for. Depending on the signal structure, these two goals may conflict
with each other, which makes a complete characterization of the optimal contract very
intricate. Nevertheless, it can be shown that the optimal contract displays the following
plausible property.
Proposition I.3: Let S+ ≡ {s ∈ S|γHs − γ
L
s > 0}. The optimal partition of the
signals for which the high wage is paid, B∗, has the following property: either B∗ ⊆ S+
or S+ ⊆ B∗.
Put verbally, the optimal partition of the signal set takes one of the two possible
forms: the high wage is paid out to the agent (i) either only for good signals though
possibly not for all good signals, or (ii) for all good signals and possibly a few bad
signals as well. Loosely speaking, if the principal considers it optimal to pay the high
wage very rarely, she will reward only good signals with the extra payment b. If, on the
other hand, she wants the agent to receive the high wage with high probability, then
she will reward at least all good signals.
Without further assumptions, due to the discrete nature of the problem it is hard to
characterize the signals that are included in B∗. Back to the “0-1 Knapsack Problem”,
here it is well-established for the continuous version of the problem that the solution
can easily be found by ordering the items according to their value-to-weight ratio.33
Defining κ := max{s,t}⊆S |γs(aˆ) − γt(aˆ)|, we can obtain a similar result. Assuming
that κ is sufficiently small, which is likely to hold if the performance measure is, for
instance, sales revenues measured in cents, makes the principal’s problem of choosing
B∗ similar to a continuous problem.34 With this assumption, we can show that it is
optimal to order the signals according to their likelihood ratios.
Proposition I.4: Suppose κ is sufficiently small, then there exists a constant K such
that B∗ = {s ∈ S | γHs /γ
L
s ≥ K}.
33In the continuous “0-1 Knapsack Problem” the constraints on the variables xj ∈ {0, 1} are relaxed
to xj ∈ [0, 1], e.g. Dantzig (1957).
34Here, the probability of observing a specific signal, say, sales revenues of exactly $13,825.32 is rather
small.
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Though wage payments are only weakly increasing in the likelihood ratio, this finding
resembles the standard result for a risk-averse agent, where the incentive scheme is
strictly increasing in the likelihood ratio.
Before moving on to the discussion of the more general case in which the agent is
both risk and loss averse, we want to pause to point out the following comparative
static results.
Proposition I.5: An increase in the agent’s degree of loss aversion (i) strictly in-
creases the minimum cost of implementing action aˆ; (ii) decreases the necessary wage
spread to implement action aˆ if and only if PB∗ > 1/2, given that the change in λ does
not lead to a change of B∗.
Part (ii) of Proposition 5 relates to the reasoning by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) that
if the agent is loss averse and expectations are the driving force in the determination of
the reference point, then “in principal-agent models, performance-contingent pay may
not only directly motivate the agent to work harder in pursuit of higher income, but
also indirectly motivate [him] by changing [his] expected income and effort.” As can
be seen from (1), the agent’s expected utility under the second-best contract comprises
of two components, the first of which is expected net intrinsic utility from choosing
effort level aˆ, uL + b
∗
∑
s∈B∗ γs(aˆ) − c(aˆ). Due to loss aversion, however, there is a
second component: With losses looming larger than equally sized gains, in expectation
the agent suffers from deviations from his reference point. While the strength of this
effect is determined by the degree of the agent’s loss aversion, λ, his action choice –
together with the signal parameters – determines the probability that such a deviation
from the reference point actually occurs. We refer to this probability, which is given by
PB∗(1−PB∗), as loss probability. Therefore, when choosing his action, the agent has to
balance off two possibly conflicting targets, maximizing expected net intrinsic utility
and minimizing the loss probability. The loss probability, which is a strictly concave
function of the agent’s effort, is locally decreasing at aˆ if and only if PB∗ > 1/2. In
this case, an increase in λ, which makes reducing the loss probability more important,
may lead to the agent choosing a higher effort level, which in turn allows the principal
to use lower-powered incentives. The principal, however, cannot capitalize on this
since, according to part (i) of Proposition 5, the overall cost of implementation strictly
increases in the agent’s degree of loss aversion.
3.2. The General Case: Loss Aversion and Risk Aversion
We now turn to the intermediate case where the agent is both risk and loss averse.
The agent’s intrinsic utility for money is a strictly increasing and strictly concave
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function, which implies that h(·) is strictly increasing and strictly convex. Moreover,
the agent is loss averse, i.e., λ > 1. From Lemma 1, we know that the constraint set
of the principal’s problem is nonempty. By relabeling signals, each contract can be
interpreted as a contract that offers the agent a (weakly) increasing intrinsic utility
profile. This allows us to assess whether the agent perceives receiving us instead of ut
as a gain or a loss. As in the case of pure loss aversion, we analyze the optimal contract
for a given feasible ordering of signals.
The principal’s problem for a given arrangement of the signals is given by
Program MG:
min
u1,...,uS
S∑
s=1
γs(aˆ)h(us)
subject to
S∑
s=1
γs(aˆ)us − (λ− 1)
S−1∑
s=1
S∑
t=s+1
γs(aˆ)γt(aˆ)[ut − us]− c(aˆ) = u¯ , (IRG)
S∑
s=1
(γHs − γ
L
s )us−
(λ− 1)
S−1∑
s=1
S∑
t=s+1
[
γs(aˆ)(γ
H
t − γ
L
t ) + γt(aˆ)(γ
H
s − γ
L
s )
]
[ut − us] = c
′(aˆ) , (ICG)
uS ≥ uS−1 ≥ . . . ≥ u1 . (OCG)
Since the objective function is strictly convex and the constraints are all linear in
u = {u1, . . . , uS}, the Kuhn-Tucker theorem yields necessary and sufficient conditions
for optimality. Put differently, if there exists a solution to the problem (MG) the
solution is characterized by the partial derivatives of the Lagrangian associated with
(MG) set equal to zero.
Lemma I.2: Suppose (A1)-(A3) hold and h′′(·) > 0, then there exists a second-best op-
timal incentive scheme for implementing action aˆ ∈ (0, 1), denoted u∗ = {u∗1, . . . , u
∗
S}.
In order to interpret the first-order conditions of the Lagrangian to problem (MG)
it is necessary to know whether the Lagrangian multipliers are positive or negative.
Lemma I.3: The Lagrangian multipliers of program (MG) associated with the incen-
tive compatibility constraint and the individual rationality constraint are both strictly
positive, i.e., µIC > 0 and µIR > 0.
We now give a heuristic reasoning why pooling of information may well be optimal
in this more general case. For the sake of argument, suppose there is no pooling of
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information in the sense that it is optimal to set distinct wages for distinct signals.
In this case all order constraints are slack; formally, if us 6= us′ for all s, s
′ ∈ S and
s 6= s′, then µO,s = 0 for all s ∈ {2, . . . , S}. In this case, i.e., when none of the ordering
constraints is binding, then the first-order condition of optimality with respect to us,
∂L(u)/∂us = 0, can be written as follows:
h′(us) =
(
µIR + µIC
γHs − γ
L
s
γs(aˆ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Hs
[
1− (λ− 1)
(
2
s−1∑
t=1
γt(aˆ) + γs(aˆ)− 1
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Γs
− µIC(λ− 1)
[
2
s−1∑
t=1
(γHt − γ
L
t ) + (γ
H
s − γ
L
s )
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:Λs
. (I.6)
For λ = 1 we have h′(us) = Hs, the standard“Holmstro¨m-formula”.
35 Note that Γs > 0
for λ ≤ 2. More importantly, irrespective of the signal ordering, we have Γs > Γs+1.
The third term, Λs, can be either positive or negative. If the compound signal of all
signals below s and the signal s itself are bad signals, then Λs < 0.
Since the incentive scheme is nondecreasing, when the order constraints are not
binding it has to hold that h′(us) ≥ h
′(us−1). Thus, if µOC,s−1 = µOC,s = µOC,s+1 = 0
the following inequality is satisfied:
Hs × Γs − Λs ≥ Hs−1 × Γs−1 − Λs−1. (I.7)
Note that for the given ordering of signals, if there exists any pair of signals s, s − 1
such that (I.7) is violated, then the optimal contract for this ordering involves pooling
of wages. Even when Hs > Hs−1, as it is the case when signals are ordered according
to their likelihood ratio, it is not clear that inequality (I.7) is satisfied. In particular,
when s and s−1 are similarly informative it seems to be optimal to pay the same wage
for these two signals as can easily be illustrated for the case of two good signals: If s
and s−1 are similarly informative good signals then Hs ≈ Hs−1 > 0 but Γs < Γs−1 and
Λs > Λs−1, thus condition (I.7) is violated. In summary, it may well be that for a given
incentive-feasible ordering of signals, and thus overall as well, the order constraints are
binding, i.e., it may be optimal to offer a contract which is less complex than the signal
space allows for. We illustrate this conjecture in the following with an example.
Application with Constant Relative Risk Aversion In the general case of a
risk and loss-averse agent the principal seeks to minimize the loss and the risk premium.
35See Holmstro¨m (1979). This formula is also referred to as the modified Borch sharing rule (Borch,
1962).
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Roughly speaking, the risk premium is increasing in the curvature of the agent’s intrin-
sic utility function. Put differently, when the agent’s intrinsic utility function becomes
close to linearity the risk premium goes to zero. Thus, for a slightly concave intrinsic
utility function one should expect that the principal’s main objective is to minimize
the loss premium, which is achieved by a bonus scheme as is shown in Section 3.1. In
the following we show that these reasoning is correct for the case of an intrinsic utility
function that features constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).
Suppose h(u) = ur, with r ≥ 0 being a measure for the agent’s risk aversion. More
precisely, the Arrow-Pratt measure for relative risk aversion of the agent’s intrinsic
utility function is R = 1 − 1
r
and therefore constant. The following result states that
the optimal contract is still a bonus contract when the agent is not only loss averse,
but also slightly risk averse.
Proposition I.6: Suppose (A1)-(A3) hold, h(u) = ur with r > 1, and λ > 1. Generi-
cally, for r sufficiently small the optimal incentive scheme {u∗s}
S
s=1 is a bonus scheme,
i.e., u∗s = u
∗
H for s ∈ B
∗ ⊂ S and u∗s = u
∗
L for s ∈ S\B
∗ where u∗L < u
∗
H .
Without loss aversion, in contrast, according to Proposition 1 the optimal contract
is fully differentiated even for intrinsic utility being arbitrarily close to linearity.
Next, we demonstrate by means of an example that pooling of signals may well be
optimal even for a non-negligible degree of risk aversion. Suppose the agent’s effort
cost is c(a) = (1/2)a2 and the effort level to be implemented is aˆ = 1
2
. Moreover,
we assume that the reservation utility u¯ = 10, which guarantees that all utility levels
are positive.36 To keep the example as simple as possible, it is assumed that the
agent’s performance can take only three values, i.e., the agent’s performance is either
excellent (E), satisfactory (S) or inadequate (I). We consider two specifications of the
performance measure. In the first specification the satisfactory signal is a good signal,
whereas in the second specification it is a bad signal. In all parameter constellations
we consider, it turns out that it is always (weakly) optimal to order signals according
to their likelihood ratio, i.e., u1 = uI , u2 = uS and u3 = uE. In the first specification
the conditional probabilities take the following values:
γHE = 5/10 γ
L
E = 1/10
γHS = 4/10 γ
L
S = 3/10
γHI = 1/10 γ
L
I = 6/10 .
The structure of the optimal contract for this specification and various values of r and
λ is presented in Table 1.
36Increasing u¯ makes the agent less (absolutely) risk averse and thus is similar to a reduction in r.
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@
@
@
@
r
λ
1.0 1.1 1.3 1.5
1.5 u1 < u2 < u3 u1 < u2 = u3 u1 < u2 = u3 u1 < u2 = u3
2 u1 < u2 < u3 u1 < u2 < u3 u1 < u2 = u3 u1 < u2 = u3
3 u1 < u2 < u3 u1 < u2 < u3 u1 < u2 = u3 u1 < u2 = u3
Table I.1.: Structure of the optimal contract with two “good” signals.
Table 1 suggests that the optimal contract typically involves pooling of the two good
signals, in particular when the agent’s intrinsic utility is not too concave, i.e., if the
agent is not too risk averse. Table 1 nicely illustrates the trade-off the principal faces
when the agent is both, risk and loss averse: If the agent becomes more risk averse
pooling is less likely to be optimal. If, on the other hand, he becomes more loss averse,
pooling is more likely to be optimal.37
In the second specification we assume that there are two bad signals. The conditional
probabilities are as follows:
γHE = 6/10 γ
L
E = 1/10
γHS = 2/10 γ
L
S = 4/10
γHI = 2/10 γ
L
I = 5/10 .
The results for this case are presented in Table 2.
@
@
@
@
r
λ
1.0 1.1 1.3 1.5
1.5 u1 < u2 < u3 u1 = u2 < u3 u1 = u2 < u3 u1 = u2 < u3
2 u1 < u2 < u3 u1 = u2 < u3 u1 = u2 < u3 u1 = u2 < u3
3 u1 < u2 < u3 u1 = u2 < u3 u1 = u2 < u3 u1 = u2 < u3
Table I.2.: Structure of the optimal contract with two “bad” signals.
In this specification, a binary statistic that pools the two bad signals seems to be
optimal almost always. The reason behind this observation is that the two bad signals
are very similar. In consequence, paying the same wage for satisfactory as well as
inadequate performance increases the risk premium only slightly. On the other hand,
by pooling satisfactory and inadequate performance it becomes less likely for the agent
37For a given r, the degree of pooling does not monotonically increase in λ. As discussed at the
end of Section 3.1, a higher degree of loss aversion of the agent may help the principal to create
incentives. If this is the case, a contract that contains less pooling is preferred from an incentive
point of view. If this positive effect of less pooling on incentives outweighs the negative effect on
the agent’s loss premium, then the optimal contract consists of more distinct wage payments when
λ increases. This can happen, however, only locally: at some point the degree of pooling increases
in λ.
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ex ante to experience a loss, i.e., the loss premium is reduced. Therefore, it is optimal
for the principal to use a bonus scheme even when the agent’s degree of loss aversion
is small.
4. Implementation Problems, Turning a Blind Eye, and
Stochastic Contracts
In this section, we relax the assumptions that guaranteed the validity of the first-order
approach. In particular, in order to explore the implications of a higher degree of loss
aversion, we relax (A2). We restrict attention to two simplifications of the former
model. First, we return to the assumption of a purely loss-averse agent. Second, only
binary measures of performance are considered.
4.1. The Case of a Binary Measure of Performance
As before, the principal cannot observe the agent’s action a or whether the benefit B
was realized or not. Instead she observes a contractible binary measure of performance,
i.e., S = {1, 2}. For notational convenience , let (1−γH) and γH denote the probabilities
of observing signal s = 1 and s = 2, respectively, conditional on B being realized.
Accordingly, (1 − γL) and γL are the probabilities of observing signal s = 1 and
s = 2, respectively, conditional on B not being realized.38 Thus, the unconditional
probability of observing signal s = 2 for a given action a is γ(a) ≡ aγH + (1 − a)γL.
Let γˆ = (γH , γL). We reformulate (A1) for the binary case as follows.
Assumption (A4): 1 > γH > γL > 0 .
With only two possible signals to be observed, the contract takes the form of a bonus
contract: the agent is paid a base wage which yields intrinsic utility u if the bad signal
is observed, and he is paid the base wage plus a bonus b resulting in intrinsic utility
u + b if the good signal is observed. For now assume that b ≥ 0.39 We assume that
the agent’s intrinsic disutility of effort is a quadratic function, c(a) = (k/2)a2.40 The
agent’s expected utility from choosing effort level a then is
E [U(a)] = u+ γ(a)b−
k
2
a2 − (λ− 1)γ(a)(1− γ(a))b. (I.8)
38In the notation introduced above, we have γH
1
= 1− γH , γH
2
= γH , γL
1
= 1− γL and γL
2
= γL.
39The assumption b ≥ 0 is made only for expositional purposes, the results hold true for b ∈ R.
40This functional form does not fit exactly the assumptions on c(·) that we imposed above, but is made
for expositional convenience. Allowing for more general effort cost functions does not qualitatively
change the insights that are to be obtained.
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As before, the first component is expected net intrinsic utility from choosing effort level
a, that is, expected wage payment minus effort cost. The second component is the loss
premium, with γ(a)(1− γ(a)) denoting the loss probability.
4.2. Invalidity of the First-Order Approach
The first derivative of expected utility with respect to effort is given by
E [U ′(a)] = (γH − γL)b [2− λ+ 2γ(a)(λ− 1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
MB(a)
− ka︸︷︷︸
MC(a)
. (I.9)
While the marginal cost, MC(a), obviously is a straight line through the origin with
slope k, the marginal benefit, MB(a), also is a positively sloped, linear function of
effort a. An increase in b unambiguously makes MB(a) steeper. Letting a0 denote the
intercept of MB(a) with the horizontal axis, we have
a0 =
λ− 2− 2γL(λ− 1)
2(γH − γL)(λ− 1)
.
The cases for a0 < 0 and a0 > 0 are depicted in Figures 1 and 2, respectively.
Implementation problems in our sense refer to a situation where there are actions
aaˆa0
MC(a)
MB(a)
Figure I.1.: a0 < 0.
aaˆa0
MB(a) MC(a)
Figure I.2.: a0 > 0.
a ∈ (0, 1) that are not incentive compatible for any bonus payment.
Proposition I.7: Suppose (A4) holds, then effort level aˆ ∈ (0, 1) is implementable if
and only if a0 ≤ 0.
Implementation problems arise when a0 > 0, or equivalently, when γ
L < 1/2 and
λ > 2(1 − γL)/(1 − 2γL) > 2. Somewhat surprisingly, this includes performance
measures with γL < 1/2 < γH , which (possibly) are highly informative. Informative
in this context means that it is more likely to observe the bad signal if benefit B was
not realized, whereas it is more likely to observe the good signal if B was realized. So,
why do these implementation problems arise in the first place? Remember that the
agent has two targets: First, as in classic models, he seeks to maximize net intrinsic
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utility, u+ bγ(a)− (k/2)a2. When the agent cares only about this net intrinsic utility
(e.g., he is loss neutral) then each action can be implemented by choosing a sufficiently
high bonus. Due to loss aversion, however, the agent has a second target which is
minimizing the expected loss. How can the agent pursue this goal? He can do so by
choosing an action such that the loss probability, γ(a)(1− γ(a)), becomes small. The
crucial point is that these two targets may conflict with each other in the sense that an
increase in effort may increase net intrinsic utility but at the same time also increases
the loss probability. First of all, note that implementation problems never arise when
γL ≥ 1/2 or λ ≤ 2. For γL ≥ 1/2, the loss probability is strictly decreasing in the
agent’s action. Consequently, with both targets of the agent being aligned, an increase
in the bonus unambiguously leads to an increase in the agent’s action. For λ ≤ 2, the
weight put on gain-loss utility, λ− 1, is lower than the weight put on intrinsic utility,
so the agent is more interested in maximizing net intrinsic utility than in minimizing
the loss probability. For γL < 1/2, on the other hand, implementation problems do
arise when λ is sufficiently large. Roughly speaking, being sufficiently loss averse, the
agent primarily cares about reducing the loss probability. With the loss probability
being inverted U-shaped, the agent achieves this by choosing one of the two extreme
actions a ∈ {0, 1}. Therefore, the principal cannot motivate the agent to choose an
action aˆ ∈ (0, 1) when γL < 1/2 and the agent’s loss aversion is sufficiently severe.
4.3. Turning a Blind Eye
As we have seen in the preceding analysis, the principal faces implementation problems
whenever a0 > 0. One might wonder if there is a remedy for these implementation
problems. The answer is “yes”, there is a remedy. The principal can manipulate
the signal in her favor by not paying attention to the signal from time to time but
nevertheless paying the bonus in these cases. Formally, suppose the principal commits
herself to stochastically ignoring the signal with probability p ∈ [0, 1).41 Thus, the
overall probability of receiving the bonus is given by γ(a; p) ≡ p + (1 − p)γ(a). This
strategic ignorance of information gives rise to a transformed performance measure
γˆ(p) = (γH(p), γL(p)). As before, γH(p) denotes the probability that the bonus is
paid to the agent conditional on benefit B being realized. Given that B is realized,
this happens either when the performance measure is ignored, or – if the principal
pays attention to the performance measure – when the good signal is realized. Hence,
γH(p) = p + (1 − p)γH . Analogously, the probability of the bonus being paid out
conditional on B not being realized is given by γL(p) = p + (1 − p)γL. As it turns
41Always ignoring the signal, i.e., setting p = 1, would be detrimental for incentives because then the
agent’s monetary payoff is independent of his action. Hence, he would choose the least cost action
a = 0. Therefore, we a priori restrict the principal to choose p from the interval [0, 1).
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out, ignoring the whole performance measure with probability p is formally equivalent
to ignoring only the bad signal with probability p.42 For this reason, we refer to the
principal not paying attention to the performance measure as turning a blind eye on bad
performance of the agent. It is readily verified that under the transformed performance
measure γˆ(p) the intercept of the MB(a) function with the horizontal axis,
a0(p) ≡
λ− 2− 2
[
p+ (1− p)γL
]
(λ− 1)
2(1− p)(γH − γL)(λ− 1)
,
not only is decreasing in p but also can be made arbitrarily small, in particular, ar-
bitrarily negative. Formally, da0(p)/dp < 0 and limp→1 a0(p) = −∞. In the light
of Proposition 7 this immediately implies that the principal can eliminate any imple-
mentation problems by choosing p sufficiently high, that is, by turning a blind eye
sufficiently often.
Besides alleviating possible implementation problems, turning a blind eye can also
benefit the principal from a cost perspective. Using the definition of γ(a; p) it can
be shown that the minimum cost of implementing action aˆ under the transformed
performance measure, C(aˆ; p), takes the following form:
C(aˆ; p) = u +
k
2
aˆ2 +
kaˆ(λ− 1)(1− γ(aˆ))
(γH − γL)
γ(aˆ) + p(1− γ(aˆ))
1− (λ− 1) [1− 2γ(aˆ)− 2p(1− γ(aˆ))]
(I.10)
Differentiating the principal’s cost with respect to p reveals that sign{dC(aˆ; p)/dp} =
sign{2− λ}. Hence, an increase in the probability of ignoring the bad signal decreases
the cost of implementing a certain action if and only if λ > 2. Hence, whenever the
principal turns a blind eye in order to remedy implementation problems, she will do so
to the largest possible extent.43,44 We summarize the preceding analysis in the following
proposition.
Proposition I.8: Suppose the principal can commit herself to stochastic ignorance of
the signal. Then each action aˆ ∈ [0, 1] can be implemented. Moreover, the implemen-
tation costs are strictly decreasing in p if and only if λ > 2.
We restricted the principal to offer non-stochastic payments conditional on which
signal is observed. If the principal was able to do just that, then she could remedy
42In this latter case, the agent receives the bonus either when the good signal is observed, which
happens with probability γ(a), or when the bad signal is observed but is ignored, which happens
with probability (1 − γ(a))p. Hence, the overall probability of the bonus being paid out is given
by γ(a) + (1− γ(a))p.
43Formally, for λ > 2, the solution to the principal’s problem of choosing the optimal probability to
turn a blind eye, p∗, is not well defined because p∗ → 1. If the agent is subject to limited liability or
there is a cost of ignorance, however, the optimal probability of turning a blind eye is well defined.
44This is in the spirit of Becker and Stigler (1974), who show that despite a small detection probability
of malfeasance, incentives can be maintained if the punishment is sufficiently severe.
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implementation problems by paying the base wage plus a lottery in the case of the bad
signal. For instance, when the lottery yields b with probability p and zero otherwise,
this is just the same as turning a blind eye. This observation suggests that the principal
may benefit from offering a contract that includes randomization, which is in contrast
to the finding under conventional risk aversion, see Holmstro¨m (1979).45
4.4. Blackwell Revisited
We conclude this section by briefly pointing out an interesting implication of the above
analysis. Suppose the principal has no access to a randomization device, i.e., turning
a blind eye is not possible. Then the above considerations allow a straight-forward
comparison of performance measures ζˆ = (ζH , ζL) and γˆ = (γH , γL) if ζˆ is a convex
combination of γˆ and 1 ≡ (1, 1).
Corollary I.1: Let ζˆ = p1 + (1 − p)γˆ with p ∈ (0, 1). Then the principal at least
weakly prefers performance measure ζˆ to γˆ if and only if λ ≥ 2.
The finding that the principal prefers the “garbled”performance measure ζˆ over per-
formance measure γˆ is at odds with Blackwell’s theorem. To see this, let performance
measures γˆ and ζˆ be characterized, respectively, by the stochastic matrices
P γ =
(
1− γH γH
1− γL γL
)
and P ζ =
(
1− ζH ζH
1− ζL ζL
)
.
According to Blackwell’s theorem, any decision maker prefers information system γˆ to
ζˆ if and only if there exists a non-negative stochastic matrixM with
∑
jmij = 1 such
that P ζ = P γM .
46 It is readily verified that this matrixM exists and takes the form
M =
(
1− p p
0 1
)
.
Thus, even though comparison of the two performance measures according to Black-
well’s theorem implies that the principal should prefer γˆ over ζˆ, the principal actually
prefers the “garbled” information system ζˆ over information system γˆ. While Kim
(1995) has already shown that the necessary part of Blackwell’s theorem does not hold
in the agency model, the sufficiency part was proven to be applicable to the agency
45The finding that stochastic contracts may be optimal is not novel to the principal-agent literature.
Haller (1985) shows that in the case of a satisficing agent, who wants to achieve certain aspiration
levels of income with certain probabilities, randomization may pay for the principal. Moreover,
Strausz (2006) finds that deterministic contracts may be suboptimal in a screening context.
46See Blackwell (1951, 1953).
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framework by Gjesdal (1982).47 Our findings, however, show that this is not the case
anymore when the agent is loss averse.
5. Robustness, Extensions, and Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we explore the implications of reference-dependent preferences on con-
tract design in an otherwise standard model of principal-agency. We find that introduc-
ing a loss-averse agent leads to a reduction in the complexity of the optimal contractual
arrangement. When loss aversion is the predominant feature of the agent’s risk pref-
erences, the optimal contract takes the form of a simple bonus contract even if the
agent is also risk averse: some realizations of the performance measure are rewarded
with a bonus payment, while others are not. Thus, loss aversion provides a theoretical
rationale for bonus contracts, the wide application of which is hard to reconcile with
obvious drawbacks – as seasonality effects or insurance fraud – that come along with
this particular contractual form.
In the remainder of this section, we consider the robustness of our results. After a
brief and semi-formal analysis of an alternative equilibrium concept, we explore the
consequences of non quadratic effort costs for implementation problems. Finally, we
conclude by discussing diminishing sensitivity of the gain-loss function. Throughout
the whole analysis, we adopted the concept of choice-acclimating personal equilibrium
(CPE). Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) provide another concept, called unacclimating
personal equilibrium (UPE). The major difference between UPE and CPE is the timing
of expectation formation and actual decision making. Under UPE a decision maker first
forms his expectations, which determine his reference point, and thereafter, given these
expectations, chooses the optimal action. To rule out that people can systematically
cheat themselves, for action aˆ to be an UPE, it must be optimal for the decision
maker to choose aˆ given that he expected to do so. In the following, we will argue
that applying UPE instead of CPE does not change our main findings. Intuitively,
the optimality of simple contracts is rooted in the agent’s dislike of being exposed to
numerous outcomes, which is reflected in the functional form of his ex ante expected
utility. With expectations being met on the equilibrium path under UPE, the expected
utility takes the same form under both equilibrium concepts. Thus, one should expect
simple contracts to be optimal also under UPE. For the sake of a more formal argument,
consider the case of a purely loss-averse agent, i.e., suppose intrinsic utility is linear.
47In order to avoid confusion: The necessary part of Blackwell’s theorem states that the principal
being better off implies that she uses a more informative performance measure. The sufficiency
part conversely states that making use of more informative performance measure implies that the
principal is better off.
40 Dissertation of Fabian Herweg
The agent’s ex ante expected utility from choosing action a when expecting action aˆ is
E[U(a|aˆ)] =
S∑
s=1
γs(a)
[
us +
s−1∑
j=1
γj(aˆ)(us − uj)− λ
S∑
t=s+1
γt(aˆ)(ut − us)
]
− c(a) + µ(c(aˆ)− c(a)) .
The agent’s ex ante expected utility, and in consequence the individual rationality
constraint, takes the same form under both equilibrium concepts, CPE and UPE.
The incentive compatibility constraint, on the other hand, depends on the applied
equilibrium concept. Given the agent expected to choose aˆ, his marginal utility from
choosing a is
E[U ′(a|aˆ)] =
S∑
s=1
(γHs − γ
L
s )us +
S∑
s=1
s−1∑
j=1
γj(aˆ)(γ
H
s − γ
L
s )(us − uj)
− λ
S∑
s=1
S∑
j=s+1
γj(aˆ)(γ
H
s − γ
L
s )(uj − us)− c
′(a) + µ′(c(aˆ)− c(a)) .
Note that either µ′(·) = 1 or µ′(·) = λ, depending on whether aˆ is greater or lower than
a. Even though E[U(a|aˆ)] is a strictly concave function in the agent’s actual action
choice a for all values of λ ≥ 1, under UPE there arises the problem of multiplicity of
equilibria. More precisely, for a given incentive scheme u, there exists a range of actions
a ∈ [a(u), a¯(u)] all of which constitute a UPE. This problem can be circumvented by
assuming that the agent chooses the highest action which constitutes a UPE. In this
case there is no need to impose additional assumptions on the cost function or to assume
that λ is sufficiently small.48 By imposing this alternative assumption, the incentive
compatibility constraint can be rewritten as
S∑
s=2
bs
{(
S∑
t=s
(γHt − γ
L
t )
)(
1 +
s−1∑
j=1
γj(aˆ)
)
− λ
(
S∑
t=s
γt(aˆ)
)(
s−1∑
j=1
(γHj − γ
L
j )
)}
= 2c′(aˆ) .
Clearly, the incentive compatibility constraint is linear in the additional payments
b = (b2, . . . , bS). Thus, our bonus contract result is robust with respect to this change
of assumptions.
There is another way to resolve the multiplicity problem under UPE. Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2006, 2007) define a preferred personal equilibrium (PPE) as a decision maker’s
48For given expectations aˆ, let EUg and EUl denote the agent’s expected utility given that µ(x) = x
and µ(x) = λx, respectively. Both EUg and EUl are strictly concave functions, with EUg achieving
its maximum at a strictly higher action than EUl. EUg and EUl intersect at aˆ. Action aˆ is an
UPE if it lies between the maximizing actions of EUg and EUl. Therefore, expecting to choose the
action which maximizes EUg not only constitutes an UPE, but also is the highest possible UPE.
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ex ante favorite plan among those plans he actually will follow through. Put differ-
ently, given incentive scheme u, the agent chooses the action aPPE ∈ [a(u), a¯(u)]
that maximizes expected utility among those actions that constitute a UPE. If for all
incentive-compatible incentive schemes we have aPPE ∈ (a(u), a¯(u)) then PPE and
CPE coincide, i.e., aPPE is determined by the first-order condition that characterizes
the agent’s action under CPE. Thus, by imposing the PPE-analogue of (A2) and (A3)
we can derive results identical to those under CPE. If aPPE ∈ {a(u), a¯(u)} for all
incentive-compatible incentive schemes, the optimal contract also is a bonus contract
since both boundary actions are determined by functions linear in b = (b2, . . . , bS).
49
In the intermediate case, however, where aPPE ∈ (a(u), a¯(u)) for some incentive-
compatible incentive schemes but aPPE ∈ {a(u), a¯(u)} for others, the optimal contract
is not necessarily a bonus scheme.
If the agent’s action is characterized by PPE, for all actions aˆ ∈ (0, 1) to be imple-
mentable we still need the assumption that λ is not too high. Put differently, similar
implementation problems as discussed in Section 4 also arise under PPE. Compared
to CPE, however, these implementation problems are less severe. For instance, actions
close to zero are always implementable under PPE.
For the discussion of implementation problems in Section 4, we restricted attention to
quadratic effort costs. The finding that implementation problems are a potential issue,
however, holds true for a wide variety of cost functions. Depending on the particular
functional form of the corresponding marginal costs, these implementation problems
may be more or less severe. For instance, the result that there are implementation
problems if a0 > 0 holds true for all strictly increasing and strictly convex cost functions
with c′(0) = 0. As for strictly concave marginal costs with c′(0) = 0, no action aˆ ∈ (0, 1)
is implementable if a0 ≥ 0; and even for a0 < 0 there may be actions, in particular
actions close to 1, that are not implementable.
Moreover, we kept the whole analysis simple by ignoring diminishing sensitivity,
that is, by considering a piece-wise linear gain-loss function. A more general gain-loss
function makes the analysis far more complicated: Both the incentive compatibility
constraint and the individual rationality constraint are no longer linear functions in
the intrinsic utility levels, and thus the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are not necessarily
sufficient. Nevertheless, we expect that a reduction in the complexity of the contract
will benefit the principal in this case as well. Diminishing sensitivity of the agent’s
utility implies that the sum of two net losses of two monetary outcomes exceeds the
net loss of the sum of these two monetary outcomes. Therefore, in addition to the
49The case of aPPE = a¯(u) corresponds to the alternative assumption to (A2) discussed above. If
aPPE = a(u), on the other hand, then aPPE maximizes EUl, as defined in the previous footnote.
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effects discussed in the paper, under diminishing sensitivity there is another channel
through which melting two bonus payments into one “big” bonus affects, and in ten-
dency reduces, the agent’s expected net loss. There is, however, an argument running
counter to this intuition. As we have shown, loss aversion may help the principal to
create incentives. Therefore, setting many different wage payments, and thereby – in
a sense – creating many kinks, proximity to which the agent strongly dislikes under
diminishing sensitivity, may have favorable incentive effects. Exploring the effects of
diminishing sensitivity in a principal-agent relationship with moral hazard is therefore
an open question for future research.
II. Performance of Procrastinators:
On the Value of Deadlines
Earlier work has shown that procrastination can be explained by
quasi-hyperbolic discounting. We present a model of effort choice
over time that shifts the focus from completion of to performance
on a single task. We find that being aware of the own self-control
problems may reduce a person’s performance as well as his over-
all well-being, which is in contrast to the existing literature on
procrastination. Extending this framework to a multi-task model,
we show that interim deadlines help a quasi-hyperbolic discounter
to structure his workload more efficiently, which in turn leads to
better performance. Moreover, being restricted by deadlines in-
creases a quasi-hyperbolic discounter’s well-being. Thus, we pro-
vide a theoretical underpinning for recent empirical evidence and
numerous casual observations.
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1. Introduction
Life is pervaded with situations in which people have a certain span of time to work
on a task and the final reward depends on how much devotion they put into their
work: students studying for a final or writing a thesis, employees working on a long-
term project, etc. Next to the final deadline, these tasks often have additional interim
deadlines: mandatory problem sets are often a prerequisite to pass a class; students
meet in regular intervals with their thesis adviser to report on their progress; employees
have to hold several presentations or submit memos at different stages of completion
of a project. A rational decision maker with time-consistent preferences would not
welcome such restrictions on his choice set. But when people impulsively procrastinate,
such interim deadlines can be helpful.1 Earlier research has shown that one possible
explanation for procrastination on the completion of a task is hyperbolic discounting.
This paper analyzes the behavior of hyperbolic discounters in a model of effort choice
over time that shifts the focus from completion of to performance on a task. We show
that interim deadlines are a useful commitment device for a hyperbolic discounter,
which increases his “long-run utility”. Moreover - and more interestingly - interim
deadlines are also performance-enhancing. Thus, while implementing interim deadlines
always is in the interest of the hyperbolic discounter himself, these findings suggest
that there is also scope for the employer of such an agent to benefit from imposing
such deadlines. Therefore, our paper gives a theoretical underpinning for the frequent
observation of interim deadlines.
We start out from a model where an individual has a given number of periods to
work on a single task. In each period, this person can invest costly effort into this
task. Effort is modeled as a continuous decision variable. In the final period the in-
dividual receives a reward that depends on the total amount of effort he has invested.
Since serious procrastination can hardly be explained by exponential discounting with
a reasonable discount factor, we adopt the assumption that the agent discounts quasi-
hyperbolically, which gives rise to time-inconsistent preferences.2 We compare the
performance of three types of agents. Next to the benchmark of a time-consistent
individual without self-control problems, we consider two types of quasi-hyperbolic
discounters: naive persons who are totally unaware of their self-control problems, and
sophisticated persons who are fully aware of them. Besides finding that procrastination
in general hampers performance, we mainly ask two questions: First, does sophistica-
tion increase an individual’s performance and overall well-being? Second, do interim
1We do not claim that procrastination issues are the only explanation for observing interim dead-
lines. Other explanations may be preferences for risk diversification or motives for information
acquisition.
2See O’Donoghue and Rabin (2005) for some illustrative numerical examples.
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deadlines enhance performance, and if so, how? The answer to the first question is a
novelty in the literature: Earlier work on quasi-hyperbolic discounting has shown that
awareness of self-control problems will always benefit a person when costs are imme-
diate and rewards are delayed.3 We find, in contrast, that sophistication may actually
hurt an individual – even in this environment. In order to provide an intuition for why
this may be the case, we identify and discuss the effects that drive the differences in the
behavior of sophisticated and naive agents. A sophisticated agent realizes that he can
create incentives for his future selves to work harder by working only little today. This
may lead to an extremely uneven allocation of effort over time, which is undesirable
with regard to the agent’s long-run preferences. In order to address the second ques-
tion, we augment the basic model by introducing a second task. Two different regimes
are compared: a regime with an interim deadline and a regime without an interim
deadline. If no interim deadline is imposed, the agent can work on both tasks up to the
final period. Under an interim deadline, on the other hand, he has only half the time
to perform on the first task, and the whole span of time to work on the second task.
We show that being exposed to a deadline is beneficial for time-inconsistent agents.
Interim deadlines help hyperbolic discounters to structure their workload and to allo-
cate their effort more efficiently, leading to an overall performance increase, which in
turn improves long-run utility.
Our paper draws on two different strands of literature on time-inconsistent prefer-
ences. First, the literature on time-inconsistent procrastination, initiated by Akerlof
(1991), and second the literature on time-inconsistent consumption-saving decisions,
first studied by Strotz (1956). Earlier work on procrastination assumes that the de-
cision that an individual has to take is when to do a task. In general, these papers
are interested in the effects of awareness on behavior. O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b),
for example, consider a setting where a single task has to be performed exactly once
over a certain span of time. Each period, a person faces the binary decision whether to
complete the task or not. They find that being sophisticated with regard to self-control
problems leads to an earlier completion of the task. When costs are immediate and
rewards are delayed, this in turn implies that sophistication never hurts a person. In
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001b) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (2008), these results are
shown to carry over to situations where an individual has to choose which task to per-
form from a menu of mutually exclusive tasks or where a person engages in long-term
projects.4
3See, for example, O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b, 2001b, 2008).
4O’Donoghue and Rabin (2008) assume that a project requires two periods to be completed, one in
which it is started, and a second period in which it is finished. The decision the agent has to take
each period, however, remains a binary one.
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In the literature on time-inconsistent consumption-saving decisions, which was car-
ried on by Laibson (1996, 1997, 1998), Laibson et al. (1998), Angeletos et al. (2001),
and Diamond and Ko˝szegi (2003), an individual has to decide each period anew how
much to consume and how much to save, and thus chooses a continuous decision vari-
able. In this literature, most researchers assume sophisticated beliefs.5 The analysis
of sophisticated quasi-hyperbolic discounters and continuous action spaces is fairly
complicated. All the above contributions circumvent the arising analytical problems
by assuming that the agent’s instantaneous utility function for consumption is of the
constant-relative-risk-aversion (CRRA) type. Borrowing the essential framework from
this literature, in particular the assumption of a CRRA-utility function and sophisti-
cated beliefs, Fischer (1999) analyzes procrastination issues, showing that sophisticated
persons choose a decreasing leisure profile over time. To the best of our knowledge,
our paper is the first that provides a detailed comparison of the behavior of naive and
sophisticated individuals in a continuous-action-space framework.6
Moreover, we analyze the value of interim deadlines as commitment technology.
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999c) analyze optimal incentive schemes when a principal,
who faces a cost of delay, hires a time-inconsistent agent, who faces a stochastic task
cost, to perform a single task once. They find that under certain circumstances it is
optimal to implement a deadline scheme, that is, to fix a date beyond which procras-
tination is severely punished. While this kind of deadline in a sense compares to the
final deadline in our model, our main interest is in the impact of interim deadlines.
That interim deadlines may be a valuable commitment mechanism for hyperbolic dis-
counters is conjectured in O’Donoghue and Rabin (2005). We show that this indeed is
the case, and, moreover, we lay open the beneficial effect of interim deadlines. With
respect to consumption-savings decisions, there is no natural analog to the concept of
interim deadlines.7
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we present the
basic single-task model, and briefly review the concept of quasi-hyperbolic discounting
and the notions of naivete´ and sophistication. This model is analyzed in Section 3. In
Section 4, we identify the effects driving the differences in behavior of differently aware
agents and discuss the impact of awareness on performance and overall satisfaction.
5Diamond and Ko˝szegi (2003) briefly discuss the behavior of naive agents without comparing sophis-
ticates and naifs. Skiba and Tobacman (2008) identify partially naive hyperbolic discounting as
the most consistent explanation for payday borrowing without theoretically analyzing the effects
of awareness on behavior.
6An exception is Tobacman (2008), who, in a purely technical note, analyzes how consumption
depends on the degree of sophistication. An intuitive explanation for the different behavior of
differently aware agents or welfare implications, however, are not derived.
7In the consumption-savings context, for example, an interim deadline would compare to a Christmas
club that allows to deposit money only during the first half of the year.
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Section 5 extends the basic model to allow for a meaningful analysis of the effect of
deadlines on performance. The final section concludes. All proofs are deferred to
Appendix A.2.1. In Appendix A.2.2., we consider the case of a partially naive agent.
2. The Model
An agent has to perform a task, e.g. writing a term paper. He has two periods to work
on that task in the sense that in each period t ∈ {1, 2} the agent chooses an effort level
et ≥ 0 which he invests in the task. If the agent invests some positive effort in period t
then in the same period an effort cost c(et) arises. This cost function is assumed to be
time-invariant. The agent is rewarded for the task in period 3.8 This delayed reward,
which is assumed to be a function of total effort invested, is denoted by g(
∑2
t=1 et).
Assumption: It is assumed that the cost function and the reward function satisfy the
following properties: ∀x > 0,
c′(x) > 0, c′′(x) > 0, c(0) = 0, c′(0) = 0
g′(x) > 0, g′′(x) < 0, g(0) = 0, g′(0) > 0
To motivate the above functional assumptions, once again consider the example of
the student who has to write a term paper. The effort is the time he spends on
writing the paper. Thus, the costs of effort are the opportunity costs of not enjoying
leisure time. Making the standard assumption of decreasing marginal utility of leisure
time is equivalent to assuming a convex cost function. The reward function is the
expected grade of the term paper. The expected grade increases when the student
spends more time on writing the paper. Typically, by investing somewhat more effort
the probability to receive a C instead of a D increases significantly, whereas the increase
in effort necessary to receive an A instead of a B is much higher.
Within this framework, we study the behavior of individuals with time-inconsistent
preferences due to hyperbolic discounting.9 In particular, we assume that a person’s
intertemporal preferences from the perspective of period t are given by
Ut(ut, ut+1, ..., uT ) = ut + β
T∑
τ=t+1
δτ−tuτ ,
8We focus on a three-period model, the shortest possible time horizon that actually generates quasi-
hyperbolic discounting effects. For longer time horizons the analysis becomes very quickly very
complicated.
9Hyperbolic discounting refers to a person discounting events in the near future at a higher discount
rate than events in the distant future. For an overview of empirical studies that provide evidence
of hyperbolic discounting, see Frederick et al. (2002).
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where ut denotes that person’s instantaneous utility in period t. This functional form,
which often is referred to as quasi-hyperbolic discounting, captures the essence of hy-
perbolic discounting.10 While δ ∈ (0, 1] represents a time-consistent discount factor,
β ∈ (0, 1] introduces a time-inconsistent preference for immediate gratification and
represents a person’s self-control problem: for β < 1, at any given moment the person
has an extra bias for the present over the future.11 In order to focus on the effects
that arise from the present bias embodied in the agent’s preferences, we abstract from
time-consistent exponential discounting, that is, formally we set δ = 1.
An individual is modeled as a composite of autonomous intertemporal selves. These
selves are labeled according to their respective periods of control over the effort deci-
sion. During its period of control, self t observes all past effort choices. The current self
cannot commit future selves to a particular path of effort decisions. Within this frame-
work, we study three types of agents: time-consistent agents (TC) as a benchmark, and
two types of hyperbolic discounters, naifs (N) and sophisticates (S).12 A naif is com-
pletely unaware of future self-control problems and hence wrongly predicts his future
behavior: He believes that his future self’s preferences will be identical to his current
self’s, not realizing that as the date of action gets closer his tastes will have changed. A
sophisticate, in contrast, is fully aware of his future self-control problems and therefore
correctly predicts how he will behave in the future. The first-period intertemporal util-
ity of an agent of type i ∈ {TC,N, S} is given by U i1 = −c(e1)− βc(e2) + βg (e1 + e2).
Accordingly, given first-period effort eˆ1, the second-period intertemporal utility takes
the form U i2 = −c(e2) + βg (eˆ1 + e2). The parameter β ∈ (0, 1) measures the degree of
present bias. For a time-consistent agent we have β = 1.
Following the literature on present-biased preferences, we assume that agents follow
perception-perfect strategies, that is, strategies such that in all periods a person chooses
the optimal action given her current preferences and her perception of future behavior.
In each period, time-consistent and naive agents are just choosing an optimal effort
path. While a time-consistent agent will always follow the effort path chosen in the
10Throughout this paper, we use the terms“present-biased preferences”, “hyperbolic discounting”, and
“quasi-hyperbolic discounting” interchangeably.
11While originally introduced by Phelps and Pollak (1968) to study intergenerational altruism, these
present-biased preferences have been reapplied by Laibson (1996, 1997) to study intra-personal,
time-inconsistent decision problems. Besides procrastination and consumption-saving decisions,
present-biased preferences have been applied to a broad range of contexts of economic interest, for
example contract design (DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004, 2006)), industrial organization (Nocke
and Peitz (2003), Sarafidis (2005)), bargaining (Akin (2007)), information acquisition (Carrillo
and Mariotti (2000), Benabou and Tirole (2000)), and labor economics (DellaVigna and Paserman
(2005)).
12The two extreme assumptions about awareness, naivete´ and sophistication, already have been dis-
cussed by Strotz (1956) and Pollak (1968). Though we focus on these two extreme cases of
awareness, in the appendix we show that all our results extend to agents who are partially naive
in the sense of O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001b).
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first period, a naif, in contrast, will often revise his chosen effort path as his preferences
change over time. Sophisticates, on the other hand, in a sense play a game against
their future selves. Their behavior therefore incorporates reactions to behavior by
their future selves that they cannot directly control as well as attempts to strategically
manipulate the behavior of their future selves.
3. The Analysis
In this section, we solve the model for the three types of agents: time-consistent individ-
uals, naifs and sophisticates. Hyperbolic discounters have a preference for immediate
gratification. As was shown, for instance in O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b), due to this
present bias hyperbolic discounters are prone to procrastinate working on unpleasant
tasks. Therefore, in our model with continuous effort choice over several periods, one
should expect both naifs and sophisticates to procrastinate in the sense of an increasing
effort profile over time. Moreover, compared to a time-consistent agent, both types of
hyperbolic discounters perceive immediate effort costs as higher relative to future effort
costs and future rewards. Hence, one should expect both types of hyperbolic discoun-
ters to exert less effort in total than a time-consistent agent. We begin the analysis
with the benchmark case of an agent without self-control problems.
The Time-Consistent Agent Since the preferences of a time-consistent agent do
not change over time, his intertemporal decision problem boils down to maximizing
lifetime utility, UTC1 , by choosing both first- and second-period effort levels simulta-
neously. From the corresponding first-order conditions we immediately obtain that a
TC chooses the same effort level in both periods. This optimal effort level, eTC , is
characterized by
c′(eTC) = g′(eTC + eTC) . (II.1)
Hence, a TC prefers to smooth effort in the sense that in each period he invests the
same effort level in the task.13 This is intuitively plausible: With the cost of effort
being a convex function, a time-consistent agent can improve on any uneven allocation
of effort over time by keeping total effort - and thus the final reward - constant, but
shifting effort from the high-effort period to the low-effort period, thereby reducing
total effort costs.
13This clearly is an artifact of our choice to abstract from time-consistent discounting. With δ < 1, a
time-consistent agent would choose an increasing effort path, as was shown by Fischer (2001).
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The Naive Agent A naive agent is unaware that his preferences will change over
time. In the first period he believes that his second-period self will have the same
preferences, that is, he believes he will stick to the plan he chooses now. When the
second period finally rolls around, however, a naif’s preferences will have changed.
Definition II.1: A perception-perfect strategy for a naive agent is given by (eN1 , e
N
2 (eˆ1))
such that (i) (eN1 , e
TC
2 ) ∈ argmax(e1,e2) U
N
1 (e1, e2), and (ii) ∀ eˆ1 ≥ 0, e
N
2 (eˆ1) ∈ argmaxe2
UN2 (eˆ1, e2). Let e
N
2 = e
N
2 (e
N
1 ).
In the first period a naive agent maximizes UN1 with respect to e1 and e2.
14 The actual
first-period effort, eN1 , and the planned second-period effort, e
TC
2 , are characterized by
the following conditions:
g′(eN1 + e
TC
2 ) = c
′(eTC2 ) (II.2)
βg′(eN1 + e
TC
2 ) = c
′(eN1 ) . (II.3)
Since there is no decision to be made after period 2, beliefs about own future behavior
play no further role in determining the second-period effort. Hence, in the second
period a naive person maximizes UN2 with respect to e2. The corresponding first-order
condition which characterizes the second-period effort, eN2 , is given by
βg′(eN1 + e
N
2 ) = c
′(eN2 ) . (II.4)
From equations (II.1)-(II.4) the following result is readily obtained.
Proposition II.1: (i) A naive agent invests more effort in period 2 than in period 1,
i.e., eN1 < e
N
2 . (ii) The total effort a naive agent invests is lower than the total effort of
a time-consistent person, i.e., eN1 + e
N
2 < 2e
TC. (iii) A naive agent is overly optimistic
when predicting his future-self ’s willingness to work, i.e., eN2 < e
TC
2 .
Parts (i) and (ii) of Proposition 1 state that the two intuitive conjectures made above
hold true for naive hyperbolic discounters. According to part (i), a naive agent pro-
crastinates in the beginning and tries to catch up in the end. Part (ii) compares
the behavior of a naif and a time-consistent agent. The present bias leads to higher
perceived costs for a naif, which makes him exhibit lower overall effort than a time-
consistent agent. Moreover, part (iii) says that a naive agent overestimates his own
capabilities. Believing that he will behave time-consistently in the future, a naive agent
makes ambitious plans today, that he does not follow through tomorrow.
14Equivalently, we could solve for the behavior of a time-consistent agent in period 2 for a given
first-period effort, eTC
2
(e1). Then, wrongly believing himself to behave time-consistently in the
future, in period 1 a naive agent maximizes UN
1
with respect to e1 subject to e2 = e
TC
2
(e1). We
will actually make use of this procedure in the appendix.
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The Sophisticated Agent In contrast to a naif, a sophisticate is fully aware that
his preferences will change. Therefore, correctly predicting his own future behavior, a
sophisticate plays a game against his future self, which can be solved per backwards
induction.
Definition II.2: A perception-perfect strategy for a sophisticated agent is given by
(eS1 , e
S
2 (eˆ1)) such that (i) ∀ eˆ1 ≥ 0, e
S
2 (eˆ1) ∈ argmaxe2 U
S
2 (eˆ1, e2), and (ii) e
S
1 ∈ argmaxe1
US1 (e1, e
S
2 (e1)). Let e
S
2 = e
S
2 (e
S
1 ).
For a given first period effort level eˆ1, in period 2 a sophisticate maximizes U
S
2 with
respect to e2. The second-period effort obviously is a function of the first-period effort,
eS2 (eˆ1), and satisfies the corresponding first-order condition,
βg′(eˆ1 + e
S
2 (eˆ1)) = c
′(eS2 (eˆ1)) . (II.5)
Differentiating (II.5) with respect to e1 yields
deS2 (e1)
de1
= −
βg′′(e1 + e
S
2 (e1))
βg′′(e1 + eS2 (e1))− c
′′(eS2 (e1))
∈ (−1, 0) .
The above derivative describes how a second-period sophisticate reacts to a change
in the first-period effort. A higher first-period effort reduces the second-period effort.
Due to the strict convexity of the cost function, however, the absolute value of this
reduction is lower than the increase in effort in the first period. In the first period the
sophisticate maximizes US1 with respect to e1 subject to e2 = e
S
2 (e1). In the appendix
we show that the effort level that globally maximizes US1 , e
S
1 , is characterized by the
corresponding first-order condition.15 This first-order condition is given by
−c′(eS1 ) + βg
′
(
eS1 + e
S
2 (e
S
1 )
)
+
deS2 (e
S
1 )
de1
β
[
g′
(
eS1 + e
S
2 (e
S
1 )
)
− c′(eS2 (e
S
1 ))
]
= 0. (II.6)
With the behavior of a sophisticated agent being characterized by (II.5) and (II.6), the
following result is obtained.
Proposition II.2: (i) A sophisticated agent invests more effort in period 2 than in
period 1, i.e., eS1 < e
S
2 . (ii) The total effort a sophisticated agent invests is lower than
the total effort of a time-consistent person, i.e., eS1 + e
S
2 < 2e
TC.
Except for the fact that a sophisticated agent correctly predicts his own future be-
havior, his behavior otherwise qualitatively parallels that of a naive agent: First, a
15While there is not necessarily a unique perception-perfect strategy for a sophisticated agent, all
perception-perfect effort pairs are characterized by the corresponding first-order conditions. Mul-
tiple perception-perfect strategies are a well-known phenomenon for sophisticated hyperbolic dis-
counters, see for instance O’Donoghue and Rabin (2008).
52 Dissertation of Fabian Herweg
sophisticated agent procrastinates working on the task in the sense of an increasing
effort profile over time.16 Secondly, with the present bias increasing the perceived cost
of effort, in total a sophisticate works less than a time-consistent agent.17
4. Comparison of the Naive and the Sophisticated Agent
Having compared the behavior of both types of hyperbolic discounters with the behavior
of a time-consistent agent, now we are interested in how naifs and sophisticates compare
to each other. Put differently, what effects does awareness of self-control problems have
on performance and overall satisfaction? To answer this question a welfare criterion
needs to be defined. Following O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b, 2005) we use people’s
long-run preferences.
Definition II.3: A person’s long-run preferences are given by U0(e1, e2) ≡ −c(e1) −
c(e2) + g(e1 + e2).
Long-run preferences reflect a person’s preferences when asked from a prior perspective
when he has no option to indulge immediate gratification. To formalize this long-run
perspective, it is assumed that there is a (fictitious) period 0 where a person has no
decision to make.18 It turns out that comparing first period efforts is sufficient to
answer the question who is better off, naifs or sophisticates.
Lemma II.1: Suppose that ei1 > e
j
1, for i, j ∈ {S,N} and i 6= j. Then (i) e
i
2 < e
j
2, (ii)
ei1 + e
i
2 > e
j
1 + e
j
2, and (iii) U
i
0 ≥ U
j
0 .
The lemma has a clear intuition. Since there is no decision to be made in the future,
awareness plays no role in the second period. Hence, for a given effort level from
the first period, both types of hyperbolic discounters face the same problem in period
2. Consequently, the type who works more in the first period works less in the second
period. Due to the convexity of the cost function, however, the difference in first-period
efforts is larger than the difference in second-period efforts. Thus, the type who invests
more effort in the first period, in the end also has the overall better performance. The
optimal effort levels from a long-run perspective are those chosen by a TC. While for
both types of hyperbolic discounters total effort is below this optimal level of total
effort, the type who works more in the first period is closer to the optimal total effort.
16A similar result can be found in Fischer (1999) for log utility functions.
17Similar results can be found in the consumption-saving literature for sophisticated present-biased
consumers, see for instance Laibson (1996).
18Another possibility would be to apply the Pareto criterion, where one outcome is deemed better
than another if and only if the person views it as better at all points in time. A discussion of these
two welfare criteria for hyperbolic discounters is provided in O’Donoghue and Rabin (2005).
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Moreover, this total effort is more evenly - and thus, more efficiently - allocated over
the two periods. Therefore, the type of hyperbolic discounter who works more in the
first period is better of from a long-run perspective.
An intuitive guess would be that a sophisticate, who is aware of his self-control
problems, will exhibit a higher first-period effort - and hence a higher total effort - than
a naif. This would also be in line with previous research. For instance, O’Donoghue
and Rabin (1999b) show that “when costs are immediate, sophisticates do at least as
well as naifs (i.e. US0 ≥ U
N
0 )” (p.113).
19 While previous research analyzing the effects of
awareness solely focuses on models with discrete action spaces, we analyze a continuous
action space model. The following simple example demonstrates that the earlier result
that sophisticates are always better off than naifs when costs are immediate does not
hold true in general.20
Example: Let the cost function be c(e) = (5/3)(1 + z)(1/10)ze2 for e ≤ 1/10,
c(e) = (1/3)e1+z − 1/3(1/10)1+z(1− z)/2 for e ∈ (1/10, 1) and c(e) = (1/6)(1 + z)e2 +
1/3[1 − (1/10)1+z(1 − z)/2 − (1 + z)/2] for e ≥ 1. The reward function is given by
g(e1 + e2) = 2(e1 + e2)− (1/2)(e1 + e2)
2 for e1 + e2 ≤ 2 and g(e1 + e2) = 2 otherwise.
Suppose that z = .005 and β = 1/4.21 The optimal effort choices of a sophisticate in
the perception-perfect equilibrium are eS1 = .02602 and e
S
2 = .63700. In contrary, a naif
chooses eN1 = .03718 and e
N
2 = .62595 in the perception-perfect equilibrium. In this ex-
ample, a naif invests more effort in the task than a sophisticate both in the first period
and in total.22 Hence, a naif is better of than a sophisticate from a welfare point of view,
i.e., US0 −U
N
0 < 0. Thus, in contrast to earlier findings, awareness of future self-control
problems can hurt the agent even in a model of immediate costs and delayed rewards.23
As the above discussion suggests, characterizing the impact of awareness is complicated.
19That sophisticates are better off than naifs when costs are immediate is shown in several other
papers. O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001b), extend their earlier finding to a setting where a person
has to choose which task to perform from a menu of mutually exclusive tasks. Most recently,
considering long-term projects, O’Donoghue and Rabin (2008) have shown that in contrast to
sophisticates, naifs may start costly projects but then procrastinate finishing these projects, thus
never reaping the reward.
20That sophistication may hurt a hyperbolic discounter is well known in the literature for models
where costs are delayed and rewards are immediate like models of addiction, see O’Donoghue and
Rabin (2001a).
21While the cost function is continuously differentiable, it is not twice continuously differentiable.
Thus, the example does not fit perfectly to our Assumption 1.
22A similar finding is obtained by Tobacman (2008) in a consumption-saving framework with CRRA
preferences. He shows that current consumption can be decreasing in the degree of naivete´. Welfare
implications, however, are not drawn.
23While this result may be somewhat counterintuitive, there actually is empirical evidence supporting
this suggestion. Wong (2008) finds that time-inconsistency is associated with lower class perfor-
mance irrespective of awareness. Effects of time-inconsistency on class performance, however, are
smaller in magnitude and less statistically significant under naivete´ than under sophistication.
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Identifying the underlying effects that drive the different behavior of naifs and sophis-
ticates, however, allows us to derive sufficient conditions for a sophisticate exhibiting
higher first-period effort than a naif.
Pessimism Effect and Incentive Effect Why does sophistication may not help
to increase first-period effort and thereby long-run utility? What are the driving forces
behind this observation? O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a, 2001a) carefully identify two
effects how awareness of self-control problems can influence an agent’s behavior. First,
as O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a) point out, “sophistication about future self-control
problems can make a person pessimistic about future behavior” (p.16). Knowing that
- from today’s perspective - the future self will not behave optimally, may induce a
sophisticate to directly respond to his future shortcomings. Reasoning like “I know
that I won’t work hard tomorrow, so I’ll work more today” probably is familiar to
everyone. This is what O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a, 2001a) call the pessimism
effect. This, however, is only half the story. Sophistication about one’s own self-control
problems has a second, less direct effect on today’s behavior. Knowing about his own
future misbehavior also makes a sophisticate aware of the need and the potential to
strategically influence his future behavior via his behavior today. This second channel
is labeled incentive effect by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a, 2001a).24 So the following
question is immediately at hand: How are these effects operative in the model presented
in this paper?
A sophisticate in period 1 realizes that he will work less in period 2 than is optimal
from today’s perspective. He directly responds to his future shortcomings by working
more today. Thus, due to the pessimism effect a sophisticate tends to work more in
period 1 than a naif.25 The incentive effect, however, in tendency leads to a lower first-
period effort. The first-period self of a sophisticate would like to see his future self invest
more effort in the task than he actually does. Since the second-period self increases
effort when first-period effort is reduced, the first-period self can create incentives for
his future self to work more by working less today. Formally, adding and subtracting
βg′(e1+ e
TC
2 (e1)) from dU
S
1 /de1 yields the following formulation of the marginal utility
24The pessimism effect and the incentive effect represent a decomposition of the “sophistication effect”
identified by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999b).
25O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999a, 2001a) use the term pessimism effect in models of addictive goods
and present-biased preferences. In addictive good models, where rewards are immediate and costs
are delayed, the pessimism effect can hurt the agent. In our context, the pessimism effect helps
the sophisticate to achieve a better performance than a naif. Thus, in the model of this paper the
term pessimism effect is a little bit misleading. Here, it would be more suitable to call this effect
“realism effect”.
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of a sophisticate in period 1:
dUS1
de1
= βg′(e1 + e
TC
2 (e1))− c
′(e1)
+ β
[
g′(e1 + e
S
2 (e1))− g
′(e1 + e
TC
2 (e1))
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
PE
+(1− β)(deS2 /de1)c
′
(
eS2 (e1)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
IE
,
where eTC2 (e1) is the effort a TC chooses in period 2 for a given first period effort.
Note that the first term equals zero for e1 = e
N
1 . The second term, PE, is positive
and reflects the pessimism effect. The agent knows that his future self chooses eS2 (e1)
instead of eTC2 (e1), which would be optimal from today’s perspective. The third term,
IE, is negative and characterizes the impact of the incentive effect.26 Given that US1
is a quasi-concave function in e1, then a sophisticate chooses higher effort levels than
a naif if the incentive effect does not outweigh the pessimism effect.
At first glance, the two effects seem to be weighted by the present bias parameter
β.27 When having a closer look at the problem, however, it turns out that things are
more complicated. When the present bias is low (β → 1) then eS2 is close to e
TC
2 and
there is not much pessimism involved. When the present bias is extreme (β → 0) then
deS2 /de1 → 0 and the agent cannot set incentives for his future self effectively.
With pessimism effect and incentive effect moving in opposite directions, it is com-
plicated to obtain general results concerning the comparison of naive and sophisticated
behavior. Nevertheless, using the insights gained from the above discussion we can
characterize sufficient conditions for the cost and reward function such that sophisti-
cated agents are better off than naive ones.
Lemma II.2: Suppose that c′′′(·) ≤ 0 and g′′′(·) ≤ 0. Then a sophisticated agent
chooses a strictly higher effort in the first period than a naive agent, i.e., eS1 > e
N
1 .
In the proof of the above lemma we compile sufficient conditions such that the incentive
effect never outweighs the pessimism effect. So Lemma 2 states a very intuitive result:
given the pessimism effect outweighs the incentive effect, then sophisticates choose
higher first-period efforts than naifs.
26To be precise, it is not possible to completely disentangle the two effects, because the incentive
effect is only operative if the pessimism effect is operative.
27For a low degree of present bias the pessimism effect seems to be more important than the incentive
effect. The agent cares more about a high reward than delegating work to his future self, and
thus works harder today. On the other hand, for a high degree of present bias the incentive effect
seems to be more important. The agent’s perceived cost in the second period is remarkably lower
than his cost today. Thus, the agent prefers to create incentives for his future self to work harder
by working less today. And indeed, this is what happens in our example: For a high degree of
present-bias, β = 1/4, sophistication hurts the agent because it makes him work less in the first
period than under naivete´. For a low degree of present bias, on the other hand, for instance if
β = 3/4, a sophisticate works more than a naif, and hence is better off . A similar finding is
obtained by Gruber and Ko˝szegi (2001) who analyze the behavior of sophisticates in a model of
addictive goods.
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Proposition II.3: Suppose that c′′′(·) ≤ 0 and g′′′(·) ≤ 0. Then the long-run utility of
a sophisticated agent is at least as great as the long-run utility of a naive agent, i.e.,
US0 ≥ U
N
0 . Moreover, the performance of a sophisticated agent is strictly higher than
the performance of a naive agent, i.e., eS1 + e
S
2 > e
N
1 + e
N
2 .
5. Deadlines
In daily life deadlines are an often encountered phenomenon. As an example consider
the “good-standing rules” of the Bonn Graduate School of Economics: after a year of
coursework, a first paper has to be completed at the end of the second year, a second
paper at the end of the third year, and a third paper at the end of the fourth year. A
rational decision-maker with time-consistent preferences would not welcome constraints
on his choices. But if people impulsively procrastinate, and if they are also aware of
their procrastination problems, deadlines can be strategic and reasonable. Perhaps the
best empirical demonstration is the study of Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002), which
we will discuss in more detail at the end of this section. In this section we ask if and
how the behavior of a present-biased agent is affected by the existence of deadlines.
Our main finding is that deadlines help an individual to structure his workload more
efficiently, which decreases effort costs and in turn improves performance.28
A Multi-Task Model To tackle this question we have to modify the simple frame-
work introduced above. While we stick to the case of two periods, we now assume that
there are two independent tasks to be undertaken by the agent, task A and task B.
We consider two regimes: deadline and no deadline. When the agent faces no (interim)
deadline he is completely free in his decision how to divide his effort on tasks and over
time. More precisely, the agent can work in both periods on both tasks. When there
is an (interim) deadline, however, the agent can invest effort in task A only in period
1, whereas he can work on task B in both periods.29 The reward for a task depends
on the total effort invested in that task up to its deadline.30 Effort costs for a particu-
28One caveat is in order: While we solely focus on the positive commitment effect of deadlines,
flexibility has a strictly positive value if, for instance, future task costs are uncertain. In this case,
a deadline is welfare enhancing only if the positive commitment effect outweighs the negative effect
due to the reduction in flexibility. See Amador et al. (2006) for a detailed analysis of the tradeoff
between commitment and flexibility.
29In order to obtain a comparison of the two regimes in terms of the effort level chosen, we introduce a
second task which allows us to consider a regime-independent reward scheme. With only one task,
the reward under the regime without deadlines would have to be a function of total effort only,
whereas the reward under the regime of deadlines would have to be a function of both first-period
effort and total effort, making a comparison infeasible.
30Our model also encompasses another kind of deadline where task B is handed out after the deadline
for task A, as it is typically the case for students’ homework assignments. Formally, eB1 = 0 a
priori. Since - and now we are jumping ahead - the agent optimally chooses eB1 = 0 anyway, this
does not impose any additional restrictions and results do not change.
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lar period are determined by the sum of efforts invested in both tasks in that period.
Formally, let eit denote the effort invested in task i ∈ {A,B} in period t ∈ {1, 2}.
Moreover, let et = eAt + eBt be the total effort that the agent exhibits in period t, and
ei = ei1+ ei2 be the total effort invested in task i. The reward for task i ∈ {A,B} then
is given by gi(ei1+ ei2), and the total effort cost in period t ∈ {1, 2} is c(eAt+ eBt). We
assume that the grade function is the same for both tasks, that is, gA(·) = gB(·) = g(·).
Moreover, we keep the functional assumptions imposed in Section 3. In all that follows,
the double-superscript refers to the regime that the agent faces: D for a situation with
a deadline, and ND for a situation without a deadline.
The Time-Consistent Agent As a benchmark, consider a time-consistent agent
who faces no deadline. In the above language, the intertemporal utility of this agent
in period 1 is given by
UTC
ND
1 = −c(eA1 + eB1)− c(eA2 + eB2) + g(eA1 + eA2) + g(eB1 + eB2).
Choosing eA1, eA2, eB1, eB2 in order to maximize this expression yields
c′(eTC
ND
1 ) = c
′(eTC
ND
2 ) = g
′(eTC
ND
A ) = g
′(eTC
ND
B ). (II.7)
It follows immediately that a time-consistent agent equates effort over tasks and smoothes
effort over time, that is, eA = eB and e1 = e2. Put differently, when 2e
TCND denotes
the overall effort that a time-consistent agent invests over the two periods, then he
invests eTC
ND
in the first period and eTC
ND
in the second period. Moreover, eTC
ND
is
spent on task A and eTC
ND
is spent on task B. Note, however, that a time-consistent
agent does not care about how he splits up his per period effort between the two tasks
as long as he invests evenly in both tasks. This implies that being subject to a deadline
does not help a time-consistent agent. When investment in task A is possible only in
period 1, for a desired overall effort level 2eTC
ND
the time-consistent agent still can
choose eTC
D
A = e
TCD
1 = e
TCND and eTC
D
B = e
TCD
2 = e
TCND .
The Sophisticated Agent First consider a sophisticate who faces no deadline.
Having two periods of time to work on two tasks is similar to having two periods of
time to work on one task. The only additional question is how to divide the total effort
on the two tasks. The reward function is identical for both tasks, thus it is optimal
to invest half of the total effort in each task. From the single-task exercise we know
that a sophisticate has a tendency to work more in period 2 than in period 1. By
always working harder in the second period the agent can achieve effort smoothing
over tasks in the second period irrespectively of the proportion of first period effort
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spend on a specific task.31 This observation allows us to focus on the agent’s effort
choice over time. With effort being spread out evenly among the two tasks, the optimal
second-period effort as a function of first-period effort, eS
ND
2 (eˆ1), is characterized by
c′(eS
ND
2 (eˆ1)) = βg
′((1/2)(eˆ1 + e
SND
2 (eˆ1))). (II.8)
The effort level chosen by a sophisticate in the first period, eS
ND
1 , is determined by the
following first-order condition,32
βg′((1/2)(eS
ND
1 + e
SND
2 (e
SND
1 )))− c
′(eS
ND
1 )
+
deS
ND
2 (e1)
de1
β
[
g′((1/2)(eS
ND
1 + e
SND
2 (e
SND
1 )))− c
′(eS
ND
2 (e
SND
1 ))
]
= 0 . (II.9)
Note that the two first-order conditions are very similar to those obtained in the single
task case. Recapitulatory, when not facing a deadline, a sophisticated agent equates
effort over tasks like a time-consistent agent, but does not achieve effort-smoothing over
time, i.e. eS
ND
1 < e
SND
2 and eA = eB = (1/2)(e
SND
1 + e
SND
2 ), where e
SND
2 = e
SND
2 (e
SND
1 ).
Next, consider a situation where a sophisticated agent faces a deadline in the sense
described above: task A is due at the end of the first period, while task B is due at the
end of the second period. Put differently, the agent can invest effort in task A only in
period 1, whereas he can work for task B in both periods. Formally, eA2 = 0, eA = eA1
and eB2 = e2. For given effort levels eˆA and eˆB1, in the second period the agent’s utility
is given by
US
D
2 = −c(eB2) + βg(eˆA) + βg(eˆB1 + eB2) .
The optimal second-period effort invested in task B as a function of the first-period-
effort invested in task B, eS
D
B2 (eˆB1), satisfies
c′(eS
D
B2 (eˆB1)) = βg
′(eˆB1 + e
SD
B2 (eˆB1)) . (II.10)
Differentiation of (II.10) yields
deS
D
B2 (eB1)
deB1
= −
βg′′(eB1 + e
SD
B2 (eB1))
βg′′(eB1 + eS
D
B2 (eB1))− c
′′(eS
D
B2 (eB1))
∈ (−1, 0) .
Correctly predicting his own future behavior, in period 1 a sophisticated agent chooses
eA and eB1 in order to maximize his intertemporal utility,
US
D
1 = −c(eA + eB1)− βc(e
SD
B2 (eB1)) + βg(eA) + βg(eB1 + e
SD
B2 (eB1)) .
31In the proof of Proposition 4 we formally show, that there is no perception-perfect strategy where
the first-period self commits to a first-period effort that high and that unevenly allocated among
tasks, such that total second-period effort needed to achieve effort smothing over tasks becomes
too costly.
32The first-order approach is valid according to the same reasoning as in the single-task case.
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This utility maximization problem, however, does not have an interior solution.33 When
facing a deadline, a sophisticated agent considers it optimal to work exclusively on
task A in the first period, that is, eS
D
B1 = 0. Intuitively, the single-task case and the
no-deadline case suggest that a present-biased agent will work harder in the second
period. Hence, under a deadline, there is a tendency to invest more effort in task B
anyway. But then investing in task B in the first period is not optimal, because, due
to decreasing marginal rewards, the agent can benefit from shifting first-period effort
from task B to task A. While intuitively plausible4, the formal proof of this statement
is somewhat elaborate and therefore deferred to the appendix. The effort levels which
are chosen strictly positive, eS
D
A and e
SD
B2 , are characterized as follows:
c′(eS
D
A ) = βg
′(eS
D
A ) (II.11)
c′(eS
D
B2 ) = βg
′(eS
D
B2 ) (II.12)
From (II.11) and (II.12) it follows immediately that eS
D
A = e
SD
B2 . To sum up: When
facing a deadline, a sophisticated agent smoothes effort over time and equates effort
over tasks. Moreover, he does not invest in task B in period 1. Let eS
D
denote the
effort level that is chosen under a regime of deadlines in each period and per task.
Formally we have eS
D
1 = e
SD
A = e
SD and eS
D
B = e
SD
2 = e
SD .
After all, we are interested in whether deadlines are helpful to overcome self-control
problems and thereby to improve performance and the agent’s satisfaction. The fol-
lowing proposition compares the behavior and well-being of a sophisticate under both
regimes, deadlines and no deadlines.
Proposition II.4: When facing a deadline, a sophisticated agent chooses a higher
effort level in the first period and a higher total effort level than under a regime without
a deadline, i.e., eS
ND
1 < e
SD and eS
ND
1 + e
SND
2 < 2e
SD . Moreover, the sophisticated
agent is strictly better off from a long-run perspective when facing a deadline, i.e.,
US
D
0 > U
SND
0 .
The above proposition has a clear intuition: a deadline helps a sophisticate to better
structure his work on the two tasks. He has to complete task A in the first period
and therefore he cannot procrastinate finishing task A as he does without a deadline.
Thus, the deadline helps the sophisticate to combat procrastination and thereby effort
is allocated more efficiently over the two periods. This more efficient allocation reduces
effort cost, which in turn leads to a higher overall effort and a better performance.
The optimal total effort level from a long-run perspective is the one chosen by a TC.
Furthermore, for any total effort level the optimal allocation is investing equal amounts
33With interior solution we refer to a pair of first-period effort choices (eA, eB1) with 0 < eA, eB1 <∞.
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in both tasks and exhibiting the same amount of effort in each period. Irrespectively
of the regime, deadline or no deadline, the total effort a sophisticate invests in the
tasks is below the optimal total effort of a TC. With a deadline, however, the level of
total effort a sophisticate chooses is closer to a TC’s total effort. Moreover, this more
desirable level of total effort is more evenly allocated over the two periods. For this
reason a sophisticate is better off when being constrained by a deadline.34
The Naive Agent Since the analysis for the naive agent is completely analogous to
the one of the sophisticated agent for the regime with a deadline and to the single-task
case for the regime without a deadline, we defer the formal analysis to the appendix.
Here we briefly state the main results and then move on to a discussion of our findings.
When not facing a deadline, a naive agent equates efforts over tasks, but chooses a
higher effort level in the second period, that is, eN
ND
1 < e
NND
2 . When being subject to
a deadline, a naive agent also equates effort over tasks, but - in contrast - smoothes
effort over time. In particular, the first-period effort is spent exclusively on task A and
the second-period effort is spent exclusively on task B. Formally, eN
D
1 = e
ND
A = e
ND
and eN
D
B = e
ND
2 = e
ND . As a consequence, under a deadline a naive agent achieves
a more desirable allocation of his effort, which in turn leads to a higher level of total
effort under deadlines. Hence, with the same reasoning as above, a deadline also makes
a naive agent better off.
Proposition II.5: When facing a deadline, a naive agent chooses a higher effort level
in the first period and a higher total effort level than under a regime without a deadline,
i.e., eN
ND
1 < e
ND and eN
ND
1 + e
NND
2 < 2e
ND . Moreover, from a long-run perspective,
being subject to a deadline makes a naive agent strictly better off, i.e., UN
D
0 > U
NND
0 .
One question is immediately at hand: Which type of hyperbolic discounter benefits
more from being exposed to an interim deadline? As it turns out, under a deadline
sophisticates and naifs choose the same allocation of effort, that is, eS
D
= eN
D
.35
Thus, with long-run utility being the same for both types of hyperbolic discounters
when facing a deadline, we just have to compare long-run utilities when there are
no deadlines in order to answer the question of interest. With effort being evenly
distributed over tasks no matter what, the situation without an interim deadline is
comparable to the single-task case. Hence, from our earlier findings we know that
in general it is undetermined which type of hyperbolic discounter benefits more from
34That restrictions on the choice set may help to reduce procrastination is also shown by O’Donoghue
and Rabin (2001).
35This result, which is an artefact of our model where the agent faces as many deadlines and tasks as
periods, is formally established in the proof of Proposition 5.
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being exposed to deadlines. When c′′′(·) ≤ 0 and g′′′(·) ≤ 0, however, a naive agent will
benefit at least as much from the imposition of a deadline as a sophisticated agent.
Discussion We have shown so far that simple deadlines can help people with self-
control problems to improve their performance. The reason is that being exposed to
deadlines allows people to allocate their effort more efficiently, which in turn leads to
a higher amount of total effort and an overall better performance. Our findings are
highly in line with the empirical observations of Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002). They
demonstrate the value and effectiveness of deadlines for improving task performance
in two different studies both conducted at MIT. In one study participants were “native
English speakers [who were given the task to] proofread papers of other students to
evaluate writing skills”. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions:
evenly-spaced deadlines, end-deadline, or self-imposed deadlines.36 In each condition
a participant had to read three texts and payment was contingent on the quality of
the proofreading with a penalty for each day of delay.37 The number of errors cor-
rectly detected was highest in the evenly-spaced-deadlines condition, followed by the
self-imposed-deadlines condition, with the lowest performance in the end-deadline con-
dition. Moreover, participants were asked to estimate how much time they had spent on
each of the three texts. Participants in the evenly-spaced-deadlines condition spent the
highest amount of time on each text, followed by the participants of the self-imposed-
deadlines condition, while participants of the end-deadline condition have invested the
least amount of time. Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) summarize these observations
as follows: “[T]he results show that when deadline constraints increased, performance
improved [and] time spend on the task increased” (p.223). These observations are
predicted by our theoretical analysis of agents with self-control problems: a deadline
increases total effort, which in turn improves performance. In the other study profes-
sionals participating in an executive-education course at MIT had the task to write
three short papers. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two treatments:
no-choice or free-choice. In the no-choice treatment deadlines were fixed and evenly
spaced, in the free-choice treatment participants were free to choose the deadlines. In
both treatments deadlines were binding and there was a penalty for late submission.38
36While the evenly-spaced deadlines condition is comparable to our deadline regime, our regime of no
deadlines corresponds to the end-deadline condition.
37By setting their deadlines as late as possible, the participants would have the most time to work on
the texts and the highest flexibility in arranging their workload.
38Besides giving the students the most time to work on the papers and the highest flexibility in
arranging their workload, by setting their deadlines as late as possible they would also have the
opportunity to learn the most about the topic before submitting the papers. Students also had an
incentive to set submission dates late because the penalty would be applied only to late submissions
and not to early ones. Finally, students who wanted to submit assignments early could privately
plan to do so without precommitting to the instructor.
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The main finding is that the grade in the no-choice treatment is significantly higher
than the grade in the free-choice treatment. This observation also is in line with the
theoretical results obtained in this paper.
The focus of the latter study is on self-imposed deadlines and inefficiencies arising
due to suboptimal spacing of these deadlines. Even though we do not endogenize the
timing of deadlines, our model also captures this result - in a highly stylized way. Let
∆US0 denote the long-run utility gain of a sophisticated agent from being exposed to a
deadline. Formally, ∆US0 ≡ U
SD
0 −U
SND
0 . Analogously define ∆U
S
1 ≡ U
SD
1 −U
SND
1 to be
the utility gain of a sophisticated agent from being exposed to a deadline as perceived
from the beginning of the first period. Correctly predicting his future behavior, a
sophisticate will always welcome being subject to a deadline in (fictitious) period zero.
When asked in period 1, however, a sophisticate is not very enthusiastic about facing
a deadline. Formally, ∆US1 < 0 < ∆U
S
0 .
39 In period zero, a naive agent considers a
deadline neither helpful nor harmful, that is, ∆UN0 = 0. In period 1, on the other
hand, a naive agent considers a deadline an undesirable restriction. Formally we have
∆UN1 < 0. Thus, while both types of time-inconsistent agents may be willing to accept
a deadline long before the task is to be performed, this will not be the case when the
task is immediately at hand. Hence, when interpreting “suboptimal spacing of tasks”
as not setting deadlines at all, asking present-biased agents too late whether they are
willing to accept deadlines or to voluntarily impose deadlines on themselves may lead to
agents rejecting this opportunity. Moreover, this finding illustrates what O’Donoghue
and Rabin (2005) point out to be general principles when considering “incentives and
present bias”. Present-biased individuals are sensitive to exactly how decisions are
made - e.g. choosing in advance vs. in the moment. When all consequences of a
decision are sufficiently far in the future, however, present bias is not a problem and
it may be possible to induce better behavior when people are given the opportunity to
make decisions now about future behavior.
6. Conclusion
Empirical evidence suggests that people have self-control problems, in particular a
tendency to procrastinate unpleasant tasks. Former research has shown that this pro-
crastinative behavior can be explained by hyperbolic discounting. The focus of this
paper is not on procrastination itself, but on the effects of hyperbolic discounting and
awareness of the arising self-control problems on performance. We present a simple
model in which an agent has two periods to work on a specific task. His performance
39This result is readily established by a simple revealed-preference argument.
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depends on the total effort invested. We find that self-control problems reduce perfor-
mance. Moreover, sophistication about one’s own self-control problems not necessarily
leads to better performance than naivete´.
In a next step, in a slightly augmented version of the basic model, we analyze the
value and effectiveness of interim deadlines as commitment device. In line with recent
empirical evidence we find that interim deadlines improve performance when indi-
viduals impulsively procrastinate. This improvement of performance, which makes a
present-biased agent better off from a welfare point of view, is based on a more favorable
allocation of effort. The restrictions imposed by deadlines help an agent to better struc-
ture his workload, which in turn leads to lower effort costs and an overall higher effort
level. These results are of interest not only because they provide a theoretical under-
pinning of recent empirical work, but also because they explain many types of deadlines
encountered in daily life. To get back to one of the examples that we have mentioned
so far: Deadlines implemented by the “good-standing” rules of graduate schools make
grad students work focused on each of their papers, finishing a paper thoroughly before
starting another one, thereby improving chances to write high-quality papers. Without
these deadlines, grad students cannot commit themselves to work in their last year in
school exclusively on the their final paper. Instead, they possibly will end up spending
effort on - perhaps unfinished - older papers, resulting in a bunch of low-quality papers
that are finished in a hurry and written sloppy.
The model of this paper is simple in the sense that we consider the shortest possi-
ble time horizon that actually generates quasi-hyperbolic discounting effects. Without
imposing further assumptions on cost and reward functions, analyzing a longer time
horizon in a continuous action space framework, in particular the analysis of the be-
havior of sophisticated individuals, becomes very complicated very quickly. In the
literature the arising complications are sidestepped by assuming instantaneous utility
functions of the CRRA type. Facing the trade off between the analysis of a longer time
horizon on the one hand, and less restrictive functional assumptions on the other hand,
we opted for the latter. We think, however, that the main insights are to be obtained
in our model.
Last, throughout the paper we focused on two extreme cases of awareness, total
naivete´ and full sophistication. As we show in Appendix A.2.2., the behavior of a
partially naive person is somewhere between these two extremes. In consequence, with
both extreme types of hyperbolic discounters benefiting from the presence of interim
deadlines, it is little surprising that this result carries over to the case of partially naive
individuals.
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III. Relaxing Competition Through
Quality and Tariff
Differentiation
In this chapter, I compare two-part tariff competition to linear
pricing in a vertically differentiated duopoly. Consumers have
identical tastes for quality but differ in their preferences for quan-
tity. The main finding is that quality differentiation occurs in
equilibrium if and only if two-part tariffs are feasible. Further-
more, two-part tariff competition encourages entry, which in turn
increases welfare. Nevertheless, two-part tariff competition de-
creases consumers’ surplus compared to linear pricing.
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1. Introduction
In many markets different firms sell products of different qualities. What are firms’
strategic incentives for quality differentiation? In a seminal contribution, Shaked and
Sutton (1982) show that firms can relax price competition via quality differentiation.
This is possible due to heterogeneity of consumers with regard to their tastes for quality.
In Shaked and Sutton, if consumers do not differ in their valuations for quality, firms
have no strategic incentives for quality differentiation. This paper, in contrast, shows
that firms may have incentives for quality differentiation even when consumers do not
differ in their tastes for quality but differ in their preferences for quantity. It is shown
that quality differentiation can relax competition when firms can offer two-part tariffs.
If firms are restricted to linear pricing, however, quality differentiation does not relax
competition.1 The intuition is that selecting different qualities may facilitate market
segmentation in which different classes of consumers are also served different quantities.
Without quality differentiation the firms produce perfect substitutes and thus compete
in a Bertrand fashion. Thus, the novel contribution of this paper to the theory of
product differentiation is to identify differences in consumers’ preferences for quantity
as a reason for strategic quality differentiation by firms.2
The presented model is similar to the well-known Shaked and Sutton unit-demand
model, or rather the Choi and Shin (1992) version with quasi-linear utility functions.
The differences are that in this paper consumers have continuous demand and that
next to linear pricing two-part tariff competition is considered. The analysis presented
in this paper is based on a non-cooperative three-stage game. In the first stage, the
two potential duopolists decide whether to enter the market. After observing the entry
decisions, each firm in the market chooses a quality level for its product. Finally,
observing entry and quality decisions, firms select a two-part tariff (or a linear price
schedule). At each stage, firms act simultaneously and independently.
The main finding is that product differentiation occurs in equilibrium if and only
if two-part tariffs are feasible. One example for quality differentiation and two-part
tariffs is the health club industry: Health clubs often levy a membership fee plus a
per-use charge and they offer a fixed quality (equipment and service). In many cities
there is more than one health club in the city center (no spatial differentiation), and in
most cases these clubs differ in quality.3 Moreover, the implications of the feasibility of
1Linear pricing means that the tariff is a linear function of the quantity q, hence a linear tariff has
the following form: T (q) = p · q. Note, a two-part tariff T (q) = A+ p · q is an affine function.
2That a higher pricing flexibility may increase the degree of product differentiation is not novel to
the literature. Peitz and Valletti (2008) show for horizontally differentiated media platforms that
content differentiation is higher if platforms can charge prices from viewers compared to the case
where platforms are restricted to offer their service free to consumers.
3Other examples for two-part tariffs and vertical differentiation are discotheques, movie theaters
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two-part tariffs on welfare, consumers’ surplus, and industry profits are investigated.
I show that welfare and industry profits are higher and consumers’ surplus is lower if
two-part tariffs are feasible. If two-part tariff competition is feasible, competition is
relaxed and thus both firms enter the market, which in turn increases welfare.
The structure of the paper is as follows: After a brief review of the related literature,
Section 2 describes the model and discusses the linear pricing case. In Section 3,
the model with two-part tariff competition is solved by backwards induction. Section
4 compares the results of two-part tariff competition and linear pricing. Section 5
present two simple applications of the model to the theory of vertical restraints. The
final section summarizes the main findings.
Related Literature: Nonlinear pricing often is observed in oligopolistic markets.4
With several notable exceptions, the existing literature on nonlinear pricing focuses on
the
monopoly problem (cf. Wilson (1992) for monopoly pricing). There exist only few
papers on second-degree price discrimination or nonlinear pricing in oligopoly.5 A clas-
sic paper on this topic is Katz (1984). Katz analyzes an economy with informed high
demand consumers and uninformed low demand consumers. Informed consumers pur-
chase from the cheapest store while uninformed consumers choose a store at random.
In equilibrium, the firms choose tariffs to separate these two groups. Spulber (1989)
studies nonlinear pricing in a free-entry circular-city model. He shows that nonlinear
pricing leads to greater product variety than linear pricing. A seminal contribution to
the literature on nonlinear pricing in oligopoly is Armstrong and Vickers (2001), who
study a general framework with spatially differentiated firms that compete in nonlinear
tariffs.6 They show that under certain conditions firms choose welfare optimal two-part
tariffs in equilibrium. Nonlinear pricing in spatial competition models is also analyzed
by Stole (1995) and Rochet and Stole (2002).7 The approaches of Stole and Rochet and
and several types of clubs. The main difference between movie theaters is the size of the silver
screen. The ticket price is a fixed fee and the price for popcorn can be interpreted as the quantity
depending part. As for discotheques, there typically is a fixed entrance fee whereas drinks are
charged per bottles bought. Movie theaters and discotheques, respectively, are often located close
to a rival.
4There is no commonly accepted definition of nonlinear pricing. Following Wilson (1992, p.5), I
denote a tariff as nonlinear if the average charge is a function of the purchased quantity. In
unit-demand models where firms offer various pairs of quality and price, however, these offers are
often denoted as nonlinear pricing function. Based on the second definition, nonlinear pricing in a
vertically differentiated duopoly is also analyzed by Champsaur and Rochet (1989) and Johnson
and Myatt (2003).
5Pigou (1920) considers three kinds of price discrimination: first-degree price discrimination is perfect
price discrimination, second degree price discrimination is discrimination across quantities and for
third degree price discrimination the prices differ for distinguishable consumers.
6Armstrong and Vickers (2001) also analyze third-degree price discrimination.
7A similar framework is studied by Desai (2001) but with a different focus.
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Stole are highly related to Armstrong and Vickers if the quality is interpreted as quan-
tity. In these models consumers have unit-demand and firms discriminate via different
quality-levels. Since quality and quantity have similar properties, these approaches can
be reinterpreted as nonlinear pricing. A logit demand model with two-part tariffs is
analyzed by Yin (2004).
In contrast to the articles mentioned so far, I analyze nonlinear pricing in a model of
vertical rather than horizontal differentiation.8 In a classic contribution on vertical dif-
ferentiation, Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) analyze a price equilibrium of an oligopoly
game. Consumers differ in income m and obtain utility U = s · (m − p) when they
buy quality s at price p. The qualities of the firms are fixed exogenously in this model.
Shaked and Sutton (1982) extend the Gabszewicz-Thisse model by endogenizing qual-
ity levels. The main result is that in equilibrium firms produce distinct qualities and
thereby relax price competition. Tirole (1988) shows robustness of these earlier results
for the case of the Mussa-Rosen utility function, i.e., for the case in which U = θ ·s−p,
where θ denotes the consumer’s type.9 While Tirole focuses on parameter values such
that the market is fully covered in equilibrium, Choi and Shin (1992) analyze the model
when the market is not covered. A complete characterization of quality choices in a
duopoly model in which consumers have a Mussa-Rosen utility function is given by
Wauthy (1996). All these models assume that consumers have unit-demand. In con-
trast, I analyze the effects of quantity discounts in a vertically differentiated duopoly,
which cannot be captured by one of the utility functions mentioned above. Conse-
quently, I introduce a novel tractable utility function for the framework with vertically
differentiated firms and multi-unit demand.
2. Description of the Model
There are two potential firms (i = 1, 2) producing (distinct) substitute goods. The
two firms play a non-cooperative three-stage game.10 At the first stage, they decide
independently and simultaneously whether or not to enter the market. In case of entry,
a firm incurs fixed cost K > 0. At stage two, each firm observes whether its rival has
entered the market. Thereafter, both firms independently and simultaneously choose
their respective quality level si ∈ {0,
1
3
, 2
3
, 1}.11 This stage will be referred to as the
8Quality can be seen as a “vertical” product feature in the sense that each consumer prefers higher
quality. The subdivision in vertical and horizontal differentiation is due to Lancaster (1979).
9Mussa and Rosen (1978) characterize the optimal price-quality schedule for a monopolist.
10This three stage game is similar to the one considered by Shaked and Sutton (1982) for their
unit-demand approach.
11The presented analysis can be generalized to quality-levels si ∈ [0, 1]. The existence of tariff game
equilibria, however, then is intricate to show.
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quality game. At the third stage, both firms independently and simultaneously choose
a tariff, having observed the rival’s quality level. Each firm i chooses a two-part tariff:
Ti(q) = Ai + pi · q.
12 Here, q denotes quantity, pi ≥ 0 is the price per unit, and Ai ≥ 0
a fixed fee. The third stage will be called tariff game. If price discrimination is banned
or infeasible, then Ai = 0. The focus of this paper is on firms’ strategic incentives
for product differentiation. To separate this effect, I assume that costs are zero for all
quality levels. Put differently, there is only one reason for a firm not to produce the
best possible quality, namely to relax tariff competition on the final stage.
There exists a continuum of consumers with measure one. I assume that consumers
practice “one-stop shopping”. That is, consumers make all their purchases from one
firm. Thus, each consumer takes one of the following three actions: purchase from firm
1, purchase from firm 2, or do not purchase at all. Consumers differ in a taste parameter
θ that is uniformly distributed on the unit-interval. It is assumed that consumers have
quasi-linear utility functions and the reservation utility is normalized to zero. I assume
that the utility of a consumer with type θ who purchases q units from firm i takes the
following specific form13
U = siq − q
2/(2θ)− Ti(q) θ ∈ (0, 1] . (III.1)
Consumers have the same tastes for quality, but differ in their preferences for quantity.
Put differently, the marginal rate of substitution between quality and money is inde-
pendent of the consumer’s type, i.e., ∂2U/∂si∂θ = 0. The type parameter θ determines
a consumer’s satiation point. With this utility function, an improved quality is more
beneficial to large buyers. For instance, a frequent health club visitor who works out
before going to work suffers more from a low quality, say a dirty shower room, than
a health club member who sporadically goes to the gym in his spare time. Moreover,
quality is not additive in the sense that being member in two low-quality health clubs,
one with clean showers and the other with modern training equipment, is not equivalent
to being member in a high-quality health club that offers both. From the above utility
function I can derive a consumer’s conditional demand function. When a consumer of
type θ buys from firm i, his demand is given by:
qi(pi, θ) = θ(si − pi) for pi ≤ si, (III.2)
and zero otherwise. Inserting the demand into the utility function and ignoring the
12It is assumed that general nonlinear tariffs are infeasible.
13Granted this utility function is arbitrary, but it leads to a tractable linear demand function with rea-
sonable properties. Assuming particular functional forms for consumers’ utility is not uncommon
in the literature on vertical differentiation. Jensen (2008) analyzes the problem of a monopolist
who offers a menu of two-part tariffs and qualities. She also assumes a simple quadratic utility
function in quantity.
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fixed fee yields the surplus function
vi(pi, θ) = (1/2)θ(si − pi)
2 for pi ≤ si, (III.3)
and zero otherwise. This surplus is the maximum net utility a consumer of type θ
can receive excluding a potential fixed fee payment when purchasing from firm i at
marginal price pi. The type parameter θ is a simple multiplier in the consumer’s
surplus function. A consumer’s surplus is increasing in the quality he consumes and
decreasing in the marginal price he has to pay. The consumer’s surplus is a weighted
quadratic function of the product’s“net value”(si−pi). Since a large buyer does benefit
more as quality improves and since demand is increasing in the consumer’s type, the
increase in indirect utility due to an improved quality is larger for a consumer with
a higher type, i.e., ∂2vi/∂si∂θ > 0. If firms practice marginal cost pricing (pi = 0),
then the indirect utility of a consumer with type θ is given by V = 1
2
θ · s2i −Ai.
14 It is
assumed that consumers have full information about the tariffs and the quality levels in
the market. Consumers’ tastes are private information, only the distribution is known
by the firms. If a consumer is indifferent between firm 1 and firm 2, he purchases the
higher-quality product.15 If quality levels are equal, the consumer chooses a store at
random. The equilibrium concept employed is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies. Thus, the game is solved by backwards induction.
2.1. Linear Pricing
Suppose price discrimination is infeasible, that is, firms are restricted to offer linear
prices. It is assumed, without loss of generality, that firm 2 is the high-quality supplier
and that firm 1 is the low-quality supplier, i.e., s1 ≤ s2. Given that both firms are
active in the market, it follows immediately from consumers’ surplus functions that all
consumers purchase from the firm that offers the product with the higher “net value”
(si−pi). In contrast to former models of vertical differentiation, like Shaked and Sutton
(1982), where consumers with different types have different rankings for price-quality
pairs, here all consumers have the same ranking for price-quality pairs. Thus, firms
cannot relax price competition via quality differentiation.
Lemma III.1: Suppose firms are restricted to linear prices and that both firms have
entered the market. Then it is impossible that both firms realize strictly positive profits.
14In this case the consumer’s indirect utility function is similar to the well-known Mussa and Rosen
(1978) utility function for unit demand models with distinct qualities, where U = θ · s − p. The
Mussa and Rosen utility function is used in various models of vertically differentiated markets, for
instance Choi and Shin (1992), or in an augmented version in Rochet and Stole (2002).
15This assumption is not crucial, however, it simplifies some proofs.
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Proof: All proofs are given in the appendix.
The outcome of the two-stage game (quality game and tariff game) when only linear
pricing is feasible, depends on the behavior of firm 1. When firm 1 chooses a quality
s1 < s2 ≤ 1, then in equilibrium firm 1 has no positive market share and consequently
zero profits. On the other hand, if firm 1 chooses s1 = s2, there is perfect competition
and pi1 = pi2 = 0. In either case firm 1 earns zero profits. Consequently, when price
discrimination is infeasible at most one firm enters.
3. Two-part Tariff Competition
Now suppose firms can use two-part tariffs. This section shows that when two-part
tariff competition is feasible firms can relax price competition via tariff and quality
differentiation.
3.1. Preliminary Remarks on the Quality Game
In this subsection, I establish that when both firms are active in the market, they
produce distinct quality levels.
Lemma III.2: Suppose that both firms produce the same quality and two-part tariffs
are feasible. Then in the unique tariff game equilibrium both firms use the cost-based
linear tariff T ∗ = 0 · q and earn zero profits.
The intuition is similar to the reasoning behind the well-known Bertrand paradox.
Assume, for a sake of contradiction, that both firms produce the same quality and at
least one firm makes positive profits. Then the firm with lower profits can increase
its profits by slightly undercutting the rival’s tariff.16 Firm i undercutting firm j’s
tariff means that in an expenditure-quantity diagram the tariff of firm i is completely
below the tariff of firm j. This logic is still true when the firms have equal positive
profits. When firm i slightly undercuts firm j’s tariff, firm i obtains all customers of
firm j and almost always keeps some of its former customers. Consequently, slightly
undercutting the rival’s tariff increases profits. Hence, for equal qualities I obtain that
the well-known Bertrand result also holds when two-part tariffs are feasible.
Without quality differentiation price discrimination is infeasible and perfect compe-
tition leads to zero profits for both firms. Therefore, due to the presence of entry costs,
I obtain the following result for the subgame perfect equilibrium.
Lemma III.3: In any subgame perfect equilibrium in which both firms enter, the firms
produce distinct quality levels.
16The tariff Ti undercuts tariff Tj if ∀q piq +Ai < pjq +Aj .
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This result extends Proposition 1 in Shaked and Sutton (1982) to the multi-unit ap-
proach with two-part tariffs.
3.2. The Tariff Game
Suppose that s2 > s1, so that there is a high-quality supplier (firm 2) and a low-quality
supplier (firm 1). The net surplus of a consumer of type θ, given the tariffs of the two
firms, depending on the consumer’s quality decision is:
V (θ) =


1
2
θ(s2 − p2)
2 − A2 if he buys from firm 2 (high-quality),
1
2
θ(s1 − p1)
2 − A1 if he buys from firm 1 (low-quality),
0 otherwise.
(III.4)
Due to the following lemma, one can focus on the case where the high-quality firm
serves the consumers with high valuations for the good.17
Lemma III.4: There does not exist a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the tariff game
with (i) the low-quality firm selling to consumers with high valuations θ ∈ [θ˜, 1], and
(ii) the high-quality firm selling to consumers with relatively low valuations θ ∈ [θˆ, θ˜],
where 0 ≤ θˆ ≤ θ˜ < 1.
According to Lemma 4, if both firms share the market in equilibrium, then consumers
with relatively strong tastes for the product buy from the high-quality firm. For
“middle-type” consumers, the high-quality firm is too expensive, hence they purchase
the low-quality product at a (very) cheap tariff. Consumers with relatively low tastes
do not purchase at all. I will call consumers who are indifferent between two options
“marginal consumers”. Therefore, in the economy there exist two kinds of marginal
consumers: one is indifferent between buying from firm 1 and firm 2, whereas the other
marginal consumer is indifferent between buying from firm 1 and not buying at all (see
Figure 1). The first type of marginal consumer will be denoted by θ˜, the latter type
by θˆ.
This market structure implies that A2 > A1 and (s2 − p2) > (s1 − p1) in equilib-
rium, see Figure 1.18 From the definitions of the marginal consumers, one immediately
obtains the following characterization of the fixed fees charged by the two firms in an
17Readers should be aware that the proof of Lemma 4 requires some results presented in Section 3
later on. Therefore, I recommend to postpone reading the proof to the end of Section 3.
18For the relations of the fixed fees and the products’ net values one can distinguish four cases. Two
of these cases are ruled out by Lemma 4 as equilibrium candidates. The first of the two remaining
cases is depicted in Figure 1, whereas the second case, in which firm 2 serves the whole market, is
analyzed later on.
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Figure III.1.: Optimal choices for different consumer types.
equilibrium in which both firms share the market:
A1 =
1
2
θˆ(s1 − p1)
2 , (III.5)
A2 =
1
2
θ˜
[
(s2 − p2)
2 − (s1 − p1)
2
]
+ A1 . (III.6)
Note that given pi and the rival’s tariff, the fixed fee Ai is uniquely determined by θ˜. Put
differently, the choice of the fixed fee is equivalent to choosing the marginal consumer
θ˜.19 Each firm i chooses (pi, θ˜) to maximize profits. The firms’ profit functions, for a
given tariff of the competitor, are20
pi2(p2, θ˜) = (1− θ˜) · A2(p2, θ˜) + p2 ·
1∫
θ˜
q2(p2, θ) dθ , (III.7)
pi1(p1, θ˜) =
(
θ˜ − θˆ(θ˜, p1)
)
· A1(p1, θ˜) + p1 ·
θ˜∫
θˆ(θ˜,p1)
q1(p1, θ) dθ . (III.8)
For now, assume that firms’ maximization problems have interior solutions. In the
appendix it is shown that this indeed is the case.
Profit Maximization Problem of Firm 2 (High-Quality Supplier)
More specifically, the profit function of the high quality firm is given by
pi2(p2, θ˜) = (1− θ˜) · A2 +
1
2
p2(s2 − p2)(1− θ˜
2) (III.9)
19Note that in equilibrium the marginal consumers θ˜ chosen by the two firms are the same.
20More precisely, Ai = Ai(pi, pj , Aj , θ˜) for i 6= j, but I suppress in the following the rival’s tariff
parameters.
74 Dissertation of Fabian Herweg
where
A2 =
1
2
θ˜
[
(s2 − p2)
2 − (s1 − p1)
2
]
+ A1 .
First, setting the partial derivative of pi2 with respect to p2 equal to zero allows to solve
for the optimal marginal price of firm 2,
p∗2 =
1
2
(1− θ˜)s2 . (III.10)
The optimal marginal price p∗2 is determined by the marginal consumer θ˜. Hence, p
∗
2
depends only indirectly on rival’s tariff via θ˜. Obviously, p∗2 decreases in θ˜. Intuitively,
a greater market share is accompanied by a lower fixed fee, i.e., less of the surplus of
the served consumers can be extracted by the fixed fee. This in turn leads to a raise
in the optimal marginal price. Note that the optimal marginal price exceeds marginal
cost. This result is in contrast to several models of horizontal differentiation, where in
equilibrium marginal prices equal marginal costs. For instance, Armstrong and Vickers
(2001) show for spatially differentiated markets that the firms offer cost-based two-part
tariffs in equilibrium. On the other hand, Yin (2004) points out that in the context of
a Hotelling model, marginal prices are higher than marginal costs if the transportation
costs are shipping costs.21 The observation that in the model of Armstrong and Vickers
consumers’ types do not interact with quantity, whereas in Yin’s model and the one
presented here there is an interaction between consumers’ types and quantity leads me
to the following conclusion: regardless of the differentiation framework, marginal prices
exceed marginal costs if for a given marginal price consumers with different types prefer
different quantities.
The first-order condition for profit maximization of firm 2 with respect to θ˜ is given
by
∂pi2
∂θ˜
= 0 ⇐⇒ −A2+(1− θ˜)
1
2
[
(s2 − p2)
2 − (s1 − p1)
2
]
− p2(s2− p2)θ˜ = 0 . (III.11)
Inserting the optimal marginal price, p∗2, into (III.11) and rearranging yields
A∗2 =
1
2
· (1− θ˜)
[
1
4
s22(1− θ˜
2)− (s1 − p1)
2
]
. (III.12)
Profit Maximization Problem of Firm 1 (Low-Quality Supplier)
The profit function and the optimization constraints of firm 1 are given by
pi1(p1, θ˜) = (θ˜ − θˆ) · A1 +
1
2
p1(s1 − p1)(θ˜
2 − θˆ2) , (III.13)
21Anderson and Engers (1994) describe two types of transportation costs. A shipping cost depends
on the quantity which is “shipped” and a shopping cost is independent of the amount purchased.
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where
θˆ = θ˜
[
1−
(
s2 − p2
s1 − p1
)2]
+
2A2
(s1 − p1)2
A1 =
1
2
θ˜
[
(s1 − p1)
2 − (s2 − p2)
2
]
+ A2 .
Setting the partial derivative of pi1 with respect to p1 equal to zero yields an implicit
condition for the optimal marginal price p∗1:
∂pi1
∂p1
= 0 ⇐⇒ 3θˆ = θ˜ . (III.14)
In equilibrium the low-quality firm serves 2
3
of the residual demand. Equation (III.14)
can be rewritten as
p∗1 = s1 −
√
3
θ˜
(
1
2
θ˜(s2 − p2)2 − A2
)
.
The optimal marginal price of firm 1 is higher than marginal costs if the net surplus of
the marginal consumer θ˜ is sufficiently small. The net surplus of marginal consumer θ˜
is quite small if competition between the two firms is not very intense. Hence, when
the products of the two firms are sufficiently differentiated the marginal price of firm 1
is positive. The other first-order condition of firm 1 is obtained by setting the partial
derivative of the profit function with respect to θ˜ equal to zero. Rewriting this equation
and inserting p∗1 yields the following formulation for the optimal fixed fee:
A∗1 =
(
1
2
θ˜(s2 − p2)
2 − A2
)[
−3A2
θ˜(s2 − p2)2
+
7
2
−
2s1
(s2 − p2)2
√
3
2
(s2 − p2)2 −
3A2
θ˜
]
−
1
3
θ˜s1
√
3
2
(s2 − p2)2 −
3A2
θ˜
. (III.15)
3.3. Characterization of the Equilibria
Any pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the tariff game in which both firms have a posi-
tive market share, has to satisfy the equations (III.5), (III.6), (III.10), (III.12), (III.14),
and (III.15). In a Nash equilibrium both firms choose the best response given the rival’s
tariff. Hence, for each firm the two first-order conditions must hold.22 Equation (III.6)
ensures that both firms choose the same marginal consumer θ˜, which is necessary for
an equilibrium. Condition (III.5) determines the optimal θˆ for a given tariff of firm 1.
More precisely, the Nash equilibrium is characterized by a system of equations with six
equations and six unknown variables (p1, p2, A1, A2, θ˜, θˆ). This system of equations can
22The second-order necessary conditions (SOCs) are checked in the appendix, see A.3.2. I suggest to
postpone reading A.3.2. until the end of Section 3.
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be condensed into a single equation, a polynomial of sixth order in θ˜. This polynomial
and therefore the Nash equilibrium cannot be solved analytically. Fortunately, if the
degree of product differentiation is sufficiently large (s2/s1 ≥ 2), it can be shown nu-
merically that this polynomial has exactly one root in [0, 1], which is the solution for
θ˜. If, however, the degree of product differentiation is low, then there does not exist
an equilibrium in which both firms share the market.
If only one firm has a positive market share in equilibrium, then this is necessarily the
high-quality firm. Note that, for any feasible tariff of firm 1, the tariff T2(q) = (s2−s1)q
leads to strictly positive profits for firm 2. Furthermore, in an equilibrium in which
firm 1 makes non-positive profits there cannot be an unsatisfied residual demand, thus
it has to be a best response for firm 2 to serves the whole market. The unique tariffs
corresponding to an equilibrium where the high-quality firm serves the whole market
are T ∗1 (q) = 0 and T
∗
2 (q) = (s2 − s1)q. These tariffs constitute an equilibrium of the
tariff game, if the degree of quality differentiation is not too high (s2/s1 ≤ 2). If,
on the other hand, the degree of quality differentiation is sufficiently high, firm 1 is
not a tough competitor and thus firm 2 behaves more like a monopolist and leaves
an unserved residual demand. The following proposition summarizes the tariff game
equilibria for all relevant quality pairs. Note that s1 = 0 is as if firm 1 is not present
in the market.
Proposition III.1 (Tariff Game Equilibria): (i) For s2 = 1 and s1 = 2/3 (low
differentiation) there exists a unique pure strategy equilibrium. In equilibrium, both
firms offer linear tariffs. The low-quality firm has a zero market share and makes zero
profits, while the high-quality firm serves the whole market and makes strictly positive
profits.
(ii) For s2 = 2/3 and s1 = 1/3 (middle differentiation) there are two pure strategy
equilibria. In one equilibrium, both firms use linear tariffs; firm 2 serves the whole
market and makes strictly positive profits, while firm 1 has a zero market share and
makes no profits. In the other equilibrium, both firms offer two part tariffs and realize
strictly positive profits. In this equilibrium the market is not fully covered.
(iii) For s2 = 1 and s1 = 1/3 (high differentiation) there exists a unique pure strategy
equilibrium. In equilibrium, the market is not fully covered and both firms offer a
two-part tariff. The two firms share the market and both firms realize strictly positive
profits.
By using Proposition 1, it is straightforward to obtain firms’ optimal behavior at the
quality stage. In case (i), it is profitable for firm 1 to deviate to s1 = 1/3. In case
(ii), irrespective of which equilibrium is played at the final stage, at least firm 1 has an
incentive to deviate to s1 = 1. Being the leading firm in the market is clearly better
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than serving a small residual demand. Thus, in the unique pure strategy subgame
perfect equilibrium of the quality game and the tariff game, one firm chooses a quality
level of 1, whereas the other firm produces a quality of 1/3. Since a firm decides to
enter the industry if its expected profits exceed the entry cost, the next result follows
immediately.
Proposition III.2: Suppose the entry cost, K, is sufficiently small. Then there exists
a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies. Both firms enter the industry
and make strictly positive profits in equilibrium.
Applying numerical methods to solve for the root of the polynomial of sixth order,
that characterizes the value of θ˜ in equilibrium, allows one to compute the equilibrium
profits, prices, and fixed fees:
pi1 = .00138222−K pi2 = .142833−K
p1 = .0657433 p2 = .351995
A1 = .00353261 A2 = .0550837
θˆ = .0986701 θ˜ = .29601
4. Two-Part Tariff Competition versus Linear Pricing
With the above analysis the characterization of firms’ optimal entry decisions, depend-
ing on whether price discrimination is feasible or not, follows immediately.
Proposition III.3: For sufficiently small entry cost, K, two firms enter the mar-
ket if price discrimination is permitted, and a ban on price discrimination leads to a
monopoly.
If two-part tariffs are infeasible firms are not able to relax price competition. In con-
trast, if two-part tariffs are feasible the two firms produce distinct qualities and realize
strictly positive profits. Relaxing price competition via quality differentiation is pos-
sible if and only if two-part tariff competition is feasible. What are the driving forces
behind this result? An explanation can be given by analyzing the consumers’ utility
functions. Since all consumers have the same ranking for price-quality pairs firms can-
not relax competition via quality differentiation when being restricted to linear pricing.
Nevertheless, consumers with high types benefit more from an improved quality. Thus,
a consumer’s willingness to pay an upfront fee to obtain the right to purchase the
high-quality product is increasing in his type. This is the reason why firms can relax
competition if two-part tariffs are feasible. Here, firms’ incentives for quality differ-
entiation are based on heterogeneity in consumers’ preferences for quantity, which is
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novel in the literature. Former research studied vertical differentiation only with lin-
ear tariffs, for instance Shaked and Sutton (1982). In these unit-demand frameworks,
consumers are heterogeneous with regard to their tastes for quality.23
Now I address the question how a ban on price discrimination affects welfare, con-
sumers’ surplus and industry profits. Social welfare is defined as the sum of consumers’
surplus and industry profits.
Proposition III.4: Suppose the entry cost, K, is sufficiently small. Then social wel-
fare and industry profits are higher and aggregate consumers’ surplus is lower if two-part
tariff competition is feasible.
Permitting price discrimination encourages entry, which in turn increases welfare.24
This finding is in line with the result obtained by Armstrong and Vickers (2001), who
analyze non-linear pricing in a free entry circular city model. In their model, as in the
one presented here, permitting price discrimination increases industry profits which in
turn encourages entry, thereby increasing welfare. Surprisingly, from consumers’ point
of view it is better to have a monopolist who is restricted to linear pricing than facing
two competing firms that are able to charge two-part tariffs.
It is worthwhile to point out, that imposing a minimum quality-standard can have
the same entry effect as banning price discrimination. If the quality standard is too
high, so that the possible profits of firm 1 are lower than the entry cost, then in the
subgame perfect equilibrium only one firm will enter the market.
5. Motivation of the Utility Function: Applications to
Vertical Relations
The utility function (III.1) can also be interpreted as a profit function of a retailer.
Two-part tariffs are widely used and discussed in the context of vertical relations.25
Assume that firms, called manufacturers in this section, do not sell their products to
consumers directly but to a retail firm. A retail firm can only sell the product of a
single manufacturer. As far as vertical relations are concerned, when the manufacturer
sets a fixed fee, this fixed fee can be interpreted as franchise fee. For instance, the
decision of a potential retailer may be to open either a McDonald’s, a Pizza Hut, or
23See, for example, Choi and Shin (1992). In Shaked and Sutton (1982), consumers have the same
utility function: u(s,m) = s ·m, and different incomes (m). Note that the income is like a taste
parameter for quality.
24While market entry in a vertical product differentiation model is also analyzed by Donnenfeld and
Weber (1992, 1995) and in particular by Johnson and Myatt (2003), these models are unit-demand
models.
25Classic contributions to the theory of vertical restraints, in particular on upstream competition and
two-part tariffs, are Rey and Stiglitz (1988) and Bonnano and Vickers (1988).
Essays in Industrial Organization and Behavioral Economics 79
neither. A model of vertical differentiation and market power on the upstream market
is also analyzed in Avenel and Caprice (2006). In their model a monopolist produces a
high quality product and the low quality product is produced by a competitive fringe.
Product differentiation on the upstream market is exogenous. The focus of Avenel and
Caprice is on retailers’ product lines. In the reinterpretation of the model introduced
so far, both upstream firms have market power and the degree of quality differentiation
is endogenous. But the retailers are exclusive dealers, who cannot sell the products of
both manufacturers.
In the following, I will give two examples of how the utility function (III.1) can be
interpreted as a profit function of a retailer who sells manufacturer i’s products.
Example 1 (Retailer is price taker): Consider a retail firm that operates as
a price taker. Suppose there exists a competitive fringe selling the same qualities as
produced by the manufacturers. The market price depends on the quality the retailer
sells and is given by
P (si) = si . (III.16)
For selling q units of a product purchased by manufacturer i, a retailer of type θ ∈ (0.1]
has costs
c(q, θ) =
1
2
q2
θ
, (III.17)
where θ measures how efficient the retailer is. If θ is high, the retailer has relatively
low costs for serving consumers. The profit of the retailer when selling the products of
firm i is then given by
piPTR (q, i, θ) = siq −
1
2
q2
θ
− piq − Ai , (III.18)
where Ai is a franchise fee the retailer has to pay for the permission to sell firm i’s
products and pi is firm i’s wholesale price. Obviously, the above profit function is
equivalent to the utility function assumed throughout the whole paper.
Example 2 (Retailer is local monopolist): Consider a retailer of type θ ∈ (0, 1]
who sells the products of manufacturer i. Assume that the retailer is a local monopolist
and operates without costs. The demand of a retailer of type θ with retail price P is
q = θD(P ), where D(P ) = 2[si − P ]. A higher θ corresponds to a retailer with higher
demand. Put differently, θ measures the“market size”of the retailer in the downstream
market. Thus, the inverse demand function he faces is
P (q, θ) = si −
1
2
q
θ
.
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Given a tariff Ti offered by manufacturer i to each potential retailer, the profit of a
retailer of type θ who sells firm i’s products is
piLMR (q, i, θ) =
(
si −
1
2
q
θ
)
q − piq − Ai . (III.19)
Hence, the profit function of the retailer is equivalent to the utility function (III.1).
In the main body of the paper, I focused on the case where each producer (i = 1, 2)
offers his products to consumers directly. Nevertheless, the above applications allow
for an interpretation of consumers as retail outlets.
6. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, a vertically differentiated duopoly with endogenous degree of product
differentiation and two-part tariffs is analyzed. The main finding is that product dif-
ferentiation occurs in equilibrium if and only if two-part tariff competition is feasible.
With consumer heterogeneity regarding their preferences for quality being absent in
the model presented, firms’ incentives for quality differentiation are solely based on
consumers’ heterogeneity in their preferences for quantity. This finding is in contrast
to earlier models of vertically differentiated industries, where consumers differ only in
their tastes for quality and quality differentiation can always relax price competition.
The utility function assumed in this paper is arbitrary. The main findings, however,
can also be obtained for surplus functions of the form vi(pi, θ) = ψ(θ) · ρ(si, pi). Al-
lowedly, the assumption that consumers differ only in their tastes for quantity and not
in their tastes for quality is strong. By focusing on this extreme case, I established that
the possibility of price discrimination may increase firms’ strategic incentives for qual-
ity differentiation. Moreover, the model of the paper is simple in the sense that firms
can produce only quality levels si ∈ {0,
1
3
, 2
3
, 1}. For qualities si ∈ [0, 1] the existence
of a pure strategy equilibrium of the tariff game is complicated to show. Trusting that
firms’ first-order conditions with respect to marginal prices and marginal consumers
characterize the tariff game equilibrium, application of numerical methods allows to
compute the subgame perfect quality levels. Firm 2 produces quality s2 = 1 and firm
1’s quality level is s1 ≈ 0.36. All results remain qualitatively the same.
For real-world applications, this model represents just an extreme case, similar as
pure spatial competition models. I believe, however, that focusing on pure vertical
differentiation sheds some light on firms’ incentives for quality differentiation in real
life. From an elementary perspective, this paper demonstrates that when consumers
are heterogeneous, firms can always relax price competition as long as there are enough
dimensions for firms to differentiate their products.
IV. Uncertain Demand, Consumer
Loss Aversion, and Flat-Rate
Tariffs
The so called flat-rate bias is a well-known phenomenon caused
by consumers’ desire to be insured against fluctuations in their
billing amount. This paper shows that consumer loss aversion
provides a formal explanation for this bias. We investigate into
two-part tariffs offered by oligopolistic firms to loss-averse con-
sumers who are uncertain about their demand. The main finding
is that, in equilibrium, firms offer a flat-rate tariff to those con-
sumers whose degree of loss aversion is sufficiently high compared
to marginal cost. Moreover, we show that differently loss-averse
consumers may not impose an informational externality on each
other. Thus, firms may be able to screen differently loss-averse
consumers at no cost.
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1. Introduction
Consumers facing the choice between several tariffs often do not select the optimal
one given their consumption patterns. In particular, consumers often prefer a flat-rate
tariff even though they would save money with a measured tariff. Train (1991) referred
to this phenomenon as “flat-rate bias”. Given the fact that consumers are willing to
pay a “flat-rate premium” it is unsurprising that this tariff form is widely utilized in
many industries, e.g., telephone services, Internet access, car rental, car leasing, DVD
rental, amusement parks, health clubs, and many others.
That flat rates are such a favorable pricing scheme is hard to reconcile with orthodox
economic theory, in particular for industries where marginal costs are non-negligible.1,2
Train et al. (1989) point out that “customers do not choose tariffs with complete
knowledge of their demand, but rather choose tariffs [...] on the basis of the insurance
provided by the tariff in the face of uncertain consumption patterns”. Since variations
in the monthly billing rates are small compared to a consumer’s income, standard risk
aversion cannot capture this insurance motive, however.3 Already Train (1991) states
that “[t]he existence of this [flat-rate] bias is problematical. Standard theory of con-
sumer behavior does not incorporate it.” Therefore, to capture first-order risk aversion
we posit that consumers are loss averse.4 A loss averse consumer dislikes even small
deviations from his reference point. In our model, the consumer’s demand is uncertain
at the point where he selects a tariff. We assume that a consumer forms rational ex-
pectations about his invoice, which determine his reference point. The consumer feels
a loss if his actual invoice amount is above his reference point, and he feels a gain if
it is below his reference point. We follow Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) and assume
that the reference point is a full distribution of the possible billing rates. To illustrate
this concept, suppose the consumer’s amount invoiced is either $15, $20, or $30. Then,
receiving a bill of $ 20 generates a mixture of feelings, a gain of $5 and a loss of $10.
We show that a consumer with these preferences is biased in favor of flat-rate tariffs,
since flat rates insure against the risk of losses in periods of greater than average usage.
Because observed tariffs are the result of strategic interactions of firms and con-
sumers, we set up an oligopoly model where firms compete for loss averse consumers.
Moreover, we allow for consumer heterogeneity with respect to their degree of loss aver-
1Sundararajan (2004) shows that it is always optimal for a monopolistic firm to offer a flat rate next to
usage-based tariffs if marginal costs are zero and there are positive transaction costs accompanied
with usage-based pricing.
2It is important to notice that, despite conventional wisdom, the marginal cost of a telephone call
is not zero, see for instance Faulhaber and Hogendorn (2000). Moreover, one should keep in mind
that telephone companies pay access charges on a per minute basis for off-net calls.
3Cf. Clay et al. (1992) or Miravete (2002).
4That consumer loss aversion could potentially explain the flat-rate bias is argued in the marketing
literature, see Lambrecht and Skiere (2006).
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sion. The timing is as follows: (i) Firms offer a menu of two-part tariffs to consumers;
(ii) Each consumer selects either one tariff or none; (iii) The consumer observes the
realization of the state of the world which determines his preferences for the good and
chooses a demanded quantity. We analyze the symmetric information case in which
firms observe a consumer’s degree of loss aversion, as well as the asymmetric informa-
tion case in which the degree of loss aversion is private information. In equilibrium of
the symmetric information benchmark, firms offer a flat-rate tariff to those consumers
whose degree of loss aversion compared to marginal cost exceeds a certain threshold.
Consumers with a lower degree of loss aversion are assigned to a metered tariff, i.e.,
a two-part tariff with a strictly positive unit price. These findings turn out to carry
over likewise to the asymmetric information case. Interestingly, offering the appropri-
ate flat-rate tariff next to usage-based tariffs never reduces the firm’s profits obtained
from serving those consumers who are assigned to a usage-based contract. Moreover,
under certain conditions differently loss averse consumers do not impose informational
externalities on each other. Put differently, firms may be able to screen a consumer’s
degree of loss aversion at no cost.
The structure of the paper is as follows: After presenting some evidence on the
prevalence of flat-rate biases and a discussion of the related literature, Section 2 presents
the model and in particular consumer’s preferences. Section 3 analyzes the demand
function of a loss averse consumer who signed an arbitrary two-part tariff. Sections
4 and 5 solve firms’ profit maximization problems and characterize the equilibrium
outcome for the symmetric information and the asymmetric information case. The
final section summarizes our main findings and discusses some shortcomings of the
presented model.
Evidence and Related Literature
Existence and Causes of Tariff-Choice Biases.—The existence of tariff-choice biases
was first documented for U.S. households among telephone service options. Train et al.
(1987) provide evidence for U.S. households favoring flat-rate tariffs over measured ser-
vices for local telephone calls. Conducting a logit model with a tariff specific constant,
the authors find that this constant is highest for the flat-rate option. Similar results
are obtained by Train et al. (1989). The authors argue that consumers choose a tariff
that ends up not being cost-minimizing for the customer’s level of consumption because
consumers also care about the insurance provided by the tariff option. Given uncertain
consumption patterns “the flat-rate tariff provides complete insurance” (Train et al.,
1989). A tendency of households to prefer flat-rate tariffs for telephone services is also
84 Dissertation of Fabian Herweg
reported by Hobson and Spady (1988) for single-person households, by Kling and van
der Ploeg (1990) who evaluate a tariff experiment of AT&T, by Mitchell and Vogelsang
(1991), and Kridel et al. (1993). For instance, Kridel et al. (1993) find that 55% of
all customers who choose a flat-rate service would have achieved higher surplus if they
had chosen measured service instead. The authors also hold an insurance motive of the
customers responsible for this finding. They report that customers exhibit substantial
risk aversion when faced with bill uncertainty. Miravete (2003) rejects the thesis that
customers are subject to a flat-rate bias when selecting telephone service tariffs. In his
data set, however, the flat-rate option is optimal for the vast majority of households.
The flat-rate bias is documented also for other telecommunication services. Lam-
brecht and Skiera (2006) analyze transactional data of over 10,000 customers of an
Internet service provider in Germany. They find that over 50% of these customers are
biased in favor of a flat-rate option. Moreover, they provide evidence that the flat-rate
bias is at least partially due to an insurance motive of the consumers. In a follow up
paper, Lambrecht et al. (2007) argue “[c]onsumers may prefer a tariff that leads to
fewer month-to-month fluctuations in their bill”. For mobile telephone services, a pref-
erence for flat-rate tariffs that cannot be explained by customers’ usage is documented
by Gerpot (2009) and Mitomo et al. (2009). These papers, however, rely on survey
data.
Relying on survey data, Nunes (2000) finds strong evidence for a flat-rate bias outside
telecommunications services (grocery shopping online, access payment for a swimming
pool of an apartment building). Presumably the most powerful demonstration of the
flat-rate bias outside the telecommunications service sector is DellaVigna and Mal-
mendier (2006). They analyze a data set from three U.S. health clubs and show that
a large fraction of health club members who are enrolled in a flat-fee contract (either
monthly or annually) paid on average more per visit than they would have paid with
a pay-per-visit option. According to the authors, the leading explanation for these ob-
servations is consumers’ overconfidence about future self-control. A low per usage price
is a commitment device for higher attendance in case of self-control problems, when
consumption leads to immediate costs and delayed rewards. Such motives of selecting
an option that provides commitment to higher usage rates obviously cannot explain
the prevalence of flat rates for telecommunications services, car rental, car leasing and
amusement parks. Moreover, from a theoretical point of view, consumer self-control
problems can only explain why marginal prices may be below marginal cost but not
why marginal prices are exactly zero, see DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004).5
5In DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004), generically the optimal per-unit price is unequal to zero. If
one does not allow for negative unit prices, then there is a broad range of parameter combinations
such that the optimal unit price equals zero.
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(Behavioral) Models of Pricing Strategies.—Since Oi’s (1971) analysis of an optimal
two-part tariff for a monopolist, this pricing scheme is intensely analyzed in the eco-
nomic literature. Leland and Meyer (1976) show that a firm, regardless of its objective,
always does at least as well with a two-part tariff as with linear pricing. Pareto-optimal
menus of tariffs are analyzed by Willig (1978). He shows that a Pareto-optimal menu
includes a cost-based two-part tariff. The pricing literature of the 80’s solves for the
optimal nonlinear tariff. Notable works on this topic are Maskin and Riley (1984),
Goldman et al. (1984) as well as the book by Wilson (1993). This literature estab-
lished the now well-known no distortion at the top result, i.e., marginal prices exceed
marginal cost for all but the last unit. While these classic screening models focus on
deterministic demand, there are some papers analyzing sequential screening problems.
In these papers, a consumer first chooses a contract and then he learns his true pref-
erences before making a quantity choice. See, for instance, Courty and Li (2000) or
Miravete (2002).
This paper is more related to the recent and growing literature investigating how
rational firms respond to consumer biases. A seminal contribution in this field is
DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004). They consider a market, either monopolistic or
perfectly competitive, with homogeneous time-inconsistent consumers. Their main
finding is that the unit price of the optimal two-part tariff is above marginal cost
for leisure goods (usage of rental car) and below marginal cost for investment goods
(health club attendance). Likewise presuming that consumers are quasi-hyperbolic
discounters, Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2008b) set up a model of a perfectly competitive
market for credit-cards. They allow for consumer heterogeneity and pay particularly
attention to welfare implications of possible policy interventions. Using a different
notion of time-inconsistency, Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) solve for the optimal menu of
tariffs for a monopolist who faces consumers that differ in their degree of sophistication.
The optimal contract exploits those consumers who are sufficiently naive about their
self-control problems. Moreover, they show that the optimal menu can be implemented
by a menu of three-part tariffs. The optimal menu does not include a flat-rate tariff.
The optimal nonlinear pricing scheme for a monopolist who sells to consumers with
self-control problems is also analyzed by Esteban et al. (2007). Instead of assuming
time inconsistency, they model self-control problems by applying the concept of Gul
and Pesendorfer (2001). The optimal tariff resembles the one in the standard nonlinear
pricing literature except for a price ceiling. Similar results are obtained by Esteban and
Miyagawa (2006) for a perfectly competitive market where consumers have temptation
preferences according to Gul-Pesendorfer.
Next to time inconsistency, there are a few papers dealing with the optimal selling
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strategy for overconfident consumers. Grubb (forthcoming) analyzes the optimal menu
of nonlinear price schedules for a monopolist as well as for a perfectly competitive
market. Consumers in his model are overconfident in the sense that they underestimate
fluctuations in their demand. The optimal menu is close to a menu of three-part
tariffs which is often observed in the cellular phone service industry. The optimal tariff
is completely flat up to the allowance only if marginal costs are zero, however. A
similar model where firms screen consumers at the basis of their priors is considered by
Uthemann (2005). In his model firms are differentiated a` la Hotelling. Unlike Grubb, he
does not assume that consumption is satiated at a finite level, and therefore he obtains
that marginal prices are always above marginal cost. Focusing on only two-states of
the world but without imposing any differentiability assumptions on the consumer’s
utility function, Eliaz and Spiegler (2008) analyze the problem of a monopolist who
faces consumers with biased beliefs regarding the probability assignment to the two
states of nature. Optimistic consumers, who assign too much weight on the state of
nature that is characterized by larger gains from trade, sign exploitative contracts. In
a stylized example, the authors show that the optimal menu may include a flat-rate
tariff. The authors, however, do not derive conditions under which there model predicts
flat-rate contracts.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no paper analyzing nonlinear tariffs when
consumers are loss averse. Nevertheless, loss aversion and in particular the concept
developed by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) is used in models of industrial organiza-
tion. Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2005) apply this concept to provide an explanation why
monopoly prices react less sensitive to cost shocks than predicted by orthodox the-
ory. Moreover, Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2008a) introduce consumer loss aversion into a
model of horizontally differentiated firms. They show that in equilibrium asymmetric
competitors charge identical focal prices for differentiated products. Next to industrial
organization, the Ko˝szegi and Rabin formulation is applied to contract theory by Her-
weg et al. (2008). Considering a moral hazard framework, they provide an explanation
for the frequent usage of lump-sum bonus contracts.
2. The Model
Market Framework
We consider a market for a single good. In the market there are two firms, A and B,
facing a continuum of potential consumers with measure normalized to one.
Consumers.—The consumers can be partitioned into two groups that differ in a pa-
rameter λ ≥ 1 (degree of loss aversion). Let the two groups be denoted by j = 1, 2 with
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λ1 < λ2. A consumer’s demand for the good is continuous and depends on the state of
the world θ ∈ [θ, θ¯] ≡ Θ. The state of the world is continuously distributed according
to the commonly known and twice differentiable cumulative distribution function F (·).
Let the probability density function be f(·). The state of the world is unknown to
consumers and firms at the point of contracting. For instance, a consumer may sign
a contract with a car rental company today for his holidays in a few weeks. How fre-
quently he will use the rented car depends on the weather. If the sun is always shinning
the consumer uses the car only to drive to the nearby beach. But if the weather is bad
he takes longer sight-seeing trips.
Firms & Timing.—Both profit maximizing firms produce the single good at constant
marginal cost c > 0 and without fixed cost. Each firm i = A,B offers a two-part tariff
to each group of consumers j = 1, 2. The tariff is given by T ij (q) = L
i
j+p
i
jq, where q ≥ 0
is the quantity, and Lij and p
i
j denote the fixed fee and the per unit price, respectively,
charged by firm i from consumers of type j. We will analyze the symmetric information
case in which firms observe λ, as well as the asymmetric information case in which λ
is private information of the consumer.
The timing is as follows: (1) Firms simultaneously and independently offer a tupel
of two-part tariffs {(Lij, p
i
j)}j=1,2 to consumers. (2) Each consumer either signs exactly
one contract or none. (3) Consumers, but not firms, observe the realization of the state
of the world. A consumer chooses his demand to maximize his utility for the given state
of the world if he signed a contract. (4) Finally, payments are made according to the
demanded quantities and the concluded contracts.
Discrete Choice Framework.—The products of the two firms are symmetrically differ-
entiated. We assume that, next to λ, consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their
brand preferences. Each consumer has idiosyncratic preferences for differing brands of
the product (firms), which are parameterized by ζ = (ζ0, ζA, ζB). A consumer with
brand preferences ζ has net utility vi + ζ i if he buys from firm i, and net utility ζ0
if no contract is signed. The brand preferences ζ = (ζ0, ζA, ζB) are independently
and identically distributed according to a known distribution among the two groups of
consumers.
To solve for the tariffs that are offered in the pure-strategy Nash equilibrium by the
two firms, we follow the approach of Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and model firms
as offering utility directly to consumers. Each two-part tariff can be considered as
a deal of a certain expected value that is offered by a firm to its consumers. Thus,
firms compete over customers by trying to offer them better deals, i.e., a two-part tariff
that yields higher utility (including gain-loss utility). Put differently, we decompose a
firm’s problem into two parts. First, we solve for the two-part tariff that maximizes
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profits subject to the constraint that the consumer receives a certain utility level.
Thereafter, we solve for the utility levels (vi1, v
i
2) a firm i offers to its customers. It
is important to note that, when λ is unobservable, the two-part tariffs have to be
designed such that each group of consumers prefers the offer that is dedicated to them.
Suppose the utility offered to consumers of group j by firm A and firm B is vAj and
vBj , respectively. Furthermore, assume that the incentive constraints are satisfied.
Then, the market share of firm A in the submarket j is mj(v
A
j , v
B
j ) and the market
share of firm B is mj(v
B
j , v
A
j ), with mj(v
A
j , v
B
j ) + mj(v
B
j , v
A
j ) ≤ 1. The market share
functionmj(·) is increasing in the first argument and decreasing in the second. Since the
brand preferences are identically distributed among the two groups, the market share
functions are identical for the two submarkets, i.e., m1(·) = m2(·) = m(·). Following
Armstrong and Vickers, we impose some regularity conditions in order to guarantee
existence of equilibrium. First, we assume that
∂m(vA, vB)/∂vA
m(vA, vB)
is non-decreasing in vB.
Second, we assume that for each submarket the collusive utility level v˜j exists which
maximizes (symmetric) joint profits.6
Consumers’ Preferences
We assume that consumers are loss averse, in the sense that a consumer is disappointed
if the payment he has to make exceeds his reference payment. For instance, consumers
typically feel a loss if at the end of the month the invoice from their telecommunication
provider is larger than expected. Since, for the situations we have in mind, it is natural
to assume that the reference point incorporates forward looking expectations, we ap-
ply the approach of reference-dependent preferences developed by Ko˝szegi and Rabin
(2006, 2007). First, this concept posits that overall utility has two additively separable
components, consumption utility (intrinsic utility) and gain-loss utility. Second, the
consumer’s reference point is determined by his rational expectations about outcomes.
Finally, a given outcome is evaluated by comparing it to each possible outcome, where
each comparison is weighted with the ex-ante probability with which the alternative
outcome occurs.
The consumer’s intrinsic utility is quasi linear in money; formally, intrinsic utility
equals u(q, θ) − T i(q) − ζ i if he purchases from firm i. For the markets we have in
mind, like rental cars or Internet services, even if the price per unit is zero, demand
is bounded. Therefore, we assume that there exists a satiation point, qS(θ), and that
6For a detailed description of the competition-in-utility-space framework and the needed assumptions
see Armstrong and Vickers (2001).
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overconsumption is harmless, i.e., free disposal is possible. Additionally, it is assumed
that a higher state of the world is associated with a stronger need for the good. The
restrictions on the consumer’s intrinsic utility for the good are summarized in the
following assumption.
Assumption (A1): It is assumed that for all θ ∈ Θ: (i) not consuming the good
yields zero intrinsic utility u(0, θ) ≡ 0. (ii) u(q, θ) is C3 for q ≤ qS(θ). Intrinsic utility
for the good has the following properties,
∂u(q, θ)/∂q > 0 for q < qS(θ), ∂2u(q, θ)/∂q2 < 0 for q ≤ qS(θ),
∂u(q, θ)/∂q = 0 for q ≥ qS(θ), ∂2u(q, θ)/∂q∂θ > κ for q ≤ qS(θ),
where κ > 0. (iii) ∂u(0, θ)/∂q =∞.
Some comments to Assumption (A1) are in order: It is assumed that u(q, θ) is thrice
differentiable in q and θ for q ≤ qS(θ). There exists a satiation point qS(θ) such
that u(qS(θ), θ) ≥ u(q; θ) for all q ≥ 0. Moreover, overconsumption is harmless, i.e.,
u(q; θ) = u(qS(θ), θ) for q ≥ qS(θ). Finally, since the intrinsic utility of zero consump-
tion is normalized to zero and marginal utility is increasing in the state of the world it
holds that ∂u(q, θ)/∂θ > 0 for q ∈ (0, qS(θ)].
By Assumption (A1), the satiation point qS(θ) is defined by
qS(θ) = min{q ∈ R+|∂u(q, θ)/∂q = 0} . (IV.1)
The satiation point is increasing in the state of the world θ, formally:7
dqS(θ)
dθ
= −
∂2u(qS(θ), θ)/∂q∂θ
∂2u(qS(θ), θ)/∂q2
> 0 . (IV.2)
We depart from the Ko˝szegi and Rabin concept by assuming that the consumer feels
gains and losses only in the money dimension. This means that a consumer does not
feel a loss if the weather is nice and he uses the rented car less often than expected.
Similarly, he does not feel a gain when using the car more often than expected due to
bad weather. The consumer feels a loss, however, if the rental price depends on the
driven miles and he used the car more often than expected. In accordance with the
majority of applied-loss aversion papers, it is assumed that the consumer’s gain-loss
function is piece-wise linear.8 Suppose the consumer pays T , but expected to pay Tˆ ,
then his gain-loss utility is given by
µ(Tˆ − T ) =
{
Tˆ − T , for Tˆ ≥ T
−λ(T − Tˆ ), for T > Tˆ
,
7Strictly speaking, we have to take the left-hand limit when q approaches qS(θ) to obtain the stated
derivative.
8See, for instance, Heidhues and Ko˝szegi (2005, 2008a).
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where 1 ≤ λ ∈ {λ1, λ2}.
9 Note that a consumer’s expected demand conditional on the
state of the world fully determines the distribution of his expected payments, and thus
in turn his reference point. Suppose the consumer signed a contract with firm i. Then
his overall utility from this deal when purchasing q units, given the state of the world
is φ and his expected consumption is 〈q(θ)〉θ∈Θ, is given by
Uj(q|φ, 〈q(θ)〉) + ζ
i ,
where
Uj(q|φ, 〈q(θ)〉) = u(q, φ)− T
i(q) +
∫
X(q)
[T i(q(θ))− T i(q)]f(θ) dθ
− λj
∫
Xc(q)
[T i(q)− T i(q(θ))]f(θ) dθ , (IV.3)
with X(q) ≡ {θ ∈ Θ|T i(q) < T i(q(θ))} and Xc(q) ≡ {θ ∈ Θ|T i(q) > T i(q(θ))}.
Note that Xc is not the complementary set to X, since both sets are defined by strict
inequalities, i.e., X(q)∪Xc(q) ⊆ Θ. Moreover, observe that for z > 0, X(q) ⊇ X(q+z)
and Xc(q) ⊆ X(q + z) as long as T (q) is non-decreasing. To deal with the resulting
interdependence between actual consumption and expected consumption, we use the
personal equilibrium concept, which requires the strategy that generates expectations
to be optimal conditional on these expectations.10
Definition IV.1 (Personal Equilibrium): For a given per unit price p the demand
profile 〈qˆj(θ; p)〉θ∈Θ is a personal equilibrium if for all φ ∈ Θ,
qˆj(φ; p) ∈ argmax
q≥0
Uj(q|φ, 〈qˆj(θ; p)〉) .
3. The Demand Function
In this section, we characterize the consumer’s demand conditional on having accepted
the offer (pi, Li) of firm i. Since, the consumer’s demand is independent of his idiosyn-
cratic brand preferences, we will omit ζ until we discuss the consumer’s brand choice.
Moreover, to cut down on notation we suppress the superscript i ∈ {A,B} indicating
from which firm the consumer purchases and the subscript j ∈ {1, 2} denoting the
9With this formalization the weight on gain-loss utility is implicitly normalized to one. This normal-
ization has no qualitative impact on our results. Even for λ = 1 (no loss aversion), however, the
consumer has reference-dependent preferences. His utility for a given state of the world φ is then
u(q, φ) − 2T (q) + constant. The consumer values money twice at the moment of the purchasing
decision, since paying one dollar more reduces intrinsic utility and reduces gain-loss utility either by
reducing gains or by increasing losses. Ex ante, when making plans the consumer’s expected util-
ity for λ = 1 equals the expected utility of a consumer without gain-loss utility. These important
observations will become clearer after deriving the consumer’s utility.
10See Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007) for a general description and a defense of this concept of
consumer behavior.
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consumer’s degree of loss aversion in the following. We focus on p ≥ 0 since negative
unit prices cannot be optimal due to harmless overconsumption.
In order not to render flat-rate tariffs completely infeasible, it is assumed that in
case of being indifferent between two or more quantities the consumer chooses the
lowest of these quantities. Alternatively, one could assume that overconsumption is
not harmless. Since a higher state of the world is associated with a stronger preference
for the good, it seems reasonable that the demand profile is increasing in the state of
the world. The following lemma shows that this is indeed the case.
Lemma IV.1: For any two states of the world φ1, φ2 ∈ Θ with φ1 < φ2, qˆ(φ1; p) ≤
qˆ(φ2; p).
Unless specified otherwise, all proofs are presented in the appendix. Since in any
personal equilibrium demand is increasing in the state of the world and p ≥ 0, the
consumer feels losses compared to lower states and gains compared to higher ones.
Thus, the consumer’s utility for a given state φ in a personal equilibrium can be written
as
U(qˆ(φ; p)|φ, 〈qˆ(θ; p)〉) = u(qˆ(φ; p), φ)− T (qˆ(φ; p))
+
∫ θ¯
φ
[T (qˆ(θ; p))− T (qˆ(φ; p))]f(θ) dθ − λ
∫ φ
θ
[T (qˆ(φ; p))− T (qˆ(θ; p))]f(θ) dθ . (IV.4)
Taking the expected value with respect to the state of the world of the above formula
yields the consumer’s ex ante expected utility on the equilibrium path,
Eθ[U(qˆ(θ; p)|θ, 〈q(θ; p)〉)] =
∫ θ¯
θ
[u(qˆ(θ; p); θ)− T (qˆ(θ; p))]f(θ) dθ
− (λ− 1)
∫ θ¯
θ
∫ θ¯
θ
[T (qˆ(φ; p))− T (qˆ(θ; p))]f(φ)f(θ) dφdθ . (IV.5)
The first integral of the above formula represents standard expected intrinsic utility.
The second term is the ex ante expected net loss of the consumer, which is weighted
by λ − 1. The reason is that the consumer compares a given outcome with each
possible other outcome. Thus, the comparison of any two possible payments enters the
consumer’s expected utility exactly twice, once as a loss and once as an equally-sized
gain. For λ = 1 the consumer puts equal weights on gains and losses, so ex ante all
these comparisons cancel out. When making the purchasing decision, however, even
for λ = 1 these comparisons do not cancel out since then expectations are fixed.
To further characterize the personal equilibria it is useful to distinguish two cases,
namely, whether or not the marginal price p is strictly positive. We start with the case
of a flat-rate tariff where p = 0.
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Marginal Price Equals Zero
Obviously, with p = 0 the consumer does neither feel any sensation of gains nor of
losses. Thus, the consumer maximizes for each state of the world his intrinsic utility
for the good.
Lemma IV.2: Suppose p = 0, then there is a unique personal equilibrium. In the per-
sonal equilibrium the consumer demands for all states of the world θ ∈ Θ his satiation
quantity, i.e., qˆ(θ; 0) = qS(θ).
Proof: Follows directly from the observation that the consumer’s utility for an
arbitrary state of the world is independent of the expected demand for all other states
of the world. Formally, U(qˆ(φ; p)|φ, 〈q(θ; p)〉) = u(q;φ) − L which is maximized for
q ≥ qS(φ). By our assumption that the consumer does not overconsume, it follows
immediately that demand equals qS(φ).
Q.E.D.
With the marginal price being zero the consumer’s expected utility is
Eθ[U(q
S(θ)|θ, 〈qS(θ)〉)] =
∫ θ¯
θ
u(qS(θ), θ)f(θ) dθ − L .
Let S(p) be the expected joint surplus of a firm and a consumer when contracting at
marginal price p. Formally
S(p) ≡ Eθ[U(qˆ(θ; p)|θ, 〈q(θ; p)〉)] + (p− c)Eθ[qˆ(θ; p)] + L . (IV.6)
Thus, the generated joint surplus from a flat-rate tariff amounts to
S(0) =
∫ θ¯
θ
[
u(qS(θ), θ)− cqS(θ)
]
f(θ) dθ (IV.7)
=
∫ θ¯
θ
∫ qS(θ)
0
[
∂u(q, θ)
∂q
− c
]
dqf(θ) dθ
The surplus generated by a flat rate, S(0), becomes arbitrarily negative for sufficiently
large marginal costs c and approaches the first-best surplus SFB for c → 0, where
SFB := max〈q(θ)〉θ∈Θ
∫ θ¯
θ
(u(q(θ), θ)− cq(θ)) f(θ)dθ.
Positive Marginal Prices
First, we present a technical result: The consumer’s demand when playing a personal
equilibrium does not ”jump” if the state of the world changes slightly.
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Lemma IV.3: Suppose p > 0. Then any personal equilibrium 〈qˆ(θ; p)〉θ∈Θ is continu-
ous in the state of the world θ.
Since the demand profile is non-decreasing and continuous, we can conclude that it
is differentiable almost everywhere. Before exploiting this property of the personal
equilibrium, it is shown that demand is strictly increasing in the state of the world
if the marginal price is small. To establish this result we define the function q˜(θ; p),
which is implicitly characterized by
∂u(q˜(θ; p), θ)
∂q
= p [2 + (λ− 1)F (θ)] . (IV.8)
In fact, as we will show, the function q˜(θ; p) characterizes the unique personal equi-
librium if p is sufficiently small. It turns out that whether or not q˜(θ; p) is strictly
increasing in the state of the world plays an important role for the characterization of
personal equilibria. Implicit differentiation of (IV.8) with respect to θ yields
dq˜(θ; p)
dθ
= −
∂2u(q˜(θ; p), θ)/∂q∂θ − p(λ− 1)f(θ)
∂2u(q˜(θ; p), θ)/∂q2
.
The function q˜(θ; p) is strictly increasing in θ if and only if the following condition is
satisfied:
Condition: For all θ ∈ Θ,
p <
∂2u(q˜(θ; p), θ)/∂q∂θ
(λ− 1)f(θ)
. (C1)
The condition is more likely to be satisfied if the distribution of the state of the world
is not very dense. Put differently, if the environment is sufficiently unpredictable then
Condition 1 holds. Furthermore, the above condition is satisfied if the per unit price
is sufficiently small. To see this, note that ∂2u(q, θ)/∂q∂θ > κ for all θ ∈ Θ and all
q ≥ 0. Now, we are prepared to establish the result that in a personal equilibrium
there cannot be a set of types that consumes the same amount if the per unit price is
low.
Lemma IV.4: Suppose p > 0. Then in a personal equilibrium it holds that for any
two types φ1, φ2 ∈ Θ with φ1 6= φ2, qˆ(φ1; p) 6= qˆ(φ2; p) if and only if (C1) holds.
Unique Personal Equilibrium
We know that the personal equilibrium qˆ(θ; p) is differentiable almost everywhere.
Since, given (C1) holds, the personal equilibrium is strictly increasing we can conclude
that dqˆ(θ; p)/dθ > 0. Put differently, the consumer’s overall utility is differentiable with
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respect to q for q ∈ [qˆ(θ; p), qˆ(θ¯; p)], except at a finite number of kinks. In the following,
we derive a candidate personal equilibrium where higher types consume strictly more
by construction. It is shown that there exists exactly one candidate. This equilibrium
candidate is strictly increasing given (C1) holds.
The utility of a consumer in state φ who consumes q ∈ [qˆ(θ; p), qˆ(θ¯; p)] units, given
he expected to play a personal equilibrium where consumption is strictly higher for
higher states, is given by
U(q|φ, 〈qˆ(θ; p)〉) = u(q;φ)− pq − L
+ p
∫ θ¯
α(q)
[qˆ(θ; p)− q]f(θ) dθ − λp
∫ α(q)
θ
[q − qˆ(θ; p)]f(θ) dθ , (IV.9)
where α(q) is implicitly defined by qˆ(α(q); p) ≡ q. Note that the derivative α′(q) =
(dqˆ(α(q); p)/dθ)−1 > 0 almost everywhere if (C1) holds. Taking the partial derivative
of U(q|·) with respect to q yields
∂U(q|·)
∂q
=
∂u(q, φ)
∂q
− p− λp[q − qˆ(α(q); p)]f(α(q))α′(q)− λp
∫ α(q)
θ
f(θ) dθ
− p[qˆ(α(q); p)− q]f(α(q))α′(q)− p
∫ θ¯
α(q)
f(θ) dθ . (IV.10)
Taking into account that qˆ(α(q); p)− q = 0, the above derivative can be simplified to
∂U(q|·)
∂q
=
∂u(q, φ)
∂q
− p− p[1− F (α(q))]− pλF (α(q)) .
Hence, the consumer’s utility is strictly concave for q ∈ [qˆ(θ; p), qˆ(θ¯; p)] since
∂2U(q|·)
∂q2
=
∂2u(q, φ)
∂q2
− p(λ− 1)f(α(q))α′(q) < 0 .
A necessary condition for 〈qˆ(θ; p)〉θ∈Θ to constitute a personal equilibrium is that for all
θ ∈ Θ the first-order condition ∂U(qˆ(θ; p)|θ, ·)/∂q = 0 is satisfied. Thus, the following
condition is necessary for a personal equilibrium with a strictly increasing demand
function: ∀ θ ∈ Θ,
∂u(qˆ(θ; p), θ)
∂q
= p [2 + (λ− 1)F (θ)] . (IV.11)
Note that (IV.11) gives us a unique candidate for a personal equilibrium with strictly
increasing demand. Equation (IV.11) characterizes the unique personal equilibrium if
dqˆ(θ; p)/dq > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ, which is satisfied if and only if condition (C1) holds.
Furthermore, note that qˆ(θ; p) = qS(θ) for p = 0.
Proposition IV.1: Suppose (C1) holds. Then there exists a unique personal equi-
librium 〈qˆ(θ; p)〉θ∈Θ. The personal equilibrium is characterized by ∂u(qˆ(θ; p), θ)/∂q =
p[2 + (λ− 1)F (θ)].
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The consumer’s expected utility from signing a two-part tariff (p, L) is given by
Eφ[U(qˆ(φ; p)|φ, 〈qˆ(θ; p)〉)] =
∫ θ¯
θ
{
u(qˆ(φ; p), φ)− pqˆ(φ; p)
+ p
∫ θ¯
φ
[qˆ(θ; p)− qˆ(φ; p)]f(θ) dθ − λp
∫ φ
θ
[qˆ(φ; p)− qˆ(θ; p)]f(θ) dθ
}
f(φ) dφ− L .
(IV.12)
Personal Equilibrium with Bunching
How does the personal equilibrium look like if condition (C1) fails to hold? In this
case there exists an interval of states of the world for which demand is the same.
Before characterizing the personal equilibrium candidates, we show that any personal
equilibrium demand is bounded from above and from below. Let the lower and the
upper bound be denoted by qMIN , respectively qMAX . Clearly, these bounds depend on
the marginal price p. It is straightforward to show that the bounds are characterized
by the following equations,11
∂u(qMIN , θ)
∂q
= (λ+ 1)p and
∂u(qMAX , θ¯)
∂q
= 2p.
For q < qMin even the lowest type, θ, has an incentive to deviate to a higher quantity.
Similarly, for q > qMAX it is optimal for all types, even for the highest type, θ¯, to
deviate to a lower quantity.
By Lemmas 2 and 3, any personal equilibrium is continuous in the state of the
world even if (C1) does not hold. Furthermore, if the personal equilibrium consists of
flat parts as well as strictly increasing parts, then for the strictly increasing parts the
personal equilibrium is given by q˜(θ; p). Thus, if the flat-part is an interior interval of
Θ, then at the boundary points condition (IV.8) has to hold. On the other hand, if
the flat segment starts at θ or ends at θ¯, then the “bunching quantity” q¯ has to satisfy
an inequality constraint: Given q¯ a downward (upward) deviation has to reduce the
utility of the type θ (respectively θ¯). The following lemma characterizes these cases.
Lemma IV.5: Consider a personal equilibrium 〈qˆ(θ; p)〉θ∈Θ with bunching in at least
one interval I ⊆ Θ with bounds θ1 and θ2 where θ ≤ θ1 < θ2 ≤ θ¯, i.e., qˆ(θ; p) = q¯ ∀
θ ∈ I. Then the constant quantity q¯ and the bounds, θ1 and θ2, are characterized by
∂u(q¯, θ1)/∂q − p[2 + (λ− 1)F (θ1)] = 0 if θ1 > θ
∂u(q¯, θ1)/∂q − p[2 + (λ− 1)F (θ1)] ≥ 0 if θ1 = θ
11Suppose qˆ(φ; p) < qMIN ∀φ ∈ Θ. Then, if a consumer of type θ chooses a quantity q ≥ qMIN
his utility is u(q, θ) − pq − λp
∫ θ¯
θ
[q − qˆ(φ; p)]f(φ)dφ. Thus, type θ has an incentive to deviate if
∂u(qMIN , θ)/∂q − (λ + 1)p > 0. The lowest incentive for an upward deviation has type θ, which
characterizes the bound qMIN . The upper bound, qMAX , is obtained by a similar reasoning.
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and
∂u(q¯, θ2)/∂q − p[2 + (λ− 1)F (θ2)] = 0 if θ2 < θ¯
∂u(q¯, θ2)/∂q − p[2 + (λ− 1)F (θ2)] ≤ 0 if θ2 = θ¯.
For the parts where the personal equilibrium is strictly increasing qˆ(θ; p) = q˜(θ; p).
The situation described in the above lemma is depicted in Figure 1.
θ θ1 θ2 θ¯
q¯
qˆ(θ; p)
θ
q˜(θ; p)
Figure IV.1.: Personal Equilibrium with Bunching
Without further assumptions on the utility function and the distribution function of
the state of the world, the “bunching” regions are intricate to characterize. Moreover,
if condition (C1) does not hold and thus the personal equilibrium consists of flat parts,
there are typically multiple personal equilibria. Since we are interested in situations
where it is optimal for firms to offer flat-rate tariffs, there is no need to further discuss
the personal equilibria for high per-unit prices. A flat-rate can only be optimal if
marginal costs are not too high. If marginal costs are sufficiently low, however, then
the gains from trade for high marginal prices such that bunching occurs are lower than
the joint surplus generated from a flat rate. Hence, it is never optimal for a firm to
set such high per unit prices. When we analyze firms’ behavior we provide a sufficient
condition that allows us to focus on the case where (C1) is satisfied.
For illustrative purposes, we characterize all personal equilibria for a special case.
Suppose the state of the world is uniformly distributed and that the cross derivative is
constant. Then, dq˜(θ; p)/dθ is either strictly increasing for all θ ∈ Θ or non-increasing
for all θ. Thus, depending on the per unit price, the personal equilibrium is either
strictly increasing or constant over all states of the world.
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Corollary IV.1: Suppose ∂2u(q, θ)/∂q∂θ = K > 0 and θ ∼ U [θ, θ¯]. Then (i) for
p < K(θ¯− θ)/(λ− 1) there exists a unique personal equilibrium which is characterized
by ∂u(qˆ(θ; p), θ)/∂q = p[2+(λ−1)(θ−θ)/(θ¯−θ)], (ii) for p ≥ K(θ¯−θ)/(λ−1) in any
personal equilibrium demand is independent of the state of the world, i.e., qˆ(θ; p) = q¯
for all θ ∈ [θ, θ¯]. In this case there are multiple personal equilibria and q¯ satisfies
[∂u(q¯, θ¯)/∂q]/(λ+ 1) ≤ p ≤ [∂u(q¯, θ)/∂q]/2 .
4. Firm’s Subproblem: Joint Surplus Maximization
For this section, suppose firms can observe consumers’ types λ ∈ {λ1, λ2}. With the
consumers’ types being observable, the two market segments of types λ1 and λ2 can
be viewed as distinct markets. Thus, for the analysis we can focus on one market
where consumers are homogeneous with respect to their degree of loss aversion, which
is denoted by λ.
Suppose firm i ∈ {A,B} offers consumers a “deal” using a two-part tariff (Li, pi)
that gives them utility vi. Then, if a consumer with brand preferences ζ = (ζ0, ζA, ζB)
purchases from firm i his net utility is vi+ζ i. Let pij(v
i) be firm i’s maximum profit per
customer of type j when offering them a deal that yields utility vi. The per consumer
profit function is the same for both firms but it depends on the consumer’s degree of
loss aversion λ. In this section, we focus on one market segment and therefore the type
subscript can be omitted without confusion. Since pi(·) is the same for both firms, we
will omit firm’s superscript in the following. With this notation, pi(v) is given by the
solution to the problem:
pi(v) = max
L,p≥0
:
{
L+ (p− c)
∫ θ¯
θ
qˆ(θ, p)f(θ)dθ
∣∣∣∣ Eθ[U(qˆ(θ, p)|θ, 〈q(φ, p)〉)] = v
}
.
(IV.13)
First, we study the firm’s subproblem, that is, we derive the optimal two-part tariff
that solves the above problem. In the next section, we solve for the utility levels and
the corresponding tariffs which are offered by the two firms in equilibrium. Now, we
maximize a firm’s profit over the choice variables p and L subject to the constraint
that the consumer’s utility from the offered deal is v. The constraint of (IV.13) can be
written as
L =
∫ θ¯
θ
{
u(qˆ(φ, p), φ)− pqˆ(φ, p) + p
∫ θ¯
φ
[qˆ(θ, p)− qˆ(φ, p)]f(θ) dθ
− λp
∫ φ
θ
[qˆ(φ, p)− qˆ(θ, p)]f(θ) dθ
}
f(φ) dφ− v. (IV.14)
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Hence, the firm’s tariff choice problem can be restated as a problem of choosing only a
per unit price p. The firm chooses p to maximize S(p)− v, where
S(p) =
∫ θ¯
θ
{
u(qˆ(φ, p), φ)− cqˆ(φ, p) + p
∫ θ¯
φ
[qˆ(θ, p)− qˆ(φ, p)]f(θ) dθ
− λp
∫ φ
θ
[qˆ(φ, p)− qˆ(θ, p)]f(θ) dθ
}
f(φ) dφ. (IV.15)
The firm chooses the marginal price p such that the joint surplus of the two contracting
parties, the consumer and the firm, is maximized. The optimal marginal price pˆ is
independent of the utility the firm offers to the consumer v. This immediately implies
that pi′(v) = −1.
Given condition (C1) does not hold then S(p) is not unambiguously defined, since
the personal equilibrium is not unique. Due to the next lemma one can focus on the
case where there is a unique personal equilibrium given that the marginal cost is low.
Let p¯ := minθ{κ[(λ− 1)f(θ)]
−1}. Note that if p < p¯ then condition (C1) is satisfied.
Lemma IV.6: Suppose marginal cost, c > 0, is sufficiently low. Then the joint sur-
plus, S(p), is maximized for a unit price p ∈ [0, p¯).
The condition under which Lemma 6 is applicable is not very restrictive if one is
prepared to assume that the distribution of the states of the world is not very dense.
With f(θ) being small and thus p¯ being high, the possible gains from trade with unit
prices larger than p¯ are small, since demand is decreasing in p. Keep in mind that the
price at which“bunching”occurs, p¯, is independent of marginal cost. If marginal cost is
relatively low compared to the price p¯, then unit prices p ≥ p¯ lead to higher distortions
in demand than a unit price of zero compared to the first-best quantities. Because the
firm tries to maximize the joint surplus, and p = 0 leads to no losses whereas prices
p ≥ p¯ do, the optimal unit price is below p¯ for not too high marginal cost. In all what
follows it is assumed that c is such that Lemma 6 is applicable.
Hence, we can focus on the case where the personal equilibrium 〈qˆ(θ, p)〉θ∈Θ is char-
acterized by ∂u(qˆ(θ, p), θ)/∂q = p[2 + (λ− 1)F (θ)]. The derivative of the joint surplus
with respect to the marginal price p is
S ′(p) =∫ θ¯
θ
{
(p− c)
dqˆ(θ, p)
dp
+ p
∫ θ¯
θ
dqˆ(φ, p)
dp
f(φ) dφ+ λp
∫ θ
θ
dqˆ(φ, p)
dp
f(φ) dφ
}
f(θ) dθ
− (λ− 1)
∫ θ¯
θ
∫ θ¯
θ
[qˆ(φ, p)− qˆ(θ, p)]f(φ)f(θ) dφdθ . (IV.16)
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The change in the demanded quantities due to a change in the marginal price is
dqˆ(θ, p)
dp
=
2 + (λ− 1)F (θ)
∂2u(qˆ(θ, p), θ)/∂q2
< 0 . (IV.17)
Obviously, for unit prices p ≥ c the joint surplus is strictly decreasing in p. Thus, the
optimal marginal price pˆ ∈ [0, c). In order to guarantee that S(p) is well behaved, we
need an additional assumption. In this regard, we define
Ψ(p) ≡ (p− c)
∫ θ¯
θ
dqˆ(θ, p)
dp
f(θ)dθ − (λ− 1)
∫ θ¯
θ
∫ θ¯
θ
[qˆ(φ, p)− qˆ(θ, p)]f(φ)f(θ) dφdθ .
Assumption (A2): For λ ∈ {λ1, λ2} and p ∈ [0, c), Ψ(p) is non-increasing in p.
Assumption 2 is satisfied, for instance, if d2qˆ(p, θ)/dp2 ≥ 0 and d2qˆ(p, θ)/dpdθ ≥ 0.
In particular, we have to rule out that a higher marginal price leads to a reduction
in expected losses, due to a highly compressed demand profile. To cut back on our
lengthy formulas we define
Σ(λ) ≡ (λ− 1)
∫ θ¯
θ
∫ θ¯
θ
[qˆ(φ, 0)− qˆ(θ, 0)]f(φ)f(θ)dφdθ
−
∫ θ¯
θ
[dqˆ(θ, 0)/dp]f(θ)dθ
.
Note that qˆ(θ, p) does also depend on λ. A few words to Σ(λ) are in order, since this
term is a crucial determinant for the optimality of flat-rate tariffs. Obviously, Σ(1) = 0.
Moreover, it can be shown that Σ(·) is strictly increasing in λ. The numerator is a
measure for the demand variation under a flat-rate contract. If the firm increases
the unit price slightly above zero this reduces the consumer’s utility by imposing an
expected net loss on him, which is proportional to the numerator of Σ(λ). Even a
small increase in p above zero has a negative first-order impact on the consumer’s gain-
loss utility. The denominator measures how strong on average the consumer’s demand
reacts due to an increase of the unit price slightly above zero. Since a flat-rate contract
leads to overconsumption which is costly, the firm has an incentive to choose a positive
unit price if price increases cause sharp reductions in demand. To sum up, we can
expect flat-rate tariffs to be optimal when Σ(λ) is large. This is the case if either
fluctuation in demand is high, or if demand reacts relatively inelastic on price changes.
With this notation, we are prepared to state the main result of this section.
Proposition IV.2: Suppose (A2) holds. Then, the joint surplus of a firm and a con-
sumer is maximized via a flat-rate tariff, i.e., pˆ = 0, if and only if Σ(λ) ≥ c, where
Σ′(λ) > 0.
Economically, the proposition states that a flat-rate tariff is optimal when the marginal
costs are sufficiently low compared to the consumer’s degree of loss aversion. On the
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one hand, a flat-tariff eliminates losses on the side of the consumer, but, on the other
hand, it leads to a too high consumption level. If marginal costs are sufficiently high,
the negative effect due to overconsumption outweighs the positive effect of minimized
losses. Moreover, a flat-rate tariff can only be optimal if there is enough variation in
the consumer’s demand. The numerator of Σ(λ) is a measure for the degree of demand
variation.12
Unfortunately, the proposition requires that condition (A2) holds. It is worthwhile
to point out, however, that a flat-rate tariff is optimal even if (A2) does not hold given
that the following condition is satisfied for all p ∈ [0, c):
(λ− 1)
∫ θ¯
θ
∫ θ¯
θ
[qˆ(φ, p)− qˆ(θ, p)]f(φ)f(θ)dφdθ
−
∫ θ¯
θ
[dqˆ(θ, p)/dp]f(θ)dθ
> c .
Example: To illustrate the optimality of flat-rate tariffs we now discuss an example.
Suppose the consumer’s intrinsic utility for the good is given by u(q, θ) = θq− (1/2)q2
for q ≤ θ = qS(θ) and u(q, θ) = (1/2)θ2 otherwise. Let the state of the world be
uniformly distributed on [2, 3]. Suppose the marginal cost of the firm c = .05. The
demanded quantities in a personal equilibrium for this example are characterized by
Corollary 1. For p < (λ − 1)−1 the demand function is strictly increasing and given
by qˆ(θ, p) = θ[1 − p(λ − 1)] − 2p(2 − λ). For p ≥ (λ − 1)−1 the consumer’s demand
is independent of the state of the world. In this case, there are multiple personal
equilibria. Here, it can easily be verified that the joint surplus is always maximized for
prices below (λ− 1)−1.
Nevertheless, we briefly characterize the joint surplus for all p values. For p ≥ (λ−
1)−1 it can be shown that the preferred personal equilibrium is to demand the highest
possible quantity, i.e., q¯ = max{2(1− p), 0}. The preferred personal equilibrium is the
plan among the consistent plans (personal equilibria) that maximizes the consumer’s
expected utility. Here, the preferred personal equilibrium is also optimal from the firm’s
perspective. The joint surplus, S(p), is depicted below for the case λ = 3. Observe
that S(p) is continuous at p = (λ − 1)−1 which is a general feature of the model and
not due to the specific example.
In this example the function Σ(·) takes the following simple form, Σ(λ) = (1/3)(λ−
1)(λ + 3)−1. Thus, by applying Proposition 2 a flat-rate tariff is optimal if λ ≥ 1.706.
Figure 3 depicts the joint surplus, S(p), for λ = 1, 1.5, 2, 3, 5. Lower curves correspond
to higher values of λ.
12Empirical studies about the flat-rate bias who support the so-called “ratio rule” often argue that a
higher variance in the consumer’s demand does not necessarily increase the consumer’s preferences
for a flat-rate option, see for instance Nunes (2000). Similarly, for a loss averse consumer an invoice
profile is more risky if it has a higher average self distance (numerator of Σ(·)), which does not
imply a higher variance.
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Figure IV.2.: Joint Surplus for λ = 3.
Figure IV.3.: Joint Surplus for λ = 1, 1.5, 2, 3, 5.
Without loss aversion (λ = 1) the optimal marginal price p = (1/2)c. Note that even
for λ = 1 the consumer has reference-dependent preferences and therefore his marginal
utility for money is two at the moment where he makes his purchasing decision. With
the consumer being loss averse (λ > 1), in most cases a flat-rate tariff is optimal.
5. Competitive Equilibrium
Since firms are symmetric we focus on the profit maximization problem of firm A.
Symmetric Information Case
With λ being observable we can regard the two market segments as distinct markets.
For a given market segment j ∈ {1, 2} firm A offers utility vAj to these consumers to
maximize profits. For a given utility vBj offered by firm B the profit maximization
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problem of firm A is given by
max
vAj
m(vAj , v
B
j )pij(v
A
j ) . (IV.18)
The necessary first-order condition for profit maximization amounts to
[∂m(vAj , v
B
j )/∂v
A
j ]pij(v
A
j ) +m(v
A
j , v
B
j )pi
′
j(v
A
j ) = 0 . (IV.19)
Remember that pi′j(v
A) = −1. The optimal marginal price is unaffected by the choice
of vAj . If firm A offers one unit utility more to consumers, then this is optimally be
achieved by lowering the fixed fee by one unit. The fixed fee is a one-to-one transfer
from the consumer to the firm. Define
Φ(v) ≡
m(v, v)
∂m(v, v)/∂vA
.
Applying Proposition 1 of Armstrong and Vickers (2001), the firm’s per customer profit
in submarket j in the symmetric equilibrium is given by
pij(vˆj) = Φ(vˆj) ,
where vˆj denotes the utility offered by both firms to consumers of type λj in equilibrium.
As is shown by Armstrong and Vickers, there are no asymmetric equilibria. Moreover,
the equilibrium is often unique.13 The following proposition summarizes the tariffs
offered by the two firms to consumers in equilibrium.
Proposition IV.3 (Full Information): Suppose (A2) holds. Then, in equilibrium,
(i) if Σ(λ1) < c ≤ Σ(λ2) both firms offer the tariff (pˆ, Lˆ) with a positive unit price
to consumers of type λ1, and a flat-rate tariff (0, L
F ) to consumers of type λ2. (ii) If
c ≤ Σ(λ1) < Σ(λ2), then both firms offer the flat-rate tariff (0, L
F ) to both types of loss
averse consumers. The tariffs (pˆ, Lˆ) and (0, LF ) are characterized by: S(pˆ) = 0,
Lˆ = Φ(vˆ1)− (pˆ− c)
∫ θ¯
θ
qˆ1(θ, pˆ)f(θ)dθ
and LF = Φ(vˆ2) + c
∫ θ¯
θ
qS(θ)f(θ)dθ ,
respectively, with pˆ ∈ (0, c).
If the degree of loss aversion of the less loss-averse consumers is below the threshold,
then firms offer to these consumers a usage-based pricing scheme. Next to the usage-
based scheme firms offer a flat-rate tariff to the more loss-averse consumers. Thus,
13See Armstrong and Vickers (2001) for sufficient conditions for a unique equilibrium.
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consumer heterogeneity with respect to their first-order risk preferences provides one
possible answer why firms offer flat-rates next to usage-based tariffs. If the degree of
loss aversion of both types is above the threshold, then firms offer only a single tariff,
which is a flat-rate tariff. It is worthwhile to point out that the structure of the tariffs
offered in equilibrium does not depend on the degree of competition. The degree of
competition only influences the size of the fixed fee. In a more competitive market
firms offer tariffs with lower fixed fees, the unit price is unaffected by the degree of
competition. Even in the limit, when we approach a perfectly competitive market, the
equilibrium tariffs do not converge to marginal cost pricing. Note that in this model
the degree of competition (or the degree of product differentiation) is measured by
Φ(·). A lower Φ(·) corresponds to a more competitive market. Φ(·) is the inverse semi-
elasticity of demand evaluated at the equilibrium utility level. Thus, the higher Φ(·)
the less elastic is the demand of a firm. To make this point even clearer, suppose firms
are located at the two extreme points of a Hotelling line of length one. Consumers’
ideal brands are uniformly distributed on this line. If a consumer incurs “transport
cost” of t times the distance between his ideal brand and the firm he purchases from,
then Φ(vˆ) = t given the market is fully covered in equilibrium.
A final comment to the offered tariffs is in order: Here, firms offer a flat-rate tariff
to those consumers who are willing to pay an extra amount to be insured against
unexpected high bills. The flat-rate tariff, however, is not offered to exploit consumers’
behavioral bias. Here, firms offer flat-rate tariffs to consumers in the cases where
these tariffs also maximize the joint surplus. This is in contrast to several models
with biased consumers where firms design tariffs to exploit consumers’ biases, see for
instance Grubb (forthcoming) or Eliaz and Spiegler (2008).
For completeness, the following result states the equilibrium outcome for the case
where consumers are not loss averse.
Corollary IV.2: Suppose consumers do not exhibit loss aversion, i.e., λ1 = λ2 = 1.
Then, in equilibrium both firms offer the two-part tariff with marginal price pˆ = (1/2)c
and fixed fee Lˆ = Φ(vˆ) + (1/2)c
∫ θ¯
θ
qFB(θ)dθ, where qFB(θ) ≡ argmaxq{u(q, θ) − cq}.
In this case the joint surplus equals the first-best surplus, vˆ + pi(vˆ) = SFB.
Without loss aversion, due to ex ante contracting, firms choose a tariff that implements
the first-best allocation. Depending on the degree of competition, the first-best surplus
is shared between firms and consumers. Since with λ = 1 consumers still have reference-
dependent preferences, the per-unit price does not equal marginal cost. Due to the
reference-dependent preferences the consumer’s marginal utility for money is two, since
the weight on gain-loss utility is assumed to be one. It is important to point out that
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reference-dependent preferences without loss aversion have only quantitative effects on
the equilibrium outcome but not qualitative effects.
Asymmetric Information Case
In this subsection, we investigate the tariffs offered by the two firms when facing a
screening problem, i.e., the degree of loss aversion is private information of the con-
sumer. The following lemma states that a consumer’s expected utility is decreasing in
his degree of loss aversion.
Lemma IV.7: Consider a two-part tariff (p, L) and suppose (C1) holds. Then,
d
dλ
[
Eθ[U(qˆ(θ; p)|θ, 〈q(θ; p)〉)]
]
≤ 0.
Suppose firms offer the tariffs as in the full information benchmark. Due to Lemma 7,
consumers who are less loss averse may have an incentive to choose the tariff that is
designed for the more loss-averse consumers. Note that when choosing a flat-rate tariff
the consumer does neither feel a loss nor a gain. Thus, the expected utility from a flat-
rate contract is independent of the consumer’s degree of loss aversion. Hence, if firms
offer a flat-rate tariff to the types with a high degree of loss aversion, then a consumer
of type λ1 does not necessarily benefit from choosing the tariff that is designed for
consumers of type λ2. If firms’ profits from the market segment of λ1 types is lower
than their profits from λ2 types, however, then consumers of type λ2 may have an
incentive to choose the tariff (pˆ, Lˆ). Because, if this is the case, then vˆ1 is considerably
larger than vˆ2. We rule this out by assuming that Φ(·) is non-decreasing.
14 With this
assumption, both firms’ profits and consumers’ surplus increase in equilibrium, if the
joint surplus from contracting increases. Assuming that an increase in joint surplus is
shared between consumers and firms seems to be natural for imperfectly competitive
markets.
With this assumption, the two types of loss averse consumers may not exert any
informational externality on each other. Put differently, if this is the case, firms can
screen the consumer’s type at no cost.
Proposition IV.4 (Asymmetric Information): Suppose (A2) holds and Φ′(v) ≥
0. Then, (i) if Σ(λ1) < c ≤ Σ(λ2) both firms offering tariff (pˆ, Lˆ) with a positive unit
price to consumers of type λ1, and flat-rate tariff (0, L
F ) to consumers of type λ2 is an
equilibrium. (ii) If c ≤ Σ(λ1) < Σ(λ2), then in equilibrium both firms offer the flat-rate
tariff (0, LF ) to both types of loss averse consumers. The tariffs, (pˆ, Lˆ) and (0, LF ),
are characterized in Proposition 3.
14For instance, this assumption is satisfied for the standard Hotelling model and the logit demand
model, see Appendix A.4.2.
Essays in Industrial Organization and Behavioral Economics 105
As in the symmetric information case, if λ1 is below and λ2 above the threshold, then
firms offer a usage-based pricing scheme to the less loss-averse types and a flat-rate
tariff to the more loss-averse consumers. The fixed fee of the flat-rate tariff is higher
than the fixed fee of the usage-based pricing scheme. In this case, we do not make any
claims about the uniqueness of this equilibrium.15 If the degree of loss aversion of both
types exceeds the threshold, then we obtain a pooling equilibrium: Each firm offers
only a single tariff that is accepted by both types of consumers.
If Σ(λ2) < c then there is an information externality. In this case, if firms can observe
λ they would offer to each type a different usage-based tariff. When offering these tariffs
in the asymmetric information case, then type λ1 obtains a higher expected utility from
signing the contract that is designed for the types λ2. We refrain from characterizing
the equilibrium tariffs for this case, since this case is intricate to analyze in the applied
competition-in-utility-space framework.
It is important to point out that offering a flat-rate tariff next to usage based tariffs
does not impose some additional incentive constraints. If the degree of loss aversion,
λ, is continuously distributed on [λ, λ¯] with Σ(λ) < c < Σ(λ¯), then in equilibrium
firms offer the flat-rate tariff (0, LF ) which is chosen at least by types λ ∈ [λ˜, λ¯], where
Σ(λ˜) = c.
6. Concluding Remarks
The goal of this article is to provide one possible explanation for the frequent usage
of flat-rate tariffs. Since empirical evidence suggests that consumers choose flat rates
because these tariffs provide insurance in case of uncertain consumption patterns, we
posit that consumers are first-order risk averse. First-order risk aversion is captured
by reference-dependent preferences of the consumer in combination with loss aversion.
This paper shows that a flat-rate contract is optimal when consumers are sufficiently
loss averse, marginal cost is small, or demand is rather unpredictable. Moreover, in an
imperfectly competitive market firms offer flat-rate tariffs to those consumers whose de-
gree of loss aversion exceeds a certain threshold. Consumers with a lower degree of loss
aversion sign a metered tariff in equilibrium. Interestingly, offering a flat-rate contract
next to usage-based pricing schemes does not introduce additional sorting constraints
into a firm’s optimization problem. Thus, this paper predicts that in markets with
low marginal cost and uncertain consumption patterns, a firm’s tariff menu includes a
flat-rate option.
15To analyze all equilibria we cannot apply the competition in utility space framework, since we have
to take the sorting constraints explicitly into account. Note that each firm has 4 choice variables
which makes the calculation of firm A’s best response to firm B’s tariff offers intricate.
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We departed from the Ko˝szegi-Rabin concept by positing that the consumer does not
feel any sensations of gains and losses in the good dimension. If one considers gain-loss
utility in both dimensions and assumes that higher states are always associated with
higher utility, then a flat-rate tariff eliminates only the losses in the money but not in
the good dimension. Depending on the particular form of the intrinsic utility function,
a flat-rate contract may increase or decrease the expected losses in the good dimension.
Alternatively, one could assume that intrinsic utility evaluated at the satiation quantity
is constant for all states, but marginal utility is still increasing in the state. With this
formulation, for a given state φ the consumer feels a loss in the good as well as in the
money dimension compared to states θ < φ. In this case, a flat-rate tariff eliminates any
losses in both dimensions; the good and the money dimension. Hence, the formulation
of this paper can be viewed as an intermediate case between the two possible approaches
with gain-loss utility in both dimensions. Moreover, focusing on the case with gain-
loss utility only in the money dimension helps to make the analysis of the personal
equilibria clearer and shorter.
An obvious drawback of our model is that firms are restricted to two-part tariffs.
With the consumer being loss averse according to Ko˝szegi-Rabin, his utility in a given
state of the world also depends on his payments in all other states. Thus, the standard
procedure of the nonlinear pricing literature, where the tariff in the firm’s objective
typically is replaced by the consumer’s net surplus, does not work here. This in turn
makes the analysis of nonlinear tariffs more complicated. We believe, however, that
focusing on two-part tariffs provides some insights on the forces at play when consumers
are loss averse. In particular, the identified insurance motive of loss averse consumers
should also play a major role when firms can offer more sophisticated contracts.
It is rather obvious that imposing a quantity limit on the flat-rate option can im-
prove the joint surplus. If the quantity limit equals the first-best quantity for the
highest state then, compared to a flat rate with unlimited usage, standard efficiency
is improved without imposing additional losses on the consumer. Flat-rate tariffs with
limited usage are often observed for the Internet service industry. Hence, investiga-
tion of optimal nonlinear pricing schedules for firms facing loss-averse consumers is an
interesting question for future research.
A. Appendices
1. Appendix to Chapter I
1.1. Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
Proof of Lemma I.1: Suppose that signals are ordered according to their likelihood
ratio, that is, s > s′ if and only if γHs /γ
L
s > γ
H
s′ /γ
L
s′ . Consider a contract of the form
us =
{
u if s < sˆ
u+ b if s ≥ sˆ
,
where b > 0 and 1 < sˆ ≤ S. Under this contractual form and given that the first-order
approach is valid, (IC) can be rewritten as
b
{[
S∑
s=sˆ
(γHs − γ
L
s )
](
1− (λ− 1)
sˆ−1∑
s=1
γs(aˆ)
)
− (λ− 1)
(
sˆ−1∑
s=1
(γHs − γ
L)
)(
S∑
s=sˆ
γs(aˆ)
)}
= c′(aˆ).
Since signals are ordered according to their likelihood ratio, we have
∑S
s=sˆ(γ
H
s −γ
L
s ) > 0
and
∑sˆ−1
s=1(γ
H
s −γ
L) < 0 for all 1 < sˆ ≤ S. This implies that the term in curly brackets
is strictly positive for λ ≤ 2. Hence, with c′(aˆ) > 0, b can alway be chosen such that
(IC) is met. Rearranging the participation constraint,
u ≥ u¯+ c(aˆ)− b
(
S∑
s=sˆ
γs(aˆ)
)[
1− (λ− 1)
(
sˆ−1∑
s=1
γs(aˆ)
)]
,
reveals that (IR) can be satisfied for any b by choosing u appropriately. This concludes
the proof.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition I.1: It is readily verified that Assumptions 1-3 from Gross-
man and Hart (1983) are satisfied. Thus, the cost-minimization problem is well defined,
in the sense that for each action a ∈ (0, 1) there exists a second-best incentive scheme.
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Suppose the principal wants to implement action aˆ ∈ (0, 1) at minimum cost. Since
the agent’s action is not observable, the principal’s problem is given by
min
{us}Ss=1
S∑
s=1
γs(aˆ)h(us) (MR)
subject to
S∑
s=1
γs(aˆ)us − c(aˆ) ≥ u¯ , (IRR)
S∑
s=1
(γHs − γ
L
s )us − c
′(aˆ) = 0 . (ICR)
where the first constraint is the individual rationality constraint and the second is the
incentive compatibility constraint. Note that the first-order approach is valid, since
the agent’s expected utility is a strictly concave function of his effort. The Lagrangian
to the resulting problem is
L =
S∑
s=1
γs(a)h(us)−µ0
{
S∑
s=1
γs(a)us − c(a)− u¯
}
−µ1
{
S∑
s=1
(γHs − γ
L
s )us − c
′(a)
}
,
where µ0 and µ1 denote the Lagrange multipliers of the individual rationality constraint
and the incentive compatibility constraint, respectively. Setting the partial derivative
of L with respect to us equal to zero yields
∂L
∂us
= 0 ⇐⇒ h′(us) = µ0 + µ1
γHs − γ
L
s
γs(aˆ)
, ∀s ∈ S. (A.1)
Irrespective of the value of µ0, if µ1 > 0, convexity of h(·) implies that us > us′
if and only if (γHs − γ
L
s )/γs(aˆ) > (γ
H
s′ − γ
L
s′)/γs′(aˆ), which in turn is equivalent to
γHs /γ
L
s > γ
H
s′ /γ
L
s′ . Thus it remains to show that µ1 is strictly positive. Suppose, in
contradiction, that µ1 ≤ 0. Consider the case µ1 = 0 first. From (A.1) it follows
that us = u
f for all s ∈ S, where uf satisfies h′(uf ) = µ0. This, however, violates
(ICR), a contradiction. Next, consider µ1 < 0. From (A.1) it follows that us < us′ if
and only if (γHs − γ
L
s )/γs(aˆ) > (γ
H
s′ − γ
L
s′)/γt(aˆ). Let S
+ ≡
{
s|γHs − γ
L
s > 0
}
, S− ≡{
s|γHs − γ
L
s < 0
}
, and uˆ ≡ min{us|s ∈ S
−}. Since uˆ > us for all s ∈ S
+, we have
S∑
s=1
(γHs − γ
L
s )us =
∑
S−
(γHs − γ
L
s )us +
∑
S+
(γHs − γ
L
s )us
<
∑
S−
(γHs − γ
L
s )uˆ+
∑
S+
(γHs − γ
L
s )uˆ
= uˆ
S∑
s=1
(γHs − γ
L
s )
= 0,
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again a contradiction to (ICR). Hence, µ1 > 0 and the desired result follows.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition I.2: The problem of finding the optimal contract u∗ to
implement action aˆ ∈ (0, 1) is decomposed into two subproblems. First, for a given
incentive feasible ordering of signals, we derive the optimal nondecreasing incentive
scheme that implements action aˆ ∈ (0, 1). Then, in a second step, we choose the
ordering of signals for which the ordering specific cost of implementation is lowest.
Step 1: Remember that the ordering of signals is incentive feasible if βs(·) > 0 for at
least one signal s. For a given incentive feasible ordering of signals, in this first step we
solve Program ML. First, note that it is optimal to set bs = 0 if βs(·) < 0. To see this,
suppose, in contradiction, that in the optimum (IC′) holds and bs > 0 for some signal
s with βs(·) ≤ 0. If βs(·) = 0, then setting bs = 0 leaves (IC
′) unchanged, but leads to
a lower value of the objective function of Program ML, contradicting that the original
contract is optimal. If βs(·) < 0, then setting bs = 0 not only reduces the value of the
objective function, but also relaxes (IC′), which in turn allows to lower other bonus
payments, thereby lowering the value of the objective function even further. Again,
a contradiction to the original contract being optimal. Let Sβ ≡ {s ∈ S|βs(·) > 0}
denote the set of signals for which βs(·) is strictly positive under the considered ordering
of signals, and let Sβ denote the number of elements in this set. Thus, Program (ML)
can be rewritten as
Program ML+:
min
{bs}s∈Sβ
∑
s∈Sβ
bsρs(γˆ, λ, aˆ)
subject to (i)
∑
s∈Sβ
bsβs(γˆ, λ, aˆ) = c
′(aˆ) (IC+)
(ii) bs ≥ 0, ∀s ∈ Sβ .
Program ML+ is a linear programming problem. It is well-known that if a linear
programming problem has a solution, it must have a solution at an extreme point
of the constraint set. Generically, there is a unique solution and this solution is
an extreme point. Since the constraint set of Program ML+, M ≡ {{bs}s∈Sβ ∈
R
Sβ
+ |
∑
s∈Sβ
bsβs(γˆ, λ, aˆ) = c
′(aˆ)}, is closed and bounded, Program ML+ has a solu-
tion. Hence, generically
∑
s∈Sβ
bsρs(γˆ, λ, aˆ) achieves its greatest lower bound at one of
the extreme points of M. (We comment on genericity below.) With M describing a
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hyperplane in R
Sβ
+ , all extreme points of M are characterized by the following prop-
erty: bs > 0 for exactly one signal s ∈ Sβ and bt = 0 for all t ∈ Sβ, t 6= s. It remains
to determine for which signal the bonus is set strictly positive. The size of the bonus
payment, which is set strictly positive, is uniquely determined by (IC+):
bsβs(γˆ, λ, aˆ) = c
′(aˆ) ⇐⇒ bs =
c′(aˆ)
βs(γˆ, λ, aˆ)
. (A.2)
Therefore, from the objective function of Program ML+ it follows that, for the signal
ordering under consideration, the optimal signal for which the bonus is set strictly
positive, sˆ, is characterized by
sˆ = argmin
s∈Sβ
c′(aˆ)
βs(γˆ, λ, aˆ)
ρs(γˆ, λ, aˆ).
Step 2: From all incentive feasible signal orders, the principal chooses the one which
minimizes her cost of implementation. With the number of incentive feasible signal
orders being finite, this problem clearly has a solution. Let s∗ denote the resulting
cutoff, i.e.,
u∗s =
{
u∗ if s < s∗
u∗ + b∗ if s ≥ s∗
,
where b∗ = c′(aˆ)/βs∗(γˆ, λ, aˆ) and u
∗ = u¯+c(aˆ)−b∗
[∑S
τ=s∗ γτ (aˆ)− ρs∗(γˆ, λ, aˆ)
]
. Letting
u∗L = u
∗, u∗H = u
∗ + b∗, and B∗ = {s ∈ S|s ≥ s∗} establishes the desired result.
On genericity: We claimed that, for any given feasible ordering of signals, generi-
cally Program ML+ has a unique solution at one of the extreme points of the constraint
set. To see this, note that a necessary condition for the existence of multiple solutions
is βs/βs′ = ρs/ρs′ for some s, s
′ ∈ Sβ, s 6= s
′. This condition is characterized by the
action to be implemented, aˆ, the structure of the performance measure,
{
(γHs , γ
L
s )
}S
s=1
,
and the agent’s degree of loss aversion, λ. Now, fix aˆ and
{
(γHs , γ
L
s )
}S
s=1
. With both
βs > 0 and ρs > 0 for all s ∈ Sβ, it is readily verified, that exactly one value of λ
equates βs/βs′ with ρs/ρs′ . Since λ is drawn from the interval (1, 2], and with the num-
ber of signals being finite, this necessary condition for Program ML+ having multiple
solutions for a given feasible ordering of signals generically will not hold. With the
number of feasible orderings being finite, generic optimality of a corner solution carries
over to the overall problem.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition I.3: B∗ maximizes X(B) :=
[∑
s∈B(γ
H
s − γ
L
s )
]
× Y (PB),
where
Y (PB) :=
1
(λ− 1)PB(1− PB)
−
1
PB
+
1
1− PB
.
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Suppose for the moment that PB is a continuous decision variable. Accordingly,
dY (PB)
dPB
=
1
P 2B(1− PB)
2
[
2P 2B +
2− λ
λ− 1
(2PB − 1)
]
. (A.3)
It is readily verified that dY (PB)/dPB < 0 for 0 < PB < P¯ (λ) and dY (PB)/dPB > 0
for P¯ (λ) < PB < 1, where
P¯ (λ) ≡
λ− 2 +
√
λ(2− λ)
2(λ− 1)
.
Note that for λ ≤ 2 the critical value P¯ (λ) ∈ [0, 1/2). Hence, excluding a signal of
B increases Y (PB) if PB < P¯ (λ), whereas including a signal to B increases Y (PB) if
PB ≥ P¯ (λ). With these insights the next two implications follow immediately.
(i) PB∗ < P¯ (λ) =⇒ B
∗ ⊆ S+
(ii) PB∗ ≥ P¯ (λ) =⇒ S
+ ⊆ B∗
We prove both statements in turn by contradiction. (i) Suppose PB∗ < P¯ (λ) and
that there exists a signal sˆ ∈ S− which is also contained in B∗, i.e., sˆ ∈ B∗. Clearly,∑
s∈B∗(γ
H
s − γ
L
s ) <
∑
s∈B∗\{sˆ}(γ
H
s − γ
L
s ) because sˆ is a bad signal. Moreover, Y (B
∗) <
Y (B∗\{sˆ}) because Y (·) increases when signals are excluded of B∗. Thus X(B∗) <
X(B∗\{sˆ}), a contradiction to the assumption that B∗ is the optimal partition. (ii)
Suppose PB∗ ≥ P¯ (λ) and that there exists a signal s˜ ∈ S
+ that is not contained in B∗,
i.e., B∗ ∩ {s˜} = ∅. Since sˆ is a good signal
∑
s∈B∗(γ
H
s − γ
L
s ) <
∑
s∈B∗∪{sˆ}(γ
H
s − γ
L
s ).
PB∗ ≥ P¯ (λ) implies that Y (B
∗ ∪ {s˜}) > Y (B∗). Thus, X(B∗) < X(B∗ ∪ {s˜}) a
contradiction to the assumption that B∗ maximizes X(B∗). Finally, since for any B∗
we are either in case (i) or in case (ii), the desired result follows.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition I.4: Suppose, in contradiction, that in the optimum there are
signals s, t ∈ S such that s ∈ B∗, t /∈ B∗ and γ
H
s −γ
L
s
γs(aˆ)
<
γHt −γ
L
t
γt(aˆ)
. We derive a contradiction
by showing that exchanging signal s for signal t reduces the principal’s cost, which
implies that the original contract cannot be optimal. Let B¯ ≡ (B∗\{s})∪{t}.It suffices
to show that X(B¯) > X(B∗), where X(B) is defined as in the proof of Proposition 3.
X(B¯) > X(B∗) is equivalent to(∑
j∈B∗
(γHj − γ
L
j ) + (γ
H
t − γ
L
t )− (γ
H
s − γ
L
s )
)[
1− (λ− 1)(1− 2PB¯)
(λ− 1)PB¯(1− PB¯)
]
>
(∑
j∈B∗
(γHj − γ
L
j )
)[
1− (λ− 1)(1− 2PB∗)
(λ− 1)PB∗(1− PB∗)
]
.
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Rearranging yields
[
(γHt − γ
L
t )− (γ
H
s − γ
L
s )
] [1− (λ− 1)(1− 2PB¯)
(λ− 1)PB¯(1− PB¯)
]
>(∑
j∈B∗
(γHj − γ
L
j )
)[
1− (λ− 1)(1− 2PB∗)
(λ− 1)PB∗(1− PB∗)
−
1− (λ− 1)(1− 2PB¯)
(λ− 1)PB¯(1− PB¯)
]
. (A.4)
With Y (PB) being defined as in the proof of Proposition 3, we have to consider two
cases, (i) dY (PB∗)/PB ≥ 0, and (ii) dY (PB∗)/PB < 0.
Case (i): Since γs(aˆ)−γt(aˆ) ≤ κ, we have PB∗ ≤ PB¯+κ. With Y (PB) being (weakly)
increasing at PB∗ , inequality (A.4) is least likely to hold for PB∗ = PB¯ + κ. Inserting
PB∗ = PB¯ + κ into (A.4) yields
[
(γHt − γ
L
t )− (γ
H
s − γ
L
s )
] [1− (λ− 1)(1− 2PB¯)
(λ− 1)PB¯(1− PB¯)
]
>(∑
j∈B∗
(γHj − γ
L
j )
)[
1− (λ− 1)(1− 2PB¯ − 2κ)
(λ− 1)[PB¯(1− PB¯) + κ(1− 2PB¯)]− κ2
−
1− (λ− 1)(1− 2PB¯)
(λ− 1)PB¯(1− PB¯)
]
.
(A.5)
The right-hand side of (A.5) becomes arbitrarily close to zero for κ→ 0, thus it remains
to show that [
(γHt − γ
L
t )− (γ
H
s − γ
L
s )
] [1− (λ− 1)(1− 2PB¯)
(λ− 1)PB¯(1− PB¯)
]
> 0 . (A.6)
For (A.6) to hold, we must have (γHt − γ
L
t ) − (γ
H
s − γ
L
s ) > 0. From the proof of
Proposition 3 we know that S+ ⊆ B∗ if Y (PB) is increasing at B
∗. Since the principal
will end up including all good signals in the set B∗ anyway, the question of interest is
whether she can benefit from swapping two bad signals. Therefore, we consider case
s, t ∈ S−, where S− ≡ {s ∈ S|γHs − γ
L
s < 0}. With s, t ∈ S
−, we have
[
(γHt − γ
L
t )− (γ
H
s − γ
L
s )
]
≥ γt(aˆ)γs(aˆ)
[
1
γs(aˆ)
γHt − γ
L
t
γt(aˆ)
−
1
γs(aˆ) + κ
γHs − γ
L
s
γs(aˆ)
]
, (A.7)
where the inequality holds because γt(aˆ) − γs(aˆ) ≤ κ. Note that for κ → 0 the right-
hand side of (A.7) becomes strictly positive, thus (γHt −γ
L
t )− (γ
H
s −γ
L
s ) > 0 for κ→ 0.
Hence, for κ sufficiently small, X(B∗) < X(B¯), a contradiction to B∗ being optimal.
Case (ii): Since γt(aˆ) − γs(aˆ) ≤ κ, we have PB∗ ≥ PB¯ − κ. With Y (PB) being
decreasing at PB∗ , inequality (A.4) is least likely to hold for PB∗ = PB¯ − κ. Inserting
PB∗ = PB¯ − κ into (A.4), and running along the lines of case (i) allows us to establish
that, for κ sufficiently small, X(B∗) < X(B¯), a contradiction to B∗ being optimal.
To sum up, for κ sufficiently small we have
max
s∈S\B∗
{(γHs − γ
L
s )/γs(aˆ)} < min
s∈B∗
{(γHs − γ
L
s )/γs(aˆ)} ,
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or equivalently,
max
s∈S\B∗
{γHs /γ
L
s } < min
s∈B∗
{γHs /γ
L
s } .
Letting K ≡ mins∈B∗{γ
H
s /γ
L
s } establishes the desired result.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition I.5: We first prove part (ii). Suppose that a small change
in λ leaves the optimal partition B∗ of the set of all signals unchanged. Rearranging
(IC′) yields
b∗ =
c′(aˆ)∑
s∈B∗(γ
H
s − γ
L
s )− (λ− 1)
[∑
s∈B∗(γ
H
s − γ
L
s )
]
[1− 2PB∗ ]
. (A.8)
Straight-forward differentiation reveals that
db∗
dλ
=
c′(aˆ)
[∑
s∈B∗(γ
H
s − γ
L
s )
]
[1− 2PB∗ ]{∑
s∈B∗(γ
H
s − γ
L
s )− (λ− 1)
[∑
s∈B∗(γ
H
s − γ
L
s )
]
[1− 2PB∗ ]
}2 .
Since under the second-best contract
∑
s∈B∗(γ
H
s − γ
L
s ) > 0, the desired result follows.
To prove part (i), let B+ ≡
{
B ⊂ S|
∑
s∈B(γ
H
s − γ
L
s ) > 0
}
. For any B˜ ∈ B+, let
bB˜ =
c′(aˆ)∑
s∈B˜(γ
H
s − γ
L
s )− (λ− 1)
[∑
s∈B˜(γ
H
s − γ
L
s )
]
[1− 2PB˜]
and
uB˜ = u¯+ c(aˆ)− bB˜PB˜ + (λ− 1)PB˜(1− PB˜)bB˜.
The cost of implementing action aˆ when paying uB˜ for signals in S \ B˜ and uB˜ + bB˜ for
signals in B˜ is given by
CB˜ = uB˜ + bB˜PB˜ = u¯+ c(aˆ) +
c′(aˆ)(λ− 1)PB˜(1− PB˜)[∑
s∈B˜(γ
H
s − γ
L
s )
]
[1− (λ− 1)(1− 2PB˜)]
. (A.9)
Differentiation of CB˜ with respect to λ yields
dCB˜
dλ
=
c′(aˆ)PB˜(1− PB˜)[∑
s∈B˜(γ
H
s − γ
L
s )
]
[1− (λ− 1)(1− 2PB˜)]
2 .
Obviously, dCB˜/dλ > 0 for all B ∈ B
+. Since the optimal partition of S may change
as λ changes, the minimum cost of implementing action aˆ is given by
C(aˆ) = min
B∈B+
CB.
Put differently, C(aˆ) is the lower envelope of all CB for B ∈ B
+. With CB being
continuous and strictly increasing in λ for all B ∈ B+, it follows that also C(aˆ) is
continuous and strictly increasing in λ. This completes the proof.
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma I.2: We show that program (MG) has a solution, i.e.,
∑S
s=1 γs(aˆ)
h(us) achieves its greatest lower bound. First, from Lemma 1 we know that the con-
straint set of program (MG) is not empty for action aˆ ∈ (0, 1). Next, note that from
(IRG) it follows that
∑S
s=1 γs(aˆ)us is bounded below. Following the reasoning in the
proof of Proposition 1 of Grossman and Hart (1983), we can artificially bound the con-
straint set – roughly spoken because unbounded sequences in the constraint set make∑S
s=1 γs(aˆ)h(us) tend to infinity by a result from Bertsekas (1974). Since the constraint
set is closed, the existence of a minimum follows from Weierstrass’ theorem.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma I.3: Since (IRG) will always be satisfied with equality due to an
appropriate adjustment of the lowest intrinsic utility level offered, relaxing (IRG) will
always lead to strictly lower costs for the principal. Therefore, the shadow value of
relaxing (IRG) is strictly positive, so µIR > 0.
Next, we show that relaxing (ICG) has a positive shadow value, µIC > 0. We do this
by showing that a decrease in c′(aˆ) leads to a reduction in the principal’s minimum cost
of implementation. Let {u∗s}s∈S be the optimal contract under (the original) Program
MG, and suppose that c′(aˆ) decreases. Now the principal can offer a new contract
{uNs }s∈S of the form
uNs = αu
∗
s + (1− α)
S∑
t=1
γt(aˆ)u
∗
t , (A.10)
where α ∈ (0, 1), which also satisfies (IRG), the relaxed (ICG), and (OCG), but yields
strictly lower costs of implementation than the original contract {u∗s}s∈S .
Clearly, for αˆ ∈ (0, 1), uNs < u
N
s′ if and only if u
∗
s < u
∗
s′ , so (OCG) is also satisfied
under contract {uNs }s∈S .
Next, we check that the relaxed (ICG) holds under {u
N
s }s∈S . To see this, note that for
α = 1 we have {uNs }s∈S ≡ {u
∗
s}s∈S . Thus, for α = 1, the relaxed (ICG) is oversatisfied
under {uNs }s∈S . For α = 0, on the other hand, the left-hand side of (ICG) is equal to
zero, and the relaxed (ICG) in consequence is not satisfied. Since the left-hand side of
(ICG) is continuous in α under contract {u
N
s }s∈S , by the intermediate-value theorem
there exists αˆ ∈ (0, 1) such that the relaxed (ICG) is satisfied with equality.
Last, consider (IRG). The left-hand side of (IRG) under contract {u
N
s }s∈S with α = αˆ
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amounts to
S∑
s=1
γs(aˆ)u
N
s − (λ− 1)
S−1∑
s=1
S∑
t=s+1
γs(aˆ)γt(aˆ)
[
uNt − u
N
s
]
=
S∑
s=1
γs(aˆ)u
∗
s − α˜(λ− 1)
S−1∑
s=1
S∑
t=s+1
γs(aˆ)γt(aˆ) [u
∗
t − u
∗
s]
>
S∑
s=1
γs(aˆ)u
∗
s − (λ− 1)
S−1∑
s=1
S∑
t=s+1
γs(aˆ)γt(aˆ) [u
∗
t − u
∗
s]
= u¯+ c(aˆ) , (A.11)
where the last equality follows from the fact that {u∗s}s∈S fulfills the (IRg) with equality.
Thus, contract {uNs }s∈S is feasible in the sense that all constraints of program (MG)
are met. It remains to show that the principal’s costs are reduced. Since h(·) is strictly
convex, the principal’s objective function is strictly convex in α, with a minimum at
α = 0. Hence, the principal’s objective function is strictly increasing in α for α ∈ (0, 1].
Since {uNs }s∈S ≡ {u
∗
s}s∈S for α = 1, for α = αˆ we have
S∑
s=1
γs(aˆ)h(u
∗
s) >
S∑
s=1
γs(aˆ)h(u
N
s ),
which establishes the desired result.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition I.6: For the agent’s intrinsic utility function being suffi-
ciently linear, the principal’s costs are approximately given by a second-order Taylor
polynomial about r = 1, thus
C(u|r) ≈
∑
s∈S
γs(aˆ)us + Ω(u|r) , (A.12)
where
Ω(u|r) ≡
∑
s∈S
γs(aˆ)
[
(us lnus)(r − 1) + (1/2)us(lnus)
2(r − 1)2
]
. (A.13)
Relabeling signals such that the wage profile is increasing allows us to express the incen-
tive scheme in terms of increases in intrinsic utility. The agent’s binding participation
constraint implies that
u1 = u¯+c(aˆ)−
S∑
s=2
bs
{
S∑
τ=s
γτ (aˆ)− (λ− 1)
[ S∑
τ=s
γτ (aˆ)
][ s−1∑
t=1
γt(aˆ)
]}
≡ u1(b) (A.14)
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and us = u1(b) +
∑s
t=2 bt ≡ us(b) for all s = 2, . . . , S. Inserting the binding partic-
ipation constraint into the above cost function and replacing Ω(u|r) equivalently by
Ω˜(b|r) ≡ Ω(u1(b), . . . , uS(b)|r) yields
C(b|r) ≈ u¯+ c(aˆ) + (λ− 1)
S∑
s=2
bs
[
S∑
τ=s
γτ (aˆ)
][
s−1∑
t=1
γt(aˆ)
]
+ Ω˜(b|r) . (A.15)
Hence, for a given increasing wage profile the principal’s cost minimization problem is:
Program ME:
min
b∈RS−1
+
b′ρ(γˆ, λ, aˆ) + Ω˜(b|r)
subject to b′β(γˆ, λ, aˆ) = c′(aˆ) (IC′)
If r is sufficiently close to 1, then the incentive scheme that solves program ML also
solves program ME. Note that generically program ME is solved only by bonus schemes.
Put differently, even if there are multiple optimal contracts for program ML, all these
contracts are generically simple bonus contracts. Thus, from Proposition 2 it follows
that generically for r close to 1 the optimal incentive scheme entails a minimum of
wage differentiation. Note that for λ = 1 the principal’s problem is to minimize Ω˜(b|r)
even for r sufficiently close to 1.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition I.7: First consider b ≥ 0. We divide the analysis for b ≥ 0
into three subcases.
Case 1 (a0 < 0): For the effort level aˆ to be chosen by the agent, this effort level has
to satisfy the following incentive compatibility constraint:
aˆ ∈ arg max
a∈[0,1]
u+ γ(a)b− γ(a)(1− γ(a))b(λ− 1)−
k
2
a2 (IC)
For aˆ to be a zero of dE [U(a)] /da, the bonus has to be chosen according to
b∗(aˆ) =
kaˆ
(γH − γL) [2− λ+ 2γ(aˆ)(λ− 1)]
.
For a > a0, b
∗(a) is a strictly increasing and strictly concave function with b∗(0) = 0.
Hence, each aˆ ∈ [0, 1] can be made a zero of dE [U(a)] /da with a non-negative bonus.
By choosing the bonus according to b∗(aˆ), aˆ satisfies, by construction, the first-order
condition. Inserting b∗(aˆ) into the d2E [U(a)] /da2 shows that expected utility is strictly
concave function if a0 < 0. Hence, with the bonus set equal to b
∗(aˆ), effort level aˆ
satisfies the second-order condition for optimality and therefore is incentive compatible.
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Case 2 (a0 = 0): Just like in the case where a0 < 0, each effort level a ∈ [0, 1] turns
out to be implementable with a non-negative bonus. To see this, consider bonus
b0 =
k
2(γH − γL)2(λ− 1)
.
For b ≤ b0, dE [U(a)] /da < 0 for each a > 0, that is, lowering effort increases expected
utility. Hence, the agent wants to choose an effort level as low as possible and therefore
exerts no effort at all. If, on the other hand, b > b0, then dE [U(a)] /da > 0. Now,
increasing effort increases expected utility, and the agent wants to choose effort as high
as possible. For b = b0, expected utility is constant over all a ∈ [0, 1], that is, as long
as his participation constraint is satisfied, the agent is indifferent which effort level
to choose. As a tie-breaking rule we assume that, if indifferent between several effort
levels, the agent chooses the effort level that the principal prefers.
Case 3 (a0 > 0): If a0 > 0, the agent either chooses a = 0 or a = 1. To see this,
again consider bonus b0. For b ≤ b0, dE [U(a)] /da < 0 for each a > 0. Hence, the
agent wants to exert as little effort as possible and chooses a = 0. If, on the other
hand, b > b0, then d
2E [U(a)] /da2 > 0, that is, expected utility is a strictly convex
function of effort. In order to maximize expected utility, the agent will choose either
a = 0 or a = 1 depending on whether E [U(0)] exceeds E [U(1)] or not.
Negative Bonus b < 0: Let b− < 0 denote the monetary punishment that the agent
receives if the good signal is observed. With a negative bonus, the agent’s expected
utility is
E [U(a)] = u+ γ(a)b− + γ(a)(1− γ(a))λb− + (1− γ(a))γ(a)(−b−)−
k
2
a2. (A.16)
The first derivative with respect to effort,
dE [U(a)]
da
= (γH − γL)b− [λ− 2γ(a)(λ− 1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
MB−(a)
− ka︸︷︷︸
MC(a)
,
reveals that MB−(a) is a positively sloped function, which is steeper the harsher the
punishment is, that is, the more negative b− is. It is worthwhile to point out that if
bonus and punishment are equal in absolute value, |b−| = b, then also the slopes of
MB−(a) and MB(a) are identical. The intercept of MB−(a) with the horizontal axis,
a−0 again is completely determined by the model parameters:
a−0 =
λ− 2γL(λ− 1)
2(γH − γL)(λ− 1)
Note that a−0 > 0 for γ
L ≤ 1/2. For γL > 1/2 we have a−0 < 0 if and only if
λ > 2γL/(2γL − 1). Proceeding in exactly the same way as in the case of a non-
negative bonus yields a familiar results: effort level aˆ ∈ [0, 1] is implementable with
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a strictly negative bonus if and only if a−0 ≤ 0. Finally, note that a0 < a
−
0 . Hence a
negative bonus does not improve the scope for implementation.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition I.8: Throughout the analysis we restricted attention to
non-negative bonus payment. It remains to be shown that the principal cannot benefit
from offering a negative bonus payment: implementing action aˆ with a negative bonus
is at least as costly as implementing action aˆ with a positive bonus. In what follows,
we make use of notation introduced in the paper as well as in the proof of Proposition
7. Let a0(p), a
−
0 (p), b
∗(aˆ; p), and u∗(aˆ; p) denote the expressions obtained from a0, a
−
0 ,
b∗(aˆ), and u∗(aˆ), respectively, by replacing γ(aˆ), γL, and γH with γ(aˆ; p), γL(p), and
γH(p). From the proof of Proposition 6 we know that (i) action aˆ is implementable
with a non-negative bonus (negative bonus) if and only if a0(p) ≤ 0 (a
−
0 (p) ≤ 0),
(ii) a−0 (p) ≤ 0 implies a0(p) < 0. We will show that, for a given value of p, if aˆ
is implementable with a negative bonus then it is less costly to implement aˆ with a
non-negative bonus.
Consider first the case where a−0 (p) < 0. The negative bonus payment satisfying
incentive compatibility is given by
b−(aˆ; p) =
kaˆ
(γH(p)− γL(p)) [λ− 2γ(aˆ; p)(λ− 1)]
.
It is easy to verify that the required punishment to implement aˆ is larger in absolute
value than than the respective non-negative bonus which is needed to implement aˆ, that
is, b∗(aˆ; p) < |b−(aˆ; p)| for all aˆ ∈ (0, 1) and all p ∈ [0, 1). When punishing the agent
with a negative bonus b−(aˆ; p), u−(aˆ; p) will be chosen to satisfy the corresponding
participation constraint with equality, that is,
u−(aˆ; p) = u¯+
k
2
aˆ2 − γ(aˆ; p)b−(aˆ; p) [λ− γ(aˆ, p)(λ− 1)] .
Remember that, if aˆ is implemented with a non-negative bonus, we have
u∗(aˆ; p) = u¯+
k
2
aˆ2 − γ(aˆ; p)b∗(aˆ; p) [2− λ+ γ(aˆ; p)(λ− 1)] .
It follows immediately that the minimum cost of implementing aˆ with a non-negative
Essays in Industrial Organization and Behavioral Economics 119
bonus is lower than the minimum implementation cost with a strictly negative bonus:
C−(aˆ; p) = u−(aˆ; p) + γ(aˆ; p)b−(aˆ; p)
= u¯+
k
2
aˆ2 − γ(aˆ; p)b−(aˆ; p) [λ− γ(aˆ; p)(λ− 1)− 1]
> u¯+
k
2
aˆ2 + γ(aˆ; p)b∗(aˆ; p) [λ− γ(aˆ; p)(λ− 1)− 1]
= u¯+
k
2
aˆ2 − γ(aˆ; p)b∗(aˆ; p) [1− λ+ γ(aˆ; p)(λ− 1)]
= u¯+
k
2
aˆ2 − γ(aˆ; p)b∗(aˆ; p) [2− λ+ γ(aˆ; p)(λ− 1)] + γ(aˆ; p)b∗(aˆ; p)
= u∗(aˆ; p) + γ(aˆ; p)b∗(aˆ; p)
= C(aˆ; p).
The same line of argument holds when a−0 = 0: the bonus which satisfies the (IC) is
b−0 (aˆ; p) = −
k
2(γH(p)− γL(p))2(λ− 1)
,
and so b∗(aˆ; p) < |b−0 (aˆ; p)| for all aˆ ∈ (0, 1) and all p ∈ [0, 1).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary I.1: Let p ∈ (0, 1). With ζˆ being a convex combination
of γˆ and 1 we have (ζH , ζL) = p(1, 1) + (1 − p)(γH , γL) = (γH + p(1 − γH), γL +
p(1 − γL)). The desired result follows immediately from Proposition 3: Consider λ >
2. Implementation problems are less likely to be encountered under ζˆ than under
γˆ. Moreover, if implementation problems are not an issue under both performance
measures, then implementation of a certain action is less costly under ζˆ than under γˆ.
For λ = 2 implementation problems do not arise and implementation costs are identical
under both performance measures. Last, if λ < 2, implementation problems are not
an issue under either performance measure, but the cost of implementation is strictly
lower under γˆ than under ζˆ.
Q.E.D.
1.2. Validity of the First-Order Approach
Lemma A.1: Suppose (A1)-(A3) hold, then the incentive constraint in the principal’s
cost minimization problem can be represented as E[U ′(aˆ)] = 0.
Proof: Consider a contract (u1, {bs}
S
s=2) with bs ≥ 0 for s = 2, . . . , S. In what follows,
we write βs instead of βs(γˆ, λ, aˆ) to cut back on notation. The proof proceeds in two
steps. First, we show that for a given contract with the property bs > 0 only if βs > 0,
120 Dissertation of Fabian Herweg
all actions that satisfy the first-order condition of the agent’s utility maximization
problem characterize a local maximum of his utility function. Since the utility function
is continuous and all extreme points are local maxima, if there exists some action that
fulfills the first-order condition, this action corresponds to the unique maximum. In
the second step we show that under the optimal contract we cannot have bs > 0 if
βs ≤ 0.
Step 1: The second derivative of the agent’s utility with respect to a is
E[U ′′(a)] = −2(λ− 1)
S∑
s=2
bsσs − c
′′(a) , (A.17)
where σs := (
∑s−1
i=1 γ
H
i − γ
L
i )(
∑S
i=s γ
H
i − γ
L
i ) < 0. Suppose action aˆ satisfies the first-
order condition. Formally
S∑
s=2
bsβs = c
′(aˆ) ⇐⇒
S∑
s=2
bs
βs
aˆ
=
c′(aˆ)
aˆ
. (A.18)
Action aˆ locally maximizes the agent’s utility if
−2(λ− 1)
S∑
s=2
bsσs < c
′′(aˆ) . (A.19)
Under Assumption (A3), we have c′′(aˆ) > c(aˆ)/aˆ. Therefore, if
S∑
s=2
bs
[
−2(λ− 1)σs − βs/aˆ
]
< 0 , (A.20)
then (A.18) implies (A.19), and each action aˆ satisfying the first-order condition of the
agent’s maximization problem is a local maximum of his expected utility. Inequality
(A.20) obviously is satisfied if each element of the sum is negative. Summand s is
negative if and only if
− 2(λ− 1)
(
s−1∑
i=1
(γHi − γ
L
i )
)(
S∑
i=s
(γHi − γ
L
i )
)
aˆ
−
(
S∑
τ=s
(γHτ − γ
L
τ )
)[
1− (λ− 1)
(
s−1∑
t=1
γt(aˆ)
)]
− (λ− 1)
[
S∑
τ=s
γτ (aˆ)
](
s−1∑
t=1
(γHt − γ
L
t )
)
< 0 .
Rearranging the above inequality yields(
S∑
i=s
(γHi − γ
L
i )
){
λ+ 2(λ− 1)
[
aˆ
s−1∑
i=1
(γHi − γ
L
i )−
s−1∑
i=1
γi(aˆ)
]}
> 0
⇐⇒
(
S∑
i=s
(γHi − γ
L
i )
){
λ
(
1−
s−1∑
i=1
γLi
)
+ (2− λ)
s−1∑
i=1
γLi
}
> 0 (A.21)
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The term in curly brackets is positive, since λ ≤ 2 and
∑s−1
i=1 γ
L
i < 1. Furthermore,
note that
∑S
i=s(γ
H
i − γ
L
i ) > 0 since βs > 0 for all bs > 0. This completes the first step
of the proof.
Step 2: Consider a contract with bs > 0 and βs ≤ 0 for at least one signal s ∈
{2, . . . , S} that implements aˆ ∈ (0, 1). Then, under this contract, (IC′) is satisfied and
there exists at least one signal t with βt > 0 and bt > 0. Obviously, the principal can
reduce both bs and bt without violating (IC
′). This reasoning goes through up to the
point where (IC′) is satisfied and bs = 0 for all signals s with βs ≤ 0. From the first step
of the proof we know that the resulting contract implements aˆ incentive compatibly.
Next, we show that reducing any spread, say bk, always reduces the principal’s cost of
implementation.
C(b) =
S∑
s=1
γs(aˆ)h
(
u1(b) +
s∑
t=2
bs
)
, (A.22)
where u1(b) = u¯+ c(aˆ)−
S∑
t=2
bs
[
S∑
τ=s
γτ (aˆ)− (λ− 1)
(
S∑
τ=s
γτ (aˆ)
)(
s−1∑
t=1
γt(aˆ)
)]
.
The partial derivative of the cost function with respect to an arbitrary bk is
∂C(b)
∂bk
=
k−1∑
s=1
γs(aˆ)h
′
(
u1(b) +
s∑
t=2
bs
)[
∂u1
∂bk
]
+
S∑
s=k
γs(aˆ)h
′
(
u1(b) +
s∑
t=2
bs
)[
∂u1
∂bk
+ 1
]
.
Rearranging yields
∂C(b)
∂bk
=
k−1∑
s=1
γs(aˆ)h
′(us)
[
(λ− 1)
(
S∑
τ=k
γτ (aˆ)
)(
k−1∑
t=1
γt(aˆ)
)
−
S∑
τ=k
γτ (aˆ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
S∑
s=k
γs(aˆ)h
′(us)
[
(λ− 1)
(
S∑
τ=k
γτ (aˆ)
)(
k−1∑
t=1
γt(aˆ)
)
−
S∑
τ=k
γτ (aˆ) + 1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
. (A.23)
Note us ≤ us+1 which implies that h
′(us) ≤ h
′(us+1). Thus, the following inequality
holds
∂C(b)
∂bk
≥
k−1∑
s=1
γs(aˆ)h
′(uk)
[
(λ− 1)
(
S∑
τ=k
γτ (aˆ)
)(
k−1∑
t=1
γt(aˆ)
)
−
S∑
τ=k
γτ (aˆ)
]
+
S∑
s=k
γs(aˆ)h
′(uk)
[
(λ− 1)
(
S∑
τ=k
γτ (aˆ)
)(
k−1∑
t=1
γt(aˆ)
)
−
S∑
τ=k
γτ (aˆ) + 1
]
. (A.24)
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The above inequality can be rewritten as follows
∂C(b)
∂bk
≥ h′(uk)
[
(λ− 1)
(
S∑
τ=k
γτ (aˆ)
)(
k−1∑
t=1
γt(aˆ)
)]
> 0 .
Since reducing any bonus lowers the principal’s cost of implementation, it cannot be
optimal to set bs > 0 for βs ≤ 0. This completes the second step of the proof. In
combination with step 1, this establishes the desired result.
Q.E.D.
2. Appendix to Chapter II
2.1. Proof of Propositions and Lemmas
Proof of Proposition II.1: As mentioned in Footnote 14, in order to establish the
proposition, we follow a different but nevertheless equivalent way than proposed in the
paper. In period 1, a naive agent believes that he is time-consistent in period 2. Thus,
we first analyze what effort a TC chooses in period 2, given an arbitrary effort level of
the first period, eˆ1. This effort choice, which maximizes U
TC
2 = −c(e2) + g(eˆ1 + e2),
obviously is a function of the first-period effort. Thus, eTC2 (eˆ1) is characterized by the
corresponding first-order condition,
g′(eˆ1 + e
TC
2 (eˆ1)) = c
′(eTC2 (eˆ1)) . (A.25)
Differentiating (A.25) with respect to e1 yields de
TC
2 (e1)/de1 ∈ (−1, 0). With U
N
1 =
−c(e1) − βc(e
TC
2 (e1)) + βg(e1 + e
TC
2 (e1)) being a strictly concave function of e1, the
effort level that a naive agent invests in the first period, eN1 , is implicitly characterized
by the following first-order condition:
βg′
(
eN1 + e
TC
2 (e
N
1 )
)
= c′(eN1 ) . (A.26)
The actual problem of a naive agent in period 2 is to maximize UN2 = −c(e2)+βg(e
N
1 +
e2) over his second-period effort choice. The optimal second-period effort, e
N
2 , satisfies
βg′
(
eN1 + e
N
2
)
= c′(eN2 ) . (A.27)
Comparison of (A.25)-(A.27) allows to establish the proposition. We prove each part
of the proposition in turn.
(iii) Comparison of (A.25) and (A.27) immediately yields eN2 < e
TC
2 (e
N
1 ) = e
TC
2 .
(i) Suppose, in contradiction, that eN1 ≥ e
N
2 . Then c
′(eN1 ) ≥ c
′(eN2 ), which in turn
implies βg′(eN1 +e
TC
2 (e
N
1 )) ≥ βg
′(eN1 +e
N
2 ). But since e
N
2 < e
TC
2 (e
N
1 ) and g
′′(·) < 0
we have βg′(eN1 + e
TC
2 (e
N
1 )) < βg
′(eN1 + e
N
2 ), a contradiction.
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(ii) From our considerations of the TC we know that g′(eˆ1 + e
TC
2 (eˆ1)) = c
′(eTC2 (eˆ1))
for all eˆ1. Hence, c
′(eTC) = c′(eTC2 (e
TC)) = g′(eTC + eTC2 (e
TC)) > βg′(eTC +
eTC2 (e
TC)). For eN1 we must have c
′(eN1 ) = βg
′(eN1 + e
TC
2 (e
N
1 )). Since de
TC
2 /de1 ∈
(−1, 0), g′′(·) < 0 and c′′(·) > 0, we immediately obtain that eN1 < e
TC . Now it
immediately follows that eN1 + e
N
2 < e
N
1 + e
TC
2 (e
N
1 ) < e
TC + eTC2 (e
TC) = 2eTC ,
where the first inequality holds by (i) and the second inequality holds because
eN1 < e
TC and deTC2 (e1)/de1 ∈ (−1, 0).
This concludes the proof.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition II.2: First we prove that the effort choice in the first period
of a sophisticated agent is characterized by a first-order condition. We can rule out
corner solutions to be optimal: With c(e) −→∞ as e −→∞, e1 =∞ is not a candidate
for the agent’s first-period effort. Next we show that e1 = 0 also is not optimal. The
derivative of US1 with respect to e1 can be rewritten as follows:
dUS1
de1
=
[
deS2 (e1)
de1
(1− β) + 1
]
c′(eS2 (e1))− c
′(e1),
where we used twice the fact that βg′
(
e1 + e
S
2 (e1)
)
= c′(eS2 (e1)). Since e
S
2 (0) > 0 and
deS2 (e1)/de1 ∈ (−1, 0), we have dU
S
1 /de1|e1=0 > 0. Note that U
S
1 is a differentiable and
hence continuous function, which establishes the desired result.
Next, we prove each part of the proposition in turn.
(i) From (II.5) and (II.6) it follows immediately that βg′
(
eS1 + e
S
2 (e
S
1 )
)
− c′(eS1 ) > 0,
which in turn implies that c′(eS2 (e
S
1 )) = βg
′(eS1 +e
S
2 (e
S
1 )) > c
′(eS1 ). Thus, e
S
2 (e
S
1 ) >
eS1 .
(ii) Suppose, in contradiction, that eS1 + e
S
2 (e
S
1 ) ≥ 2e
TC . We know that βg′(eS1 +
eS2 (e
S
1 ))−c
′(eS1 ) > 0 = g
′(eTC+eTC)−c′(eTC). With g′′(·) < 0 and c′′(·) > 0, eS1 +
eS2 (e
S
1 ) ≥ 2e
TC immediately implies eS1 < e
TC . Furthermore, βg′(eS1 + e
S
2 (e
S
1 )) −
c′(eS2 (e
S
1 )) = 0 = g
′(eTC + eTC) − c′(eTC), which under the above functional
assumptions implies that c′(eS2 (e
S
1 )) < c
′(eTC). But this means that eS2 (e
S
1 ) < e
TC ,
which leads to a contradiction to the assumption that eS1 + e
S
2 (e
S
1 ) ≥ 2e
TC .
This concludes the proof.
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma II.1: For a given first-period effort e1, both the naive agent and
the sophisticated agent face the same maximization problem in period 2. This allows us
to write eN2 = e
S
2 (e
N
1 ). For i, j ∈ {S,N} and i 6= j, together with de
S
2 (e1)/de1 ∈ (−1, 0),
this observation immediately yields that ei1 > e
j
1 implies e
i
2 = e
S
2 (e
i
1) < e
S
2 (e
j
1) = e
j
2
and ei1 + e
i
2 > e
j
1 + e
j
2. It remains to show that e
i
1 > e
j
1 implies U
i
0 = −c(e
i
1) −
c(eS2 (e
i
1)) + g(e
i
1 + e
S
2 (e
i
1)) ≥ −c(e
j
1)− c(e
S
2 (e
j
1)) + g(e
j
1 + e
S
2 (e
j
1)) = U
j
0 . Define H(e1) ≡
−c(e1)− c(e
S
2 (e1)) + g(e1 + e
S
2 (e1)). In order to establish the desired result, it suffices
to show that
dH(e1)
de1
= g′(e1 + e
S
2 (e1))− c
′(e1) +
deS2 (e1)
de1
[
g′(e1 + e
S
2 (e1))− c
′(eS2 (e1))
]
> 0
for all e1 ∈ [0, e
i
1]. Since, by Propositions 1 and 2, e
i
1 < e
i
2 = e
S
2 (e
i
1) for i ∈ {S,N}, and
moreover deS2 (e1)/de1 < 0, we have e1 < e
S
2 (e1) for all e1 < e
i
1. This in turn implies
g′(e1 + e
S
2 (e1)) − c
′(e1) > g
′(e1 + e
S
2 (e1)) − c
′(eS2 (e1)) > 0, where the last inequality
follows from (II.5). Together with deS2 (e1)/de1 ∈ (−1, 0), the desired result follows.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma II.2: By the revealed preference argument, for the first-period
effort choices of a naive and a sophisticated agent, eN1 and e
S
1 , the following two in-
equalities have to hold:
− c(eN1 )− βc(e
TC
2 (e
N
1 )) + βg(e
N
1 + e
TC
2 (e
N
1 ))
≥ −c(eS1 )− βc(e
TC
2 (e
S
1 )) + βg(e
S
1 + e
TC
2 (e
S
1 ))
and
− c(eS1 )− βc(e
S
2 (e
S
1 )) + βg(e
S
1 + e
S
2 (e
S
1 ))
≥ −c(eN1 )− βc(e
S
2 (e
N
1 )) + βg(e
N
1 + e
S
2 (e
N
1 ))
Taken together these two inequalities imply[
g(eN1 + e
TC
2 (e
N
1 ))− c(e
TC
2 (e
N
1 ))
]
−
[
g(eN1 + e
S
2 (e
N
1 ))− c(e
S
2 (e
N
1 ))
]
≥
[
g(eS1 + e
TC
2 (e
S
1 ))− c(e
TC
2 (e
S
1 ))
]
−
[
g(eS1 + e
S
2 (e
S
1 ))− c(e
S
2 (e
S
1 ))
]
. (A.28)
Define F (e1) ≡
[
g(e1 + e
TC
2 (e1))− c(e
TC
2 (e1))
]
−
[
g(e1 + e
S
2 (e1))− c(e
S
2 (e1))
]
. Since
both sides of (A.28) have the same structure, a sufficient condition for eS1 ≥ e
N
1 to hold
is dF (e1)/de1 < 0. From (A.25) and (II.5) we know that g
′(e1+ e
TC
2 (e1)) = c
′(eTC2 (e1))
and βg′(e1 + e
S
2 (e1)) = c
′(eS2 (e1)). Hence,
dF (e1)
de1
=
[
g′(e1 + e
TC
2 (e1))− g
′(e1 + e
S
2 (e1))
]
− (1 − β)g′(e1 + e
S
2 (e1))
deS2 (e1)
de1
.
(A.29)
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For β = 0 we have dF (e1)/de1 =
[
g′(e1 + e
TC
2 (e1))− g
′(e1 + e
S
2 (e1))
]
< 0 since
deS2 (e1)/de1 = 0 in this case. For β = 1 we have e
TC
2 (e1) = e
S
2 (e1) for all e1, and hence
dF (e1)/de1 = 0. Thus,
d
dβ
(dF (e1)/de1) > 0 is a sufficient condition for dF (e1)/de1 < 0
for all β ∈ (0, 1). Tackling this derivative by brute force yields
d
dβ
[
dF (e1)
de1
]
= −g′′(·)
deS2
dβ
−
[
−g′(·)
deS2
de1
+ (1− β)g′′(·)
deS2
dβ
deS2
de1
+ (1− β)g′(·)
d(deS2 /de1)
dβ
]
= (1− β)
−2g′(·)g′′(·)c′′(eS2 ) +
deS
2
dβ
βg′(·)
[
g′′(·)c′′′(eS2 )− g
′′′(·)c′′(eS2 )
]
[βg′′(·)− c′′(eS2 )]
2 ,
where we made use of the fact that
deS2
dβ
= −
g′(·)
βg′′(·)− c′′(eS2 )
.
and
d{deS2 /de1}
dβ
=
c′′(eS2 )[g
′′(·) + βg′′′(·){deS2 /dβ}]− βg
′′(·)c′′′(eS2 )
[βg′′(·)− c′′(eS2 )]
2
.
Under the imposed functional assumptions, a sufficient condition for d
dβ
(dF (e1)/de1)
> 0 for all β ∈ (0, 1) is c′′′(·) ≤ 0 and g′′′(·) ≤ 0. Together with the above observation
that dF (e1)/de1 < 0 for β = 0 and dF (e1)/de1 = 0 for β = 1, this implies that
dF (e1)/de1 < 0 for all β ∈ [0, 1). This allows us to conclude that e
N
1 ≤ e
S
1 when
c′′′(·) ≤ 0 and g′′′(·) ≤ 0.
Next, we will show that eN1 6= e
S
1 for c
′′′(·) ≤ 0 and g′′′(·) ≤ 0, which completes the
proof. Suppose in contradiction that eN1 = e
S
1 . The first-order condition of the utility
maximization problem of the first-period sophisticate can be written as follows:
βg′(eS1 + e
TC
2 (e
S
1 ))− c
′(eS1 ) + β
[
g′(eS1 + e
S
2 (e
S
1 ))− g
′(eS1 + e
TC
2 (e
S
1 ))
]
+
deS2 (e1)
de1
β
[
g′(eS1 + e
S
2 (e
S
1 ))− c
′(eS2 (e
S
1 ))
]
= 0 .
Setting eN1 = e
S
1 in the above equation yields
[
g′(eN1 + e
S
2 (e
N
1 ))− g
′(eN1 + e
TC
2 (e
N
1 ))
]
− (1− β)g′(eN1 + e
S
2 (e
N
1 ))
deS2 (e1)
de1
= 0. (A.30)
Note that the left-hand side of (A.30) is dF (e1)/de1|e1=eN1 . For c
′′′(·) ≤ 0 and g′′′(·) ≤ 0,
however, we have just shown that dF (e1)/de1 < 0 for β ∈ [0, 1), a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition II.3: Follows immediately from Lemmas 1 and 2.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition II.4: The proof consists of three major parts. First, we
formally derive the behavior of a sophisticated agent when facing no deadline. Next we
show that when facing a deadline, the utility maximization problem of a sophisticated
agent in the first period indeed is solved by a first-period effort pair (eA, eB1) with
eA > 0 and eB1 = 0. Last, we prove each of the results explicitly stated in the
proposition.
Part 1: Consider a sophisticated agent who faces no deadline. With the reward
functions for the two tasks being strictly increasing and strictly concave, given any
first-period efforts eˆA1 and eˆB1, a sophisticate will allocate second-period effort in a way
such that overall effort is allocated as evenly as possible among the two tasks. Thus,
there is the following fundamental distinction to draw for second-period behavior: for a
given first-period effort and allocation choice, effort smoothing over tasks in the second
period is either optimal or not optimal. Effort smoothing over tasks is not optimal for
the second period self, if the the total second-period effort needed to achieve this is
too costly. Starting out from this observation, we proceed in two steps: First, we show
that it is never optimal for a sophisticate in period 1 to choose effort levels eA1 and
eB1 such that effort smoothing over tasks is not optimal in period 2. Second, given
that effort smoothing over tasks is optimal in period 2, we show that when facing no
deadline, a sophisticated agent increases effort over time.
Step 1: Let α1 ∈ [0, 1] denote the share of the overall first-period effort e1 which is
dedicated to task A, i.e., eA1 = α1e1 and eB1 = (1 − α1)e1. Further, let e
S
2 (e1, α1)
denote the optimal overall effort for the second-period self of a sophisticate given e1
and α1. To prove that it is never optimal for a sophisticate to choose an allocation
of first-period effort such that effort smoothing over tasks is not optimal in period 2,
assume the opposite: Suppose in period 1 the sophisticate chooses e1 and α1 such that
(w.l.o.g.) eA < eB. First, note that for given e1 and α1, a necessary condition for effort
smoothing over tasks not being optimal in period 2 is that overall second-period effort
is lower than overall first-period effort, e1 > e
S
2 (e1, α1). Moreover, as argued above, the
second-period self will allocate all his effort e2 to task A in order to make the overall
effort allocation over tasks as even as possible, i.e.,
max
e2
−c(e2) + βg(α1e1 + e2) + βg((1− α1)e1),
with the optimal effort choice eS2 (e1, α1) being characterized by
βg′(α1e1 + e
S
2 (e1, α1)) = c
′(eS2 (e1, α1)) . (A.31)
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Differentiation with respect to e1 yields
deS2
de1
= −α1
βg′′(α1e1 + e
S
2 (e1, α1))
βg′′(α1e1 + eS2 (e1, α1))− c
′′(eS2 (e1, α1))
∈ (−α1, 0).
In the first period, the sophisticate chooses an effort allocation (e1, α1) in order to
maximize
U1(e1, α1) = −c(e1)− βc(e
S
2 (e1, α1)) + βg(α1e1 + e
S
2 (e1, α1)) + βg((1− α1)e1).
If the optimal first-period effort allocation is an interior solution, i.e., e1 ∈ (0,∞)
and α1 ∈ (0, 1), then it has to satisfy the necessary first-order conditions for op-
timality, ∂U1(e1, α1)/∂e1 = 0 and ∂U1(e1, α1)/∂α1 = 0. Together with (A.31) and
deS2 (e1, α1)/de1 < 0,
∂U1(e1, α1)
∂e1
= 0 ⇐⇒ −c′(e1) + α1βg
′(α1e1 + e
S
2 (e1, α1))
+ (1−α1)βg
′((1−α1)e1)+
deS2 (e1, α1)
de1
[
βg′(α1e1 + e
S
2 (e1, α1))− βc
′(eS2 (e1, α1))
]
= 0
implies
−c′(e1) + α1βg
′(α1e1 + e
S
2 (e1, α1)) + (1− α1)βg
′((1− α1)e1) > 0 . (A.32)
Combining (A.31) and (A.32) yields
c′(eS2 (e1, α1))− c
′(e1)− (1− α1)β
[
g′(α1e1 + e
S
2 (e1, α1))− g
′((1− α1)e1)
]
> 0 .(A.33)
As noted above, with effort smoothing over tasks not being optimal we have e1 >
eS2 (e1, α1). Moreover, α1e1 + e
S
2 (e1, α1) = eA < eB = (1 − α1)e1 by assumption. But
then c′′(·) > 0 and g′′(·) < 0 imply that (A.33) cannot be satisfied, which in turn
implies that the optimal first-period allocation (e1, α1) cannot be interior. Note that
α1 = 1 is not possible because eA < eB and effort smoothing over tasks is not possible
by assumption. Since e1 = ∞ and e1 = 0 can be ruled out as optimal (note that
∂U1(e1, α1)/∂e1|e1=0 > 0), we are left with e1 ∈ (0,∞) and α1 = 0. For α1 = 0,
second-period behavior is characterized by
βg′(e2) = c
′(e2). (A.34)
Thus, for α1 = 0, second-period effort does not depend on first-period effort, e
S
2 (e1, 0) =
eS2 . In period 1, e1 then is chosen to maximize
U1(e1, 0) = −c(e1)− βc(e
S
2 ) + βg(e
S
2 ) + βg(e1),
and thus is characterized by
βg′(e1) = c
′(e1) . (A.35)
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Taken together, (A.34) and (A.35) contradict the assumption that effort smoothing
over tasks is not optimal in period two, which requires that first-period effort strictly
exceeds second-period effort. This concludes Step 1.
Step 2: From Step 1, we know that in period 2 the agent will allocate effort in a way such
that overall effort is spread evenly among the two tasks, i.e., eA = eB = (1/2)(e1+ e2).
Thus, given eˆ1, e2 is chosen in order to maximize
US
ND
2 = −c(e2) + 2βg((1/2)(eˆ1 + e2)).
The optimal second-period effort as a function of the first-period effort, eS
ND
2 (eˆ1), sat-
isfies
c′(eS
ND
2 (eˆ1)) = βg
′((1/2)(eˆ1 + e
SND
2 (eˆ1))). (II.8)
Differentiation of (II.8) yields
deS
ND
2 (e1)
de1
= −
1
2
βg′′(1
2
(e1 + e
SND
2 (e1)))
1
2
βg′′(1
2
(e1 + eS
ND
2 (e1)))− c
′′(eS
ND
2 (e1))
∈ (−1, 0).
In period 1 a sophisticated agent then chooses his effort level in order to maximize the
intertemporal utility of his first-period self,
US
ND
1 = −c(e1)− βc(e
SND
2 (e1)) + 2βg((1/2)(e1 + e
SND
2 (e1))) .
According to the same reasoning as in the single-task case, the optimal first-period
effort, eS
ND
1 , is characterized by the following first-order condition:
βg′((1/2)(eS
ND
1 + e
SND
2 (e
SND
1 )))− c
′(eS
ND
1 )
+
deS
ND
2 (e1)
de1
β
[
g′((1/2)(eS
ND
1 + e
SND
2 (e
SND
1 )))− c
′(eS
ND
2 (e
SND
1 ))
]
= 0 . (II.9)
From (II.8) we know that βg′(1
2
(eˆ1 + e
SND
2 (eˆ1))) − c
′(eS
ND
2 (eˆ1)) = 0 for all eˆ1, and in
particular for eˆ1 = e
SND
1 . Since de
SND
2 (e1)/de1 < 0, in combination with (II.9) this
implies that βg′(1
2
(eS
ND
1 + e
SND
2 (e
SND
1 )) − c
′(eS
ND
1 ) > 0. Taken together these two
observations yield c′(eS
ND
2 (e
SND
1 )) = βg
′(1
2
(eS
ND
1 + e
SND
2 (e
SND
1 ))) > c
′(eS
ND
1 ). Since
c′′(·) > 0, it follows that when facing no deadline, a sophisticated agent increases effort
over time, that is, eS
ND
1 < e
SND
2 (e
SND
1 ).
Part 2: Next, we provide the proof that when facing a deadline, the utility maximiza-
tion problem of a sophisticated agent in the first period is solved by a first-period effort
pair (eA, eB1) with eA > 0 and eB1 = 0. To prove this result, we proceed in three steps.
First, we show that we cannot have an interior solution 0 < eA, eB1 < ∞. Second, we
rule out solutions in which the agent chooses an infinite amount of effort for at least
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one task, and also the solution that the agent does not exhibit any effort at all in the
first period. Third, we show that an effort pair (eA, eB1) with eB1 > 0 = eA is not a
solution.
Step 1: Suppose, in contradiction, that there is an interior solution. This solution then
would be characterized by the following first-order conditions:
∂US
D
1
∂eA
= 0 ⇐⇒ βg′(eA)− c
′(eA + eB1) = 0 , (A.36)
∂US
D
1
∂eB1
= 0 ⇐⇒ βg′(eB1 + e
SD
B2 (eB1))− c
′(eA + eB1)
+
deS
D
B2 (eB1)
deB1
β
[
g′(eB1 + e
SD
B2 (eB1))− c
′(eS
D
B2 (eB1))
]
= 0 . (A.37)
Combining (A.36) and (A.37) yields
βg′(eB1 + e
SD
B2 (eB1))− βg
′(eA)
= −
deS
D
B2 (eB1)
deB1
β
[
g′(eB1 + e
SD
B2 (eB1))− c
′(eS
D
B2 (eB1))
]
> 0,
where the inequality follows from (II.10). This last inequality implies that eB1 +
eS
D
B2 (eB1) < eA. From (A.36) it follows that eA decreases as eB1 increases. Com-
paring (10) and (A.36) yields that for eB1 = 0 we have eA = e
SD
B2 (0). Since d(eB1 +
eS
D
B2 (eB1))/deB1 > 0 it follows that eB1+e
SD
B2 (eB1) ≥ eA for all eB1 ≥ 0, a contradiction.
Hence, the utility maximization problem of a sophisticated agent in the first period
cannot have an interior solution.
Step 2: Obviously we can rule out effort choices where the agent invests an infinite
high effort in one or both tasks since this would lead to an intertemporal utility of
minus infinity. To see that it is not optimal to exert no positive effort at all in the
first period, let α1 ∈ [0, 1] denote the fraction of e1 which is dedicated to task B, that
is, eA1 = (1 − α1)e1 and eB1 = α1e1. For each α1, by (II.10) the optimal second-
period effort satisfies βg′(α1e1 + e
SD
B2 (α1e1)) = c
′(eS
D
B2 (α1e1)). With this notation, the
intertemporal utility in the first period is given by US
D
1 = −c(e1) − βc(e
SD
B2 (α1e1)) +
βg((1− α1)e1) + βg(α1e1 + e
SD
B2 (α1e1)). Differentiating with respect to e1, taking into
account that βg′(α1e1 + e
SD
B2 (α1e1)) = c
′(eS
D
B2 (α1e1)), and rearranging yields
dUS
D
1
de1
= β(1− α1)g
′((1− α1)e1)− c
′(e1) + α1c
′(eS
D
B2 (α1e1))
[
1 + (1− β)
deS
D
B2 (eB1)
deB1
]
.
Evaluated at e1 = 0 we have dU
SD
1 /de1|e1=0 = β(1 − α1)g
′(0) + α1c
′(eS
D
B2 (0))[1 + (1 −
β)(deS
D
B2 (eB1)/deB1)] > 0, for all α1 ∈ [0, 1].
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Step 3: We are left with two possible candidates for the corner solution: (i) eA = 0
and eB1 > 0, or (ii) eA > 0 and eB1 = 0. To see that (i) can be ruled out, suppose that
eA = 0 and eB1 > 0. For eA = 0 to be optimal it must hold that
βg′(0)− c′(eB1) ≤ 0, (A.38)
otherwise it would be optimal to invest some positive effort in task A. Since eB1 is
assumed to be strictly positive, the following first-order condition has to hold:
βg′(eB1 + e
SD
B2 (eB1))− c
′(eB1) +
deS
D
B2 (eB1)
eB1
β
[
g′(eB1 + e
SD
B2 (eB1))− c
′(eS
D
B2 (eB1))
]
= 0.
The last term of the left-hand side of the above equation is negative, which implies that
βg′(eB1 + e
SD
B2 (eB1)) − c
′(eB1) > 0. Taken together with (A.38) this yields βg
′(eB1 +
eS
D
B2 (eB1)) > g
′(0). This in turn implies eB1+ e
SD
B2 (eB1) < 0, which is not possible. This
establishes the desired result.
Part 3: Having shown that an effort pair (eA, eB1) with eA > 0 and eB1 = 0
solves the utility maximization problem of a sophisticated agent in the first period,
we now prove each part of the proposition. First we show that a sophisticate ex-
hibits a higher first-period effort when facing deadlines. Suppose, in contradiction,
that eS
ND
1 ≥ e
SD . From (II.8) and (II.12) we know, respectively, that c′(eS
ND
2 (e
SND
1 )) =
βg′(1
2
(eS
ND
1 + e
SND
2 (e
SND
1 ))) and c
′(eS
D
) = βg′(1
2
(eS
D
+ eS
D
)). Since deS
ND
2 (e
SND
1 )/de1 ∈
(−1, 0), eS
ND
1 ≥ e
SD implies that eS
ND
2 (e
SND
1 ) ≤ e
SD , which in turn in implies eS
ND
1 +
eS
ND
2 (e
SND
1 ) ≥ 2e
SD . From (II.9), however, we know that βg′(1
2
(eS
ND
1 + e
SND
2 (e
SND
1 )))−
c′(eS
ND
1 ) > 0. Together with (II.12) this implies that βg
′(1
2
(eS
ND
1 + e
SND
2 (e
SND
1 ))) −
βg′(1
2
(eS
D
+ eS
D
)) > c′(eS
ND
1 ) − c
′(eS
D
) ≥ 0, where the last inequality holds by our
initial assumption that eS
ND
1 ≥ e
SD . With g′(·) being strictly decreasing, this last
expression implies eS
ND
1 + e
SND
2 < 2e
SD , a contradiction. Therefore we must have
eS
ND
1 < e
SD . Together with eS
ND
2 (e
SD) = eS
D
, which follows from (II.8) in combination
with (II.11) or (II.12), and deS
ND
2 (e1)/de1 ∈ (−1, 0), e
SND
1 < e
SD immediately implies
eS
ND
1 + e
SND
2 (e
SND
1 ) < 2e
SD . It remains to show that a sophisticate indeed is better off
under a deadline from a long-run perspective, i.e., US
D
0 > U
SND
0 . Let α and γ denote
the allocation of some level of total effort eTotal over tasks and time, respectively. Since
time-consistent agents and sophisticated agents, both under a deadline and under no
deadline, divide effort evenly among tasks, fix α = 1
2
. Long-run utility then is given by
U0(e
Total, γ) = −c(γeTotal) − c((1 − γ)eTotal) + 2g(1
2
eTotal). Fixing γ = 1
2
, it is readily
verified that U0(e
Total, 1
2
) is a strictly concave function of eTotal which obtains its max-
imum for eTotal = 2eTC . Hence, with eS
ND
1 + e
SND
2 (e
SND
1 ) < 2e
SD < 2eTC
ND
we have
US
D
0 = U0(2e
SD , 1
2
) > U0(e
SND
1 + e
SND
2 (e
SND
1 ),
1
2
). Next, fixing an arbitrary level of total
Essays in Industrial Organization and Behavioral Economics 131
effort eTotal > 0, U0(e
Total, γ) is a strictly concave function with its maximum obtained
at γ = 1
2
. Hence, US
ND
0 < U0(e
SND
1 + e
SND
2 (e
SND
1 ),
1
2
), which establishes the desired
result.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition II.5: First consider a naive agent who faces no deadline.
Since he predicts his own future behavior to be time-consistent, a first-period naif
makes a plan that he believes to follow through in period 2. In the first period, he
chooses e1 and plans to choose e2 tomorrow. Moreover, he plans to allocate α(e1 + e2)
to task A and (1−α)(e1+ e2) to task B. It is important to note, that the allocation of
first-period effort respectively second-period effort to a specific task is not important
from the perspective of period 1. First-period utility of a naif is
UN
ND
1 (e1, e2, α) = −c(e1)− βc(e2) + βg(α(e1 + e2)) + βg((1− α)(e1 + e2)).
Obviously, UN
ND
1 (e1, e2, α) is maximized by an interior solution, (e
NND
1 , e
TCND
2 , α
NND),
which is characterized by the following first-order conditions:
∂UN
ND
1 (e1, e2, α)
∂e1
= 0 ⇐⇒ −c′(eN
ND
1 ) + βg
′(αN
ND
(eN
ND
1 + e
TCND
2 ))α
NND
+ βg′((1− αN
ND
)(eN
ND
1 + e
TCND
2 ))(1− α
NND) = 0 , (A.39)
∂UN
ND
1 (e1, e2, α)
∂e2
= 0 ⇐⇒ −βc′(eTC
ND
2 ) + βg
′(αN
ND
(eN
ND
1 + e
TCND
2 ))α
NND
+ βg′((1− αN
ND
)(eN
ND
1 + e
TCND
2 ))(1− α
NND) = 0 , (A.40)
∂UN
ND
1 (e1, e2, α)
∂α
= 0 ⇐⇒
βg′(αN
ND
(eN
ND
1 + e
TCND
2 )) = βg
′((1− αN
ND
)(eN
ND
1 + e
TCND
2 )). (A.41)
From (A.41) it follows that αN
ND
= 1/2. With αN
ND
= 1/2, eN
ND
1 and e
TCND
2 are
characterized by
βg′((1/2)(eN
ND
1 + e
TCND
2 )) = c
′(eN
ND
1 ) , (A.42)
g′((1/2)(eN
ND
1 + e
TCND
2 )) = c
′(eTC
ND
2 ) , (A.43)
which immediately implies that eN
ND
1 < e
TCND
2 .
Next, we show that given eN
ND
1 the naif will indeed achieve effort smoothing over
tasks in the second period. Suppose the opposite, i.e., assume (w.l.o.g.) that in period
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1 the naif invested that much more effort in task B than in task A such that even
if he invested all second-period effort in task A, effort smoothing is not achieved,
eN
ND
A1 + e2 < eB1. Since in period 2 the agent prefers an effort allocation as even as
possible, all second-period effort is invested in task A and therefore is characterized by
βg′(eN
ND
A1 + e
NND
2 ) = c
′(eN
ND
2 ) . (A.44)
From (A.42), we know that
βg′((1/2)(eN
ND
A1 + e
NND
B1 + e
TCND
2 )) = c
′(eN
ND
A1 + e
NND
B1 ) . (A.45)
Equations (A.44) and (A.45) together with the assumption that effort smoothing
is not optimal, which implies eN
ND
2 < e
NND
A1 + e
NND
B1 , yields βg
′(eN
ND
A1 + e
NND
2 ) <
βg′((1/2)(eN
ND
A1 +e
NND
B1 +e
TCND
2 )). This last inequality implies 2e
NND
2 > e
NND
B1 −e
NND
A1 +
eTC
ND
2 , which cannot hold since e
TCND
2 > e
NND
1 > e
NND
2 and e
NND
B1 − e
NND
A1 > e
NND
2 by
the initial assumption that effort smoothing over tasks is not achieved. Thus, first-
period effort will always be chosen such that effort smoothing over tasks is achieved in
period 2.
Taking into account that effort will be split evenly among tasks, the utility of a
second-period naif is
UN
ND
2 = −c(e2) + β2g((1/2)(e
NND
1 + e
2)) .
The optimal second-period effort, eN
ND
2 , is characterized by the following first-order
condition:
βg′((1/2)(eN
ND
1 + e
NND
2 ) = c
′(eN
ND
2 ), (A.46)
Comparing (A.43) and (A.46) yields eN
ND
2 < e
TCND
2 , which in combination with (A.42)
and (A.46) implies eN
ND
1 < e
NND
2 .
Next, consider the case where a naive agent faces a deadline, formally, eA1 = eA,
eA2 = 0, and eB2 = e2. The utility of a naive agent in the first period is given by
UN
D
1 = −c(eA + eB1)− βc(e
TC
2 (eB1)) + βg(eA) + βg(eB1 + e
TC
2 (eB1)) ,
where eTC2 (eB1) is characterized by
g′(eB1 + e
TC
2 (eB1)) = c
′(eTC2 (eB1)). (A.47)
The first-order conditions of utility maximization take the following form:
∂UN
D
1
∂eA
= 0 ⇐⇒ βg′(eA)− c
′(eA + eB1) = 0 (A.48)
∂UN
D
1
∂eB1
= 0 ⇐⇒ βg′(eB1 + e
TC
2 (eB1))− c
′(eA + eB1) = 0 (A.49)
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If the above maximization problem has interior solutions, eA > 0 and eB1 > 0, then
these solutions are characterized by (A.48) and (A.49). When both first-order condi-
tions are satisfied, we have g′(eA) = g
′(eB1 + e
TC
2 (eB1)), that is, at an interior solution
we must have eA = eB1 + e
TC
2 (eB1). By (A.48), however, it is immediate that eA is
decreasing in eB1. Moreover, comparing (A.47) and (A.48) reveals that e
TC
2 (eB1) > eA
for eB1 = 0. Together with de
TC
2 (eB1)/deB1 ∈ (−1, 0), these last two observations imply
that eA < eB1+e
TC
2 (eB1) for all eB1 ≥ 0, a contradiction. Hence, the naive agent’s first-
period utility maximization problem has a corner solution. Similar reasoning as in the
case of the sophisticate allows us to restrict attention to the following two candidates
for this corner solution: (i) eN
D
A > 0 and e
ND
B1 = 0 or (ii) e
ND
A = 0 and e
ND
B1 > 0. For (ii)
to be the solution to the naive agent’s first-period problem, the following conditions
have to hold:
βg′(0)− c′(eN
D
B1 ) ≤ 0 (A.50)
βg′(eN
D
B1 + e
TC
B2 (e
ND
B1 ))− c
′(eN
D
B1 ) = 0 (A.51)
Obviously, for (A.50) and (A.51) to hold simultaneously it is required that eN
D
B1 +
eTC2 (e
ND
B1 ) ≤ 0, which can never be the case. Therefore we are left with e
ND
A > 0 and
eN
D
B1 = 0, that is, in the first period the agents invests only in task A. This first-period
effort is characterized by
βg′(eN
D
A ) = c
′(eN
D
A ). (A.52)
The second-period utility of a naive agent under a regime with a deadline takes the
following form:
UN
D
2 = −c(eB2) + βg(e
ND) + βg(eB2) .
The optimal second-period effort then satisfies
βg′(eN
D
B2 ) = c
′(eN
D
B2 ). (A.53)
Comparing (A.52) and (A.53) yields eN
D
A = e
ND
B2 , that is, when facing a deadline a
naive agent equates effort over tasks and smoothes effort over time. Let the effort level
that is chosen by a naive agent under a regime of deadlines per period and per task be
denoted by eN
D
.
To show that a naive agent chooses a higher effort level in the first period when
facing a deadline, suppose, in contradiction, that eN
ND
1 ≥ e
ND . Then βg′(eN
D
) =
c′(eN
D
) ≤ c′(eN
ND
1 ) = βg
′(1
2
(eN
ND
1 + e
TC
2 (e
NND
1 )), where the first equality holds by
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(A.52) and the second equality holds by (A.42). But with g′′(·) < 0, this implies eN
D
≥
1
2
(eN
ND
1 + e
TC
2 (e
NND
1 )) > e
NND
1 , a contradiction. Hence we must have e
NND
1 < e
ND . Let
eNND2 (e1) be characterized by βg
′((1/2)(e1 + e
NND
2 (e1))) = c
′(eN
ND
2 (e1)). Note that
eN
ND
2 (e
ND) = eN
D
, which in combination with (A.52) and deN
ND
2 (e1)/de1 ∈ (−1, 0),
eN
ND
1 < e
ND implies eN
ND
1 + e
NND
2 < 2e
ND . That is, when facing a deadline, a naive
agent exhibits a higher total effort level than under regime without a deadline.
To see that UN
D
0 > U
NND
0 the same reasoning applies as in the case of the sophisti-
cate. For a formal argument we refer to the proof of Proposition 4. Intuitively, under
deadlines a naive chooses a more desirable total effort level than under no deadlines,
which moreover is allocated more efficiently over the two periods.
Q.E.D.
2.2. Partial Naivete´
In this section of the appendix we analyze the behavior of a partially naive agent in
the sense of O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001b). A partially naive person is aware that
he has future self-control problems, but he underestimates their magnitude. Formally,
let βˆ ∈ (β, 1) be the person’s belief about what his taste for immediate gratification
will be in the future. Thus, in the single task model a partially naive agent believes in
period 1 that his future self will maximize −c(e2)+ βˆg(eˆ1+e2), whereas he will actually
choose e2 to maximize −c(e2) + βg(eˆ1 + e2). Note that the extreme cases βˆ = 1 and
βˆ = β correspond to the cases analyzed in the main body of the paper, (total) naivete´
and (full) sophistication, respectively.
Single Task Model
Here, we investigate the behavior of a partially naive agent in the single task model
with two periods for working on that task.
Definition A.1: A perception-perfect strategy for a partially naive agent is given by
(eP1 , e
P
2 (eˆ1)) such that (i) ∀ eˆ1 ≥ 0, e
P
2 (eˆ1) ∈ argmaxe2{−c(e2) + βg(eˆ1 + e2)}, and (ii)
eP1 ∈ argmaxe1{−c(e1)−c(e
B
2 (e1))+βg(e1+e
B
2 (e1))} where e
B
2 (eˆ1) ∈ argmaxe2{−c(e2)+
βˆg(eˆ1 + e2)}. Let e
P
2 = e
P
2 (e
P
1 ).
In the first period the partially naive agent believes that his second-period effort, eB2 (eˆ1),
is characterized by the following first-order condition
βˆg′(eˆ1 + e
B
2 (eˆ1)) = c
′(eB2 (eˆ1)) . (A.54)
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Differentiating (A.54) with respect to e1 and rearranging yields
deB2 (e1)
de1
= −
βˆg′′(e1 + e
B
2 (e1))
βˆg′′(e1 + eSB(e1))− c
′′(eB2 (e1))
∈ (−1, 0) .
The utility of a partially naive agent in the the first period, taking his believed second-
period reaction into account, is
−c(e1)− βc(e
B
2 (e1)) + βg(e1 + e
B
2 (e1)) . (A.55)
The corresponding first-order condition for optimality is given by
−c′(eP1 ) + βg
′
(
eP1 + e
B
2 (e
P
1 )
)
+
deB2 (e
P
1 )
de1
β
[
g′
(
eP1 + e
B
2 (e
P
1 )
)
− c′(eB2 (e
P
1 ))
]
= 0.(A.56)
The first-order condition is necessary and sufficient for optimality by similar reasonings
as in the case of a sophisticated agent. Finally, actual second-period effort, eP2 , is
characterized by
βg′(eP1 + e
P
2 ) = c
′(eP2 ) . (A.57)
A comparison of (A.54) and (A.57) directly reveals that eB2 (e
P
1 ) > e
P
2 . A partially naive
agent is overly optimistic when predicting his future self’s willingness to work. From
equations (A.54) and (A.56) it follows that−c′(eP1 )+βg
′(eP1 +e
B
2 (e
P
1 )) > 0, which implies
that c′(eP1 ) < βg
′(eP1 + e
B
2 (e
P
1 )) < βg
′(eP1 + e
P
2 ) = c
′(eP2 ). Thus, e
P
1 < e
P
2 . Put verbally,
a partially naive agent increases his effort over time. As last result for the single task
case we show that a partially naive agent works less in total than a time-consistent
agent, i.e., eP1 + e
P
2 < 2e
TC . Suppose, in contradiction, that eP1 + e
P
2 ≥ 2e
TC . We know
that βg′(eP1 +e
B
2 (e
P
1 ))−c
′(eP1 ) > 0 = g
′(eTC+eTC)−c′(eTC). Note that eP1 +e
P
2 ≥ 2e
TC
implies that eP1 + e
B
2 (e
P
1 ) ≥ 2e
TC . Since g′′(·) < 0 and c′′(·) > 0 the above inequality
implies that eP1 < e
TC . Furthermore, βg′(eP1 +e
P
2 )−c
′(eP2 ) = 0 = g
′(eTC+eTC)−c′(eTC).
But this means that eP2 < e
TC which leads to a contradiction to our a priori assumption
that eP1 +e
P
2 ≥ 2e
TC . Now we have established the following result, which is the analog
to Propositions 1 and 2 for the case of a partially naive agent.
Proposition A.1: (i) A partially naive agent invests more effort in period 2 than in
period 1, i.e., eP1 < e
P
2 . (ii) The total effort a partially naive agent invests is lower
than the total effort of a time-consistent person, i.e., eP1 + e
P
2 < 2e
TC. (iii) A partially
naive agent overestimates his future effort, i.e., eP2 < e
B
2 (e
P
1 ).
Two Task Model
This subsection analyzes the two task model introduced in Section 5 for the case of a
partially naive agent. Let us first consider the no deadline regime, that is, the agent
136 Dissertation of Fabian Herweg
can work in periods 1 and 2 on both tasks, A and B. In principle, the agent chooses
in each period t ∈ {1, 2} an effort level et and an allocation αt, with eAt = αtet and
eBt = (1 − αt)et. Obviously, ex post it is optimal that the agent invests the same
amount in task A as in task B. Ex ante, however, it is not clear that the agent will
choose in the first period (e1, α1) such that his second-period self considers it optimal to
choose (e2, α2) such that eA = eB. Fortunately, by applying the same line of arguments
as in the proof of Proposition 4 one can show that it is never optimal for a first-period
partially naive agent to choose (e1, α1) such that neither his believed second-period
behavior nor his actual second-period behavior will not lead to effort smoothing over
tasks. Roughly, the intuition is that e1 has to be very high and α1 has to be close to
zero or one such that the total effort needed in the second period to set eA = eB is
too costly for the second-period self. We know from the single task case that the first-
period self prefers to work less today and more tomorrow. This can only be achieved
by a tupel (e1, α1) such that effort smoothing over tasks is a best response for both
the actual and the believed second-period self. This observation allows us to focus on
the agent’s effort choice over time. With effort being spread out evenly among the two
tasks, the believed second-period effort as a function of first-period effort, eB
ND
2 (eˆ1), is
characterized by
c′(eB
ND
2 (eˆ1)) = βˆg
′((1/2)(eˆ1 + e
BND
2 (eˆ1))). (A.58)
The effort level chosen by a partially naive agent in the first period is determined by
the following first-order condition,1
βg′
(
(1/2)(eB
ND
1 + e
BND
2 (e
BND
1 ))
)
− c′(eB
ND
1 )
+
deB
ND
2 (e1)
de1
β
[
g′
(
(1/2)(eB
ND
1 + e
BND
2 (e
BND
1 ))
)
− c′(eB
ND
2 (e
BND
1 ))
]
= 0 . (A.59)
The actual second-period effort, eP
ND
2 , is characterized by
c′(eP
ND
2 ) = βˆg
′((1/2)(eP
ND
1 + e
PND
2 )). (A.60)
Comparing the above equations reveals that eP
ND
1 < e
PND
2 and e
PND
A = e
PND
B =
(1/2)(eP
ND
1 + e
PND
2 ). Put verbally, when not facing a deadline, a partially naive agent
equates effort over tasks but does not achieve effort smoothing over time.
Next, the situation where the partially naive agent faces a deadline after the first
period for task A is analyzed. Thus, the agent chooses (eA, eB1) in the first period and
eB2 in the second period. When facing this interim deadline, a partially naive agent
considers it optimal to work exclusively on task A in the first period, i.e., eP
D
B1 = 0.
1The first-order approach is valid according to the same reasoning as in the single-task case.
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This statement can be verified by the same line of arguments as used to show the
corresponding result for the sophisticated agent. Hence, the effort levels which are
chosen strictly positive, eP
D
A and e
PD
B2 , are characterized as follows:
c′(eP
D
A ) = βg
′(eP
D
A ) (A.61)
c′(eP
D
B2 ) = βg
′(eP
D
B2 ) (A.62)
When facing a deadline, a partially naive agent smoothes effort over time and equates
effort over tasks. Let eP
D
= eP
D
A = e
PD
1 and e
PD = eP
D
B2 = e
PD
B = e
PD
2 . Now, we can
state the analog result to Proposition 4 (respectively 5) for the case of a partially naive
agent.
Proposition A.2: When facing a deadline, a partially naive agent chooses a higher
effort level in the first period and a higher total effort level than under a regime without
a deadline, i.e., eP
ND
1 < e
PD and eP
ND
1 + e
PND
2 < 2e
PD . Moreover, the partially naive
agent is strictly better off from a long-run perspective when facing a deadline, i.e.,
UP
D
0 > U
PND
0 .
The statements of the proposition that do not follow from the above analysis can be
shown by applying the corresponding parts of the proof of Proposition 4.
3. Appendix to Chapter III
3.1. Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
Proof of Lemma III.1: Suppose s1 ≤ s2 ≤ 1, then consumer θ’s net utility is:
1
2
θ(si − pi)
2 for i = 1, 2, if he buys from firm i. Hence, firm 1’s profit is,
pi1 =


p1(s1 − p1)
∫ 1
0
θ dθ , if s1 − p1 > s2 − p2
1
2
· p1(s1 − p1)
∫ 1
0
θ dθ , if s1 − p1 = s2 − p2 and s1 = s2
0 , otherwise
. (A.63)
Consequently, firm 1 has an incentive to choose p1 ≥ 0 as high as possible such that
s1 − p1 > s2 − p2 and it can serve the whole market. Clearly firm 1 will not set p1
higher than the monopoly price, that is p1 ≤
1
2
s1. Note that the problem for firm 2 is
similar. Thus for the price game equilibrium one obtains:
if s1 = s2 =⇒ p
∗
1 = 0, p
∗
2 = 0 and pi
∗
1 = 0, pi
∗
2 = 0
if s1 < s2 =⇒ p
∗
1 = 0, p
∗
2 = s2 − s1 and pi
∗
1 = 0, pi
∗
2 > 0 .
If firm 1 is aware that s2 = 1, then the profit of firm 1 is always zero, independent of
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the quality level s1. Hence, all quality-levels s1 ∈ {0,
1
3
, 2
3
, 1} are possible in equilibrium
of the two-stage game (quality game and tariff game).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma III.2: When both firms choose the same quality level, their
products are perfect substitutes. For the proof, I distinguish two cases.
Case 1: Suppose pii > pij ≥ 0 and that the corresponding tariffs are (Ti, Tj). Firm j
can increase its profit when it offers the tariff
T ∗j =
{
Ti − ε , if Ai > 0
(pi − ε)q , if Ai = 0
,
where ε > 0 is sufficiently small. The profit of firm j is then arbitrarily close to pii > pij.
Case 2: Suppose that pii(Ti, Tj) = pij(Tj, Ti) > 0, where Ti is the tariff of firm i and
Tj the tariff of firm j. Again, firm j can increase its profit by slightly undercutting its
rival’s tariff. That is, firm j uses the tariff T ∗j defined in Case 1. The rise in firm j’s
profit is then
lim
ε→0
[
pij(T
∗
j , Ti)− pij(Tj, Ti)
]
= lim
ε→0
[
pij(T
∗
j , Ti)− pii(Ti, Tj)
]
≥
[
1− θˆ
]
Ai + pi
∫ 1
θˆ
qi(pi, θ) dθ −
[
λ · Ai + pi
∫ 1
1−λ
qi(pi, θ) dθ
]
> 0 , (A.64)
where λ is the fraction of customers that purchase from firm i under tariffs (Ti, Tj)
and θˆ is the marginal consumer who is indifferent between buying or not when firm j
would not be present.2 Note that when firm j slightly undercuts firm i’s tariff, firm j
obtains all customers of firm i, λ, and additionally keeps some of its former customers.
Consequently, λ < 1− θˆ.
Hence, when both firms produce the same quality level, there exists no equilibrium
where at least one firm earns strictly positive profits.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma III.3: Follows immediately from Lemma 2.
Q.E.D.
2If the marginal consumer who is indifferent between purchasing or not when only firm i would be
present does not exist, then θˆ is equal to zero.
Essays in Industrial Organization and Behavioral Economics 139
Proof of Lemma III.4: Obviously, the high-quality firm can always match the
offer of the low-quality firm which yields a profit for the high-quality firm greater than
that of the low-quality firm. Thus, if there exists an equilibrium where the low-quality
firm serves the consumers with types θ ∈ [θ˜, 1] 6= ∅, then both firms share the market
in the sense that both firms have a positive market share.
Note that for the complete analysis of the tariff game it was not used that s2 > s1.
Put differently, the label “firm 2” referred to the firm serving the market segment with
high valuations whereas “firm 1” referred to the firm serving the market segment of
moderate or low valuations. Now, suppose that s2 < s1 and that firm 2 still serves the
consumers with high valuations while firm 1 serves the consumers with low valuations.
In any pure strategy equilibrium, in which the two firms share the market, prices and
fixed fees have to satisfy the necessary conditions for profit maximization outlined in
Section 3. Let (p∗2, A
∗
2, p
∗
1, A
∗
1) be the equilibrium prices and fixed fees. With firm 2
selling to the high-type consumers and both firms being active in the market it holds
that
s2 − p
∗
2 > s1 − p
∗
1 . (A.65)
Since firm 2’s market share is (1− θ˜∗), from (III.11) we obtain
−A∗2 + (1− θ˜
∗)
1
2
[(s2 − p
∗
2)
2 − (s1 − p
∗
1)
2]− p∗2(s2 − p
∗
2)θ˜
∗ = 0 .
Inserting A∗2 defined by (III.6) into the above equality yields
(1− 2θ˜∗)
1
2
[(s2 − p
∗
2)
2 − (s1 − p
∗
1)
2]− A∗1 − p
∗
2(s2 − p
∗
2)θ˜
∗ = 0 ,
which implies that θ˜∗ < 1/2. Thus, in any pure strategy equilibrium in which both
firms share the market, the firm that serves the high-type consumers has a market share
greater than 1/2. In the assumed equilibrium, the market share of firm 2 is (1 − θ˜∗)
and the market share of firm 1 is (θ˜∗ − 1
3
θ˜∗). Note that in equilibrium θˆ = 1
3
θ˜. The
profit of firm 1 in equilibrium, using (III.13), amounts to
pi∗1 =
(
θ˜∗ −
1
3
θ˜∗
)
A∗1 +
1
2
p∗1(s1 − p
∗
1)
[
(θ˜∗)2 −
1
9
(θ˜∗)2
]
. (A.66)
The fixed fee of firm 1 is given by (4), i.e., A∗1 = (1/3)θ˜
∗(1/2)(s1 − p
∗
1)
2. Thus,
pi∗1 =
1
9
(θ˜∗)2(s1 − p
∗
1)
2 +
4
9
(θ˜∗)2p∗1(s1 − p
∗
1) (A.67)
=
1
9
(θ˜∗)2(s1 − p
∗
1)[s1 + 3p
∗
1] . (A.68)
The above profit is maximized for p1 = (1/3)s1. Since θ˜
∗ < 1/2, pi∗1 is lower than
piMAX1 =
1
4
·
1
9
(
2
3
s1
)
(2s1) =
1
27
s21 . (A.69)
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In the following, I will show that if firm 1 is the high-quality firm, then there exists a
tariff Tˆ1 that yields a profit pˆi1 for firm 1 that strictly exceeds pi
MAX
1 . Suppose firm 1
offers the “linear-undercutting” tariff with Aˆ1 = 0 and pˆ1 = min{(1/2)s1, s1 − s2 + p
∗
2}
to consumers. By construction, all consumers θ ∈ [0, 1] now purchase from firm 1, since
s1 − pˆ1 ≥ s2 − p
∗
2 and AˆH = 0 < A
∗
L. The profit of firm 1 when offering Tˆ1 is
pˆi1 =
1
2
pˆ1(s1 − pˆ1) . (A.70)
Suppose pˆ1 = (1/2)s1, then pˆi1 = (1/8)s
2
1. If, on the other hand, pˆ1 = s1− s2+ p
∗
2, then
pˆi1 = (1/2)(s1− s2+ p
∗
2)(s2− p
∗
2). Note that s1− s2 ≥ 1/3 and s2− p
∗
2 ≥ (1/2)s1, since
min{(1/2)s1, s1 − s2 + p
∗
2} = s1 − s2 + p
∗
2. Thus, in this case pˆi1 ≥ (1/12)s1. While in
both cases pˆi1 ≥ min{(1/8)s
2
1, (1/12)s1} > (1/27)s
2
1 = pi
MAX
1 , offering Tˆ1 is profitable
for firm 1 (high-quality firm), which concludes the proof.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition III.1: In any pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the tariff
game either the two firms share the market, or only one firm is active in the market.
First, I analyze the equilibrium where only one firm is active in the market. I will show
that this is an equilibrium, if the firms’ degree of product differentiation is not high.
Thereafter, it is shown that there exists an equilibrium in which both firms share the
market, if the firms’ degree of quality differentiation is not low.
Step 1 (only one firm has a positive market share): If only one firm has a positive
market share in equilibrium, then this must be the high-quality firm (firm 2). For any
given tariff of firm 1, if firm 2 offers T2(q) = q(s2 − s1) to consumers, firm 2 serves the
whole market and makes strictly positive profits. Thus, if only one firm has a positive
market share then pi∗1 = 0. With pi
∗
1 = 0 firm 2 serves the whole market which implies
that A∗2 = 0. If firm 2 does not serve the whole market, then there is an unsatisfied
residual demand which can profitably be served by firm 1. Next, I will show that pi∗1 = 0
implies that p∗1 = A
∗
1 = 0. Suppose, in contradiction, that firm 1 makes a zero profit
but does not set p∗1 = A
∗
1 = 0.
Case 1: A∗1 > 0 and p
∗
1 ≥ 0. In this case, the best response for firm 2 is to set A
∗
2 > 0.
To see this, suppose A∗1 > 0, pi
∗
1 = 0 and A
∗
2 = 0. Since firm 2 serves whole market,
if firm 2 increases A2 slightly above zero, firm 2 looses some consumers with types θ
close to zero. Note that these consumers do not switch to firm 1 for A2 sufficiently
small but to the outside option. Nevertheless, firm 2 might loose some consumers with
high valuations to firm 1 when slightly increasing A2 without adjusting p2. Suppose
that – if necessary – firm 2 adjusts p2 such that all consumers with high valuations still
purchase from firm 2. Formally, if the price adjustment is necessary firm 2 decreases p2
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such that (1/2)(s2 − p2)
2 −A2 = (1/2)(s1 − p
∗
1)−A
∗
1. Thus, the necessary decrease in
p2 due to an increase in A2 either is zero (if the adjustment is not necessary), or given
by
dp2(A2)
dA2
=
−1
s2 − p2(A2)
. (A.71)
Firm 2’s profit as a function of A2 < A
∗
1 is then given by
pi2(A2) = [1− θ¯(A2)]A2 + p2(A2)[s2 − p2(A2)](1/2)[1− θ¯
2(A2)] , (A.72)
where θ¯ is the marginal consumer who is indifferent between purchasing from firm 2
and not purchasing the good. Taking the derivative of pi2(A2) with respect to A2 and
evaluating this derivative at A2 = 0 yields
dpi2(A2)
dA2
∣∣∣∣
A2=0
= 1 +
dp2(0)
dA2
1
2
[s2 − 2p
∗
2] . (A.73)
For A2 = 0 it holds that p2(A2) = p
∗
2. Since p
∗
2 is an equilibrium price, p
∗
2 ≤ (1/2)s2 =
pM(s2), where pM(s2) is the optimal linear price of a monopolist with quality s2. This
implies that 2p2(A2) ≤ s2, and hence
dpi2(A2)
dA2
∣∣∣∣
A2=0
≥ 1−
s2 − 2p
∗
2
2(s2 − p∗2)
> 0. (A.74)
Thus, given A∗1 > 0, we must have A
∗
2 > 0, which cannot happen in an equilibrium
with only firm 2 being active.
Case 2: A∗1 = 0 and p
∗
1 > 0. For s2 = 1 and s1 = 2/3, if firm 2 serves the whole
market it is profitable to set p∗2 > s2−s1, since in this case, s2−s1 < (1/2)s2 = pM(s2).
With p∗2 > s2 − s1, firm 1 can realize strictly positive profits by setting A1 = 0 and
0 < p1 < p2 − (s2 − s1), a contradiction to pi
∗
1 = 0. For s1 = 1/3 and s2 ∈ {2/3, 1} it is
optimal for firm 2 to set p∗2 ≤ pM(s2) ≤ s2− s1 and A
∗
2 > 0. Note that for p
∗
2 ≤ s2− s1
and p1 > 0 firm 2 offers the product with the strictly higher net value (s − p). Thus,
by (III.11), and since θ˜ = 0 implies that A2 = 0,
∂pi2
∂θ˜
∣∣∣∣
θ˜=0
> 0 .
Hence, it is optimal for firm 2 not to serve the whole market, which implies A∗2 > 0.
Thus, if only one firm has a positive market share in equilibrium, then p∗1 = 0 and
A∗1 = 0.
Next, given p1 = A1 = 0, firm 2’s best response is calculated. It is shown that the
unique best response for firm 2 is to offer the tariff T2(q) = 0+ (s2− s1)q, if the degree
of quality differentiation is not high, i.e., (s2 = 1, s1 = 2/3) and (s2 = 2/3, s1 = 1/3). If
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firm 2’s profit maximization problem has an interior solution, then T2 is characterized
by firm 2’s FOCs. According to (III.12), the optimal fixed fee is given by
A∗2 =
1
2
(1− θ˜)
[
1
4
s22(1− θ˜
2)− s21
]
. (A.75)
The fixed fee is strictly positive if the following condition is satisfied:
1
4
s22(1− θ˜
2)− s21 > 0 . (A.76)
For 2s1 ≥ s2 and θ˜ > 0 condition (A.76) is violated and thus the optimal tariff is a
corner solution. That is, T2 is either a linear tariff (A2 = 0) or a flat tariff (p2 = 0).
Note that θ˜ = 0 implies A2 = 0.
I) Flat tariff (A2 > 0, p2 = 0): By the definition of the marginal consumer θ˜, for
p1 = A1 = 0, I obtain
A2 =
1
2
θ˜(s22 − s
2
1) . (A.77)
Firm 2’s profit is given by
pi2 = (1− θ˜)θ˜
1
2
(s22 − s
2
1) .
The profit maximizing marginal consumer is θ˜ = 1/2 and the profit piflat is then
piflat =
1
8
(s22 − s
2
1) . (A.78)
II) Linear tariff (A2 = 0, p2 > 0): Given that the degree of quality differentiation is
not high, for the case with linear tariffs it is clear that the optimal marginal price is
p∗2 = s2 − s1. Then each consumer purchases from firm 2. If firm 2 sets a higher price
it has no market share, a lower price is not optimal because p∗2 = s2−s1 ≤
1
2
= pM(s2),
where pM is the price of a monopolist with linear tariff. The profit of firm 2 with linear
pricing, pilin, is
pilin =
1
2
s1(s2 − s1) . (A.79)
A comparison of (A.78) and (A.79) reveals that a linear tariff is optimal for firm 2.
To conclude Step 1 it is shown that firm 2 always leaves an unsatisfied residual
demand if s2 = 1 and s1 = 1/3. From equation (III.11) it follows that
∂pi2
∂θ˜
∣∣
θ˜=0
> 0,
given that
(s2 − p2)
2 − (s1 − p1)
2 > 0 (A.80)
Note that p2 ≤ (1/2)s2 = pM(s2). Thus, condition (A.80) holds for s2 > 2s1, since
(s2 − p2) ≥ (1/2)s2 > s1 ≥ (s1 − p1). Hence, for s2 > 2s1 in any pure strategy
equilibrium both firms share the market.
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Step 2 (both firms are active in the market): Suppose both firms share the market
in equilibrium. From Lemma 4 it follows that one can focus on the case where the
high-quality firm (firm 2) serves the consumers with high θ’s. If there exists a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium in which both firms share the market, then this equilibrium
is characterized by the equations (III.5), (III.6), (III.10), (III.12), (III.14), and (III.15).
This system of equations can be simplified to a single equation in θ˜, such that θ˜∗ is
characterized by P (θ˜∗) = 0, where
P (θ˜) = 27s42(9− 30θ˜ − 29θ˜
2 + 108θ˜3 + 63θ˜4 − 110θ˜5 − 75θ˜6)
+ 108s22(3− 17θ˜ + 14θ˜
2 + 46θ˜3 − 33θ˜4 − 45θ˜5)
+ 108(1− 8θ˜ + 18θ˜2 − 27θ˜4)
− 576s21(3− 23θ˜ + 57θ˜
2 − 45θ˜3)
− 192s21s
2
2(9− 48θ˜ + 58θ˜
2 + 40θ˜3 − 75θ˜4)
− 16s21s
4
2(27− 81θ˜ − 18θ˜
2 + 190θ˜3 − 25θ˜4 − 125θ˜5) .
Unfortunately, P (θ˜) is a polynomial of sixth order in θ˜ that cannot be solved analyt-
ically. A plot of the polynomial reveals that P (θ˜) has exactly one root in [0, 1] for
(s2 = 1, s1 = 1/3) and (s2 = 2/3, s1 = 1/3) and no root in [0, 1] for (s2 = 1, s1 = 2/3).
A plot of the polynomial for s2 = 1 and s1 = 1/3 is given below. If P (θ˜) = 0 for
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
theta
-100
-50
50
P
Figure A.1.: Solution of the equilibrium marginal consumer.
θ˜ ∈ [0, 1], then the root of P (θ˜) characterizes a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. By
using numerical methods one can solve for the unique θ˜∗ in the cases (s2 = 1, s1 = 1/3)
and (s2 = 2/3, s1 = 1/3). Having obtained θ˜
∗ one can compute the corresponding
equilibrium tariffs, profits, and market shares. For s2 = 1 and s1 = 1/3 the equilibrium
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values are given in the text, for s2 = 2/3 and s1 = 1/3 the equilibrium values are:
pi1 = .000885066 pi2 = .0608325
p1 = .0753264 p2 = .255018
A1 = .00260662 A2 = .014693
θˆ = .078315 θ˜ = .234945
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition III.2: The tariff-game equilibria are characterized in Propo-
sition 1. Thus, it remains to show that si = 1, sj = 1/3 with i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j is
the unique pure strategy equilibrium of the quality game. Clearly, si = 1 and sj = 2/3
is not an equilibrium, since with these quality levels pi∗j = 0, but with sj = 1/3 firm j
makes strictly positive profits. Similarly, si = 2/3 and sj = 1/3 is not an equilibrium
irrespective of which equilibrium is played at the tariff stage, because it is profitable
for firm j to deviate to sj = 1. To see this note that for si = 2/3 and sj = 1/3 firm j’s
profit is either zero or .000885066. When deviating to sj = 1, however, firm j serves
the whole market and makes profits of: pij = (sj − si)si(1/2) = 1/9 > .000885066.
Obviously, for si = 1 and sj = 1/3 no firm has an incentive to deviate, hence this is
the unique pure strategy equilibrium of the quality game.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition III.3: Follows directly from Proposition 2 in combination
with Lemma 1.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition III.4: If price discrimination is permitted, the equilibrium
tariffs, profits, and quality-levels are given in the main body of the paper. The social
welfare is then:
WD := pi1 + pi2 +
∫ 1
θ˜
v2(p2, θ) dθ − (1− θ˜)A2 +
∫ θ˜
θˆ
v1(p1, θ) dθ − (θ˜ − θˆ)A1 . (A.81)
Substituting the equilibrium values into (A.81), one obtains
W ∗D = 0.201913 . (A.82)
Furthermore, standard calculations show that industry profits and consumers’ surplus
are
Π∗D := pi
∗
1 + pi
∗
2 = 0.144215 (A.83)
CS∗D = 0.0576981 . (A.84)
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On the other hand, if price discrimination is banned, only one firm (M) enters the
market. The monopolist chooses sM = 1. The profit maximization problem for the
monopolist is:
piM = pM
∫ 1
0
θ(1− pM) dθ → max
pM
. (A.85)
The optimal price is p∗M =
1
2
and the corresponding equilibrium values for profit, welfare
and consumers’ surplus are:
pi∗M = 0.125 (A.86)
W ∗M = 0.1875 (A.87)
CS∗M = 0.0625 . (A.88)
Q.E.D.
3.2. Examination of the Second-Order Necessary Conditions
First I check the second-order condition (SOC) for firm 2 (high-quality). The partial
derivative of pi2 with respect to p2 is:
∂pi2
∂p2
=
1
2
s2(1− θ˜)
2 − (1− θ˜)p2 . (A.89)
From (A.89) it is easy to take the second derivative of pi2 with respect to p2 and the
cross-partial:
∂2pi2
∂p22
= −(1− θ˜) < 0 (A.90)
∂2pi2
∂θ˜∂p2
= p2 − s2(1− θ˜) . (A.91)
Taking the second-order partial derivative of pi2 with respect to θ˜ yields
∂2pi2
∂θ˜2
= −
[
(s2 − p2)
2 − (s1 − p1)
2
]
− p2(s2 − p2) < 0 . (A.92)
Since the zero points of the FOCs are unique, the FOCs describe a global maximum
point if the profit function is concave in the neighborhood of the stationary point.
Consequently, it is sufficient to check the sign of the determinant of the Hessian matrix.
The determinant of the Hessian is:
det(H) ≡
∂2pi2
∂θ˜2
·
∂2pi2
∂p22
−
(
∂2pi2
∂θ˜∂p2
)2
⇒ det(H) = (1− θ˜)
[
(s2 − p2)
2 − (s1 − p1)
2 + p2(s2 − p2)
]
−(
p22 − 2p2s2(1− θ˜) + s
2
2(1− θ˜)
2
)
. (A.93)
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Since a corner solution (p2 = 0 or p2 = s2) cannot be optimal, the optimal marginal
price is characterized by the FOC. Inserting the optimal marginal price p∗2 =
1
2
(1− θ˜)s2
into (A.93) yields
det(H) =
(1− θ˜)
[
(s2 − p2)
2 − (s1 − p1)
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0, for A2 ≥ 0
+
1
4
s22(1− θ˜)(1 + θ˜)−
1
4
s22(1− θ˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
]
> 0 . (A.94)
Q.E.D.
Next, I check the SOC for the low-quality firm. To prove that the SOC holds for
the low quality firm using the determinant of the Hessian matrix is very tedious. It
is easier to show that the profit maximization problem of firm 1 is not solved by a
corner solution. Suppose firm 1 sets the marginal price as high as possible, that is,
p1 = s1. Then consumers obtain a non positive surplus if they purchase from firm 1
and consequently pi1 = 0. Similarly, if firm 1 sets θ˜ = 0 then it has no market share
and thus zero profits. On the other hand, if θ˜ = 1 the high-quality firm has no market
share and realizes zero profits. This cannot happen in equilibrium: if only one firm
is active in the market it is clearly the high-quality firm. To summarize, all corner
solutions can be ruled out except that firm 1 sets p1 = 0 and offers a flat tariff.
Suppose p1 = 0 is optimal. The profit maximization problem of firm 1 then is given
by
piflat1 (θ˜) :=
(
θ˜ − θˆ(θ˜)
)
A1(θ˜) → max
θ˜
with
A1 =
1
2
θ˜[s21 − (s2 − p2)
2] + A2 and θˆ =
2A1
s21
.
Taking the derivative of piflat1 with respect to θ˜ yields
dpiflat1
dθ˜
= 0 ⇐⇒
(s2 − p2)
2
s21
(
θ˜
1
2
[
(s21 − (s2 − p2)
2
]
+ A2
)
+
(
θ˜(s2 − p2)
2 − 2A2
s21
)
1
2
[
s21 − (s2 − p2)
2
]
= 0 . (A.95)
Solving the above equation for θ˜ yields
θ˜ =
2(s2 − p2)
2 − s21
(s2 − p2)2 [(s2 − p2)2 − s21]
A2 . (A.96)
Evaluating the profit function, piflat1 , at the equilibrium tariff of firm 2 and for s1 =
1
3
and s2 = 1 (equivalent calculations for s2 = 2/3, s1 = 1/3) yields
piflat1 = 0.00129999 < 0.0138222 = pi
∗
1 .
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Hence, a flat tariff is not optimal for firm 1. All potential corner solutions have been
ruled out as profit maximizing solutions, thus the profit maximization problem of firm
1 has an interior solution.
Q.E.D.
4. Appendix to Chapter IV
4.1. Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
Proof of Lemma IV.1: For the proof we omit that demand depends on the
marginal price p. Suppose, in contradiction, that φ1 < φ2 but qˆ(φ1) > qˆ(φ2). By
revealed preferences the two inequalities below follow immediately,
u(qˆ(φ1);φ1)− T (qˆ(φ1)) +
∫
X(qˆ(φ1))
[T (qˆ(θ))− T (qˆ(φ1))]f(θ) dθ
− λ
∫
Xc(qˆ(φ1))
[T (qˆ(φ1))− T (qˆ(θ))]f(θ) dθ ≥ u(qˆ(φ2);φ1)− T (qˆ(φ2))
+
∫
X(qˆ(φ2))
[T (qˆ(θ))− T (qˆ(φ2))]f(θ) dθ − λ
∫
Xc(qˆ(φ2))
[T (qˆ(φ2))− T (qˆ(θ))]f(θ) dθ,
(A.97)
and
u(qˆ(φ2);φ2)− T (qˆ(φ2)) +
∫
X(qˆ(φ2))
[T (qˆ(θ))− T (qˆ(φ2))]f(θ) dθ
− λ
∫
Xc(qˆ(φ2))
[T (qˆ(φ2))− T (qˆ(θ))]f(θ) dθ ≥ u(qˆ(φ1);φ2)− T (qˆ(φ1))
+
∫
X(qˆ(φ1))
[T (qˆ(θ))− T (qˆ(φ1))]f(θ) dθ − λ
∫
Xc(qˆ(φ1))
[T (qˆ(φ1))− T (qˆ(θ))]f(θ) dθ .
(A.98)
Subtracting (A.97) from (A.98) and rearranging yields
[u(qˆ(φ1);φ1)− u(qˆ(φ2);φ1)]− [u(qˆ(φ1);φ2)− u(qˆ(φ2);φ2)] ≥ 0
⇐⇒
∫ qˆ(φ1)
qˆ(φ2)
∂u(q, φ1)
∂q
dq −
∫ qˆ(φ1)
qˆ(φ2)
∂u(q, φ2)
∂q
dq ≥ 0
⇐⇒
∫ qˆ(φ1)
qˆ(φ2)
∫ φ2
φ1
∂2u(q, θ)
∂q∂θ
dθdq ≤ 0 .
The last inequality cannot hold, since ∂2u(q, θ)/∂q∂θ > 0 for q ≤ qS(θ) and by as-
sumption φ1 < φ2 and qˆ(φ1) > qˆ(φ2) by hypothesis.
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma IV.3: Suppose, in contradiction, there is a personal equilibrium
that is at least at one point φ ∈ Θ discontinuous. If the personal equilibrium is discon-
tinuous at φ then either qˆ(φ; p) < limε→0 qˆ(φ + |ε|; p) or limε→0 qˆ(φ − |ε|; p) < qˆ(φ; p).
While we proof explicitly only the former case, the latter one proceeds by analogous
steps. Let qˆ(φ; p) =: q1 and limε→0 qˆ(φ+ |ε|; p) =: q2 with q1 < q2 by discontinuity and
monotonicity. First, consider a type θ ≤ φ who deviates from qˆ(θ; p) ≤ q1 to a higher
quantity q ∈ (q1, q2). The utility of this type is then given by
U(q|θ, ·) = u(q, θ)− pq − L
+ p
∫ θ¯
φ
(qˆ(z; p)− q) f(z)dz − λp
∫ φ
θ
(q − qˆ(z; p)) f(z)dz . (A.99)
For q ∈ (q1, q2) the derivative of type θ’s utility with respect to his demand is
dU(q|θ, ·)
dq
=
∂u(q, θ)
∂q
− p[2 + (λ− 1)F (φ)] . (A.100)
Note that U(q|φ, 〈qˆ(θ; p)〉) is continuous for all q ≥ 0. Thus, it has to hold that
dU/dq|q=q1 ≤ 0 since 〈qˆ(z; p)〉 is a personal equilibrium which implies that type θ has
no incentive to demand a quantity q ∈ (q1, q2). Hence, the following inequality has to
be satisfied
∂u(q1, θ)/∂q − p[2 + (λ− 1)F (φ)] ≤ 0 . (A.101)
Since ∂u(q1, θ)/∂q is increasing in θ, the above inequality is satisfied for all types
θ ∈ [θ, φ] if it is satisfied for φ. Thus, it has to hold that
∂u(q1, φ)/∂q − p[2 + (λ− 1)F (φ)] ≤ 0 . (A.102)
Note that (A.102) gives us a lower bound for q1.
Now, consider a type θ > φ who deviates from qˆ(θ; p) ≥ q2 to a lower quantity
q ∈ (q1, q2). The marginal change in type θ’s utility due to an increase in q amounts to
dU(q|θ, ·)
dq
=
∂u(q, θ)
∂q
− p[2 + (λ− 1)F (φ)] . (A.103)
This downward deviation is not profitable if dU/dq|q=q2 ≥ 0. Note that qˆ(θ; p) ≥ q2 for
θ > φ. Thus, the following inequality needs to be satisfied
∂u(q2, θ)/∂q − p[2 + (λ− 1)F (φ)] ≥ 0 . (A.104)
The above inequality is satisfied for all types θ ∈ (φ, θ¯] if it is satisfied for type φ. Thus,
it has to hold that
∂u(q2, φ)/∂q − p[2 + (λ− 1)F (φ)] ≥ 0 . (A.105)
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The inequality (A.105) provides an upper bound for q2. Combining inequalities (A.102)
and (A.105) yields
∂u(q2, φ)
∂q
≥
∂u(q1, φ)
∂q
, (A.106)
which implies that q2 ≤ q1 a contradiction to q1 < q2. Thus, the demand profile of any
personal equilibrium is continuous in the state of the world.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma IV.4: To proof the result it suffices to show that there cannot be
an interval I ⊆ Θ such that for all θ ∈ I, qˆ(θ; p) = q¯ iff (C1) holds. We show that there
is at least one type θˆ ∈ I who can profitably deviate to a slightly higher or slightly
lower quantity than q¯. First, the upward deviation is analyzed.
Consider a type θˆ ∈ I who consumes q¯ + ε, with ε > 0 but close to zero, his utility
is given by
U(q¯ + ε|θˆ, ·) = u(q¯ + ε, θˆ)− p(q¯ + ε)− L
+p
∫
{θ∈Θ|qˆ(θ;p)>q¯+ε}
(qˆ(θ; p)− q¯−ε)f(θ) dθ−λp
∫
{θ∈Θ|qˆ(θ;p)<q¯+ε}
(q¯+ε− qˆ(θ; p))f(θ) dθ .
Let ΘH ≡ {θ ∈ Θ|θ < inf{I}} and ΘL ≡ {θ ∈ Θ|θ > sup{I}}. Thus, since demand is
(weakly) increasing, it follows that for ε→ 0 it holds that {θ ∈ Θ|qˆ(θ; p) > q¯+ε} = ΘH
and {θ ∈ Θ|qˆ(θ; p) < q¯ + ε} = ΘL ∪ I. The increase in utility from consuming slightly
more than q¯ is
dU(q¯ + ε|θˆ, ·)
dε
∣∣∣∣
ε=0
=
du(q¯, θˆ)
dq
− p− p
∫
θ∈ΘH
f(θ)dθ − λp
∫
θ∈ΘL∪I
f(θ)dθ
= ∂u(q¯, θˆ)/∂q − p[2 + (λ− 1)F (θH)] , (A.107)
where θH := inf{ΘH}.
Next, the case of a downward deviation is considered. Utility of a type θˆ ∈ I, who
consumes q¯ − ε with ε > 0 is
U(q¯ − ε|θˆ, ·) = u(q¯ − ε, θˆ)− p(q¯ − ε)− L
+p
∫
{θ∈Θ|qˆ(θ;p)>q¯−ε}
(qˆ(θ; p)− q¯+ε)f(θ) dθ−λp
∫
{θ∈Θ|qˆ(θ;p)<q¯−ε}
(q¯−ε− qˆ(θ; p))f(θ) dθ .
The change in utility from an infinitesimal downward deviation is given by
dU(q¯ − ε|θˆ, ·)
dε
∣∣∣∣
ε=0
= −
du(q¯, θˆ)
dq
+ p+ p
∫
θ∈ΘH∪I
f(θ)dθ + λp
∫
θ∈ΘL
f(θ)dθ
= −∂u(q¯, θˆ)/∂q + p[2 + (λ− 1)F (θL)] , (A.108)
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where θL := sup{ΘL}. A deviation is not profitable if for all θ ∈ I it holds that
dU(q¯ + ε|θ)/dε|ε=0 ≤ 0 and dU(q¯ − ε|θ)/dε|ε=0 ≤ 0.
Thus, a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a personal equilibrium
where all θ ∈ I consume q¯ is that (A.107) holds for θH and that (A.108) holds for θL.
Formally, the following to inequalities have to be satisfied:
∂u(q¯, θH)/∂q ≤ p[2 + (λ− 1)F (θH)], (A.109)
∂u(q¯, θL)/∂q ≥ p[2 + (λ− 1)F (θL)] . (A.110)
Define q˜(θ; p) such that ∂u(q˜(θ; p), θ)/∂q ≡ p[2+(λ−1)F (θ)]. Inequalities (A.109) and
(A.110) imply that q˜(θL; p) ≥ q¯ ≥ q˜(θH ; p). By (C1), dq˜(θ; p)/dθ > 0. With I being an
interval we have θL < θH and thus q˜(θL; p) < q˜(θH ; p) a contradiction. This completes
the proof.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition IV.1: First, note that (IV.11) characterizes the personal
equilibrium except for a finite number of kink points. Since the candidate equilibrium
is continuously differentiable, we can conclude that there are no kinks in the personal
equilibrium if it is strictly increasing in θ.
Remember that local deviations q ∈ [qˆ(θ; p), qˆ(θ¯; p)] are considered in the main body
of the paper. Thus, it remains to show that there is no type who can profitably deviate
to a very high or very low quantity, q < qˆ(θ; p) or q > qˆ(θ¯; p). To verify this claim we
can focus on the case where p > 0.
Suppose the consumer chooses a quantity q < qˆ(θ; p), then his utility is given by
U(q|θ, ·) = u(q, θ)− pq − L+ p
∫ θ¯
θ
[qˆ(θˆ; p)− q]f(θˆ) dθˆ .
The optimal quantity in this case, qL is characterized by
∂u(qL, θ)
∂q
= 2p .
Thus, qL > qˆ(θ; p) for θ > θ and qL = qˆ(θ; p) for θ = θ.
Now, consider the case where q > qˆ(θ¯; p). Given the state of the world is θ, the
consumer’s utility is
U(q|θ, ·) = u(q, θ)− pq − L− pλ
∫ θ¯
θ
[q − qˆ(θˆ; p)]f(θˆ) dθˆ .
The optimal quantity in this case, qH is characterized by
∂u(qH , θ)
∂q
= (λ+ 1)p .
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Note that qH < qˆ(θ; p) for θ < θ¯ and qH = qˆ(θ; p) for θ = θ¯. Hence, no type has an
incentive to deviate.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma IV.5: First, note that if the personal equilibrium is strictly
increasing in θ in some interval, then in this interval qˆ(θ; p) ≡ q˜(θ; p). The proof of
Proposition 1 reveals that there is a unique equilibrium candidate if dqˆ/dθ > 0.
Suppose there exists an interval I ⊆ Θ such that qˆ(θ; p) = q¯ for all θ ∈ I. Let
θA := inf{I} and θB := sup{I}, with θA < θB. Furthermore, assume that if θA > θ
(θB < θ¯) then there exists an neighborhood (θA − ε, θA) (respectively (θB, θB + ε)) for
ε > 0 sufficiently small, where qˆ(·) is strictly increasing. For qˆ(·) being constant for all
θ ∈ I it has to hold that in all states of the world θ ∈ I neither a downward deviation
nor an upward deviation does improve the consumer’s utility.
Downward Deviation (q < q¯): Suppose θA > θ. The consumer deviates to a
lower quantity than q¯. Let θˆ(q) denote the state of the world for which the consumer
expected to choose the same quantity. Thus, the consumer feels a gain compared
to types (θˆ(q), θ¯) and a loss compared to types [θ, θˆ(q)]. Formally, qˆ(θˆ(q); p) = q and
limε→0 θˆ(q¯−|ε|) = θA. Note, for a minor downward deviation θˆ
′(q) > 0. The consumer’s
utility from a (minor) downward deviation is
UD = u(q, θ)− pq − L+ p
∫ θ¯
θˆ(q)
(qˆ(θ; p)− q)f(θ)dθ
− λp
∫ θˆ(q)
θ
(q − qˆ(θ; p))f(θ)dθ . (A.111)
Differentiating the above utility with respect to q yields
dUD
dq
=
∂u(q, θ)
∂q
− p
[
2 + (λ− 1)F (θˆ(q))
]
. (A.112)
A downward deviation is not utility enhancing if for all θ ∈ I the right-hand side of
(A.112) is non-negative even at q = q¯. Since we imposed the Spence-Mirrlees condition,
this holds for all θ ∈ I if it holds for θA. Thus, it has to hold that
∂u(q¯, θA)
∂q
− p [2 + (λ− 1)F (θA)] ≥ 0 . (A.113)
Note that qˆ(θ; p) is continuous and defined by q˜(θ; p) for θ slightly below θA. Hence,
for θA > θ condition (A.113) has to hold with equality.
Now suppose θA = θ. It is straightforward to show that a downward deviation is not
utility improving if the following condition holds
∂u(q¯, θ)
∂q
− 2p ≥ 0 . (A.114)
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With similar reasonings it can be shown that a non-minor downward deviation is not
utility enhancing if the above inequality or (A.113) holds.
Upward Deviation (q > q¯): Suppose θB < θ¯. Let θˆ(q) still denote the cutoff
state, i.e., the consumer feels a gain compared to types (θˆ(q), θ¯] and a loss compared
to types [θ, θˆ(q)]. Now θˆ(q) > θB and limε→0 θˆ(q¯ + |ε|) = θB. The consumer’s utility
from a (minor) upward deviation is given by
UU = u(q, θ)− pq − L+ p
∫ θ¯
θˆ(q)
(qˆ(θ; p)− q)f(θ)dθ
− λp
∫ θˆ(q)
θ
(q − qˆ(θ; p))f(θ)dθ . (A.115)
The derivative of UU with respect to q is
dUU
dq
=
∂u(q, θ)
∂q
− p
[
2 + (λ− 1)F (θˆ(q))
]
. (A.116)
An upward deviation is not utility enhancing for all θ ∈ I if
∂u(q¯, θB)
∂q
− p [2 + (λ− 1)F (θB)] ≤ 0 . (A.117)
Since the personal equilibrium is continuous and θB < θ¯ the above inequality has to
hold with equality.
Suppose θB = θ¯. In this case the consumer has no incentive to choose a quantity
q > q¯ for all states θ ∈ I if
∂u(q¯, θ¯)
∂q
− p [1 + λ] ≤ 0 . (A.118)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma IV.6: First, note that any personal equilibrium is bounded from
above by qMAX(p), which is implicitly defined by ∂u(qMAX , θ¯)/∂q = 2p. Let qFB(θ) de-
note the first-best quantities, i.e., ∂u(qFB(θ), θ)/∂q = c. In the following, we will show
that for p ≥ p¯ the joint surplus, S(p), is bounded from above and that this bound is
lower than S(0). To establish the above claim we define qˇ(θ) := min{qFB(θ), qMAX(p¯)}.
It is important to note that there is a positive mass of types for which qˇ(θ) = qMAX(p¯)
if p¯ > (1/2)c. The joint surplus generated with a unit price p ≥ p¯ is strictly lower than
Sˇ =
∫ θ¯
θ
[
u(qˇ(θ), θ)− cqˇ(θ)
]
f(θ)dθ , (A.119)
since with a positive unit price the consumer expects to incur some net losses. A
sufficient condition for S(p) being maximized by a unit price p ∈ [0, p¯) is that S(0) ≥ Sˇ
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(This condition is by no means necessary). S(0) ≥ Sˇ is equivalent to
∫ θ¯
θ
{
u(qS(θ), θ)− u(qˇ(θ), θ)− c[qS(θ)− qˇ(θ)]
}
f(θ)dθ ≥ 0 . (A.120)
The above condition is satisfied for c being sufficiently small, which completes the proof.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition IV.2: First, it is shown how to derive equation (IV.16).
Taking the derivative of (IV.15) with respect to p yields
S ′(p) =
∫ θ¯
θ
{(
∂u(qˆ(θ, p), θ)
∂q
− c
)
dqˆ(θ, p)
dp
+
∫ θ¯
θ
[qˆ(φ, p)− qˆ(θ, p)]f(φ) dφ+ p
∫ θ¯
θ
[
dqˆ(φ, p)
dp
−
dqˆ(θ, p)
dp
]
f(φ) dφ
− λ
∫ θ
θ
[qˆ(θ, p)− qˆ(φ, p)]f(φ) dφ− λp
∫ θ
θ
[
dqˆ(θ, p)
dp
−
dqˆ(φ, p)
dp
]
f(φ) dφ
}
f(θ) dθ .
(A.121)
The above equation can be rearranged to
S ′(p) =
∫ θ¯
θ
{(
∂u(qˆ(θ, p), θ)
∂q
− p[1 + (λ− 1)F (θ)]− c
)
dqˆ(θ, p)
dp
+ p
∫ θ¯
θ
dqˆ(φ, p)
dp
f(φ) dφ+ λp
∫ θ
θ
dqˆ(φ, p)
dp
f(φ) dφ
+
∫ θ¯
θ
[qˆ(φ, p)− qˆ(θ, p)]f(φ) dφ− λ
∫ θ
θ
[qˆ(θ, p)− qˆ(φ, p)]f(φ) dφ
}
f(θ) dθ . (A.122)
Note that the following equality holds
∫ θ¯
θ
{∫ θ¯
θ
[qˆ(φ, p)− qˆ(θ, p)]f(φ) dφ− λ
∫ θ
θ
[qˆ(θ, p)− qˆ(φ, p)]f(φ) dφ
}
f(θ) dθ
= −(λ− 1)
∫ θ¯
θ
∫ θ¯
θ
[qˆ(φ, p)− qˆ(θ, p)]f(φ)f(θ) dφdθ. (A.123)
Inserting (A.123) and (IV.11) into (A.122) yields the equation (IV.16) stated in the
text part. By using the definition of Ψ(·) the above derivative can be further simplified
to
S ′(p) = Ψ(p) + p
∫ θ¯
θ
{∫ θ¯
θ
dqˆ(φ, p)
dp
f(φ)dφ+ λ
∫ θ
θ
dqˆ(φ, p)
dp
f(φ)dφ
}
f(θ)dθ . (A.124)
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First observe that S ′(p) < 0 for p ≥ c. Since Ψ(p) is non-increasing for p ∈ [0, c),
it holds that S ′(0) > S ′(p) for p ∈ (0, c). Hence, if S ′(p) ≤ 0 the joint surplus is
maximized at p = 0. If, on the other hand, S ′(0) > 0 then there exists a pˆ ∈ (0, c)
at which S(p) is maximized. The price pˆ is characterized by the first-order condition
S ′(pˆ) = 0, since S(·) is continuously differentiable. Note, however, that the first-order
condition may not be sufficient.
Next, we show that S ′(0) ≤ 0 is equivalent to Σ(λ) ≥ c. By evaluating (IV.16) at
p = 0, it is obvious that S ′(0) ≤ 0 iff
− c
∫ θ¯
θ
dqˆ(θ, 0)
dp
f(θ)dθ− (λ−1)
∫ θ¯
θ
∫ θ¯
θ
[qˆ(φ, 0)− qˆ(θ, 0)]f(φ)f(θ) dφdθ ≤ 0 . (A.125)
Rearranging the above inequality and using the definition of Σ(λ) reveals that S ′(0) ≤ 0
if and only if Σ(λ) ≥ c. Finally, we verify the following claim.
Claim: Σ′(λ) > 0.
Proof: To cut down on notation we often write qˆ(θ) instead of qˆ(θ; p). Define Z(λ)
and N(λ) as the numerator and the denominator, respectively, of the fraction of Σ(·).
Thus,
Z(λ) ≡
∫ θ¯
θ
∫ θ¯
θ
[qˆ(φ, 0)− qˆ(θ, 0)]f(φ)f(θ)dφdθ, (A.126)
and N(λ) ≡ −
∫ θ¯
θ
[dqˆ(θ, 0)/dp]f(θ)dθ . (A.127)
With this notation the derivative of Σ(·) with respect to λ can be written as
Σ′(λ) =
Z(λ)
N(λ)
+ (λ− 1)
Z ′(λ)N(λ)−N ′(λ)Z(λ)
N2(λ)
(A.128)
In order to show that Σ′(λ) > 0, we analyze the itemized parts separately. First, we
take the derivative of qˆ(·) with respect to λ which leads to
dqˆ(·)
dλ
=
pF (θ)
∂2u(qˆ(θ), θ)/∂q2
≤ 0 . (A.129)
Thus,
d
dλ
[qˆ(φ)− qˆ(θ)] =
pF (φ)
∂2u(qˆ(φ), φ)/∂q2
−
pF (θ)
∂2u(qˆ(θ), θ)/∂q2
, (A.130)
which equals zero at p = 0. Hence, Z ′(λ) = 0. Taking the derivative of (IV.17) with
respect to λ yields
d
dλ
[
dqˆ(·)
dp
]
= F (θ)
(
∂2u(qˆ(θ), θ)
∂q2
)−1
− [2 + (λ− 1)F (θ)]
(
∂2u(qˆ(θ), θ)
∂q2
)−2
∂3u(qˆ(θ), θ)
∂q3
dqˆ(θ)
dλ
. (A.131)
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Evaluating the above derivative at p = 0, and thus dqˆ/dλ|p=0 = 0, leads to
d
dλ
[
dqˆ(·)
dp
] ∣∣∣∣
p=0
= F (θ)
(
∂2u(qˆ(θ), θ)
∂q2
)−1
< 0 .
Thus,
N ′(λ) = −
∫ θ¯
θ
F (θ)
(
∂2u(qˆ(θ), θ)
∂q2
)−1
f(θ)dθ .
Since Z ′(λ) = 0, equation (A.128) simplifies to
Σ′(λ) =
Z(λ)
N(λ)
− (λ− 1)
Z(λ)N ′(λ)
N2(λ)
=
Z(λ)
N2(λ)
[
N(λ)− (λ− 1)N ′(λ)
]
. (A.132)
Since Z(λ) > 0, it remains to show that N(λ)− (λ− 1)N ′(λ) > 0, which is equivalent
to
−
∫ θ¯
θ
[dqˆ(θ, 0)/dp]f(θ)dθ + (λ− 1)
∫ θ¯
θ
F (θ)
(
∂2u(qˆ(θ), θ)
∂q2
)−1
f(θ)dθ > 0 . (A.133)
Inserting the explicit formula for dqˆ(·)/dp into the above inequality yields
∫ θ¯
θ
{
− [2 + (λ− 1)F (θ)]
(
∂2u(qˆ(θ), θ)
∂q2
)−1
+ (λ− 1)F (θ)
(
∂2u(qˆ(θ), θ)
∂q2
)−1}
f(θ)dθ > 0 (A.134)
⇐⇒
∫ θ¯
θ
−2
(
∂2u(qˆ(θ), θ)
∂q2
)−1
f(θ)dθ > 0 . (A.135)
The above inequality is satisfied since u(·) is a strictly concave function in q for q ≤
qS(θ). Q.E.D.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition IV.3: In order to apply Proposition 1 of Armstrong and
Vickers (2001), the following three properties have to be satisfied: (i) [∂m(vA, vB)/∂vA]
[m(vA, vB)]−1 is non-decreasing in vB, (ii) there exists v˜j > −∞ that maximizes
m(v, v)pij(v) for j = 1, 2, and (iii) for j = 1, 2 there exists v¯j defined by pij(v¯j) = 0,
pij(v) < 0 if v > v¯j. Since we explicitly assumed (i) and (ii) these properties are
satisfied. To see that (iii) is also satisfied note that v¯j = maxp{Sj(p)}. Obviously,
pij(v¯j) = 0 and pij(v) < 0 if v > v¯j. Hence, we can apply Proposition 1 of Arm-
strong and Vickers. According to this proposition there are no asymmetric equilibria
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and the equilibrium utility level vˆj ∈ (v˜j, v¯j). Since m(v
A, vB)pij(v
A) is continuously
differentiable, the equilibrium utility level satisfies the first-order condition of profit
maximization. Thus, pij(vˆj) = Φ(vˆj).
From Proposition 2 it follows that the optimal marginal price pˆj is greater than zero
if and only if Σ(λj) < c. If this is the case then pˆj is characterized by S
′(pˆj) = 0, as
was shown in the proof of Proposition 2. The per customer profit of a firm is given by
pij = L+ (p− c)
∫ θ¯
θ
qˆj(θ; p)f(θ)dθ . (A.136)
Since, in equilibrium, pij = Φ(vˆj) the equilibrium fixed fee is given by
Lj = Φ(vˆj)− (pj − c)
∫ θ¯
θ
qˆj(θ; pj)f(θ)dθ . (A.137)
Replacing pj by pˆ and 0, leads to the fixed fees Lˆ and L
F , respectively.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma IV.7: With slight abuse of notation, we omit for the proof that
the demand function, qˆ(·), depends on the marginal price p. Define V (λ; θ) as the
consumer’s surplus for a given state of the world on the equilibrium path. Formally,
V (λ; θ) = u(qˆ(θ), θ)− pqˆ(θ)− L+ p
∫ θ¯
θ
[qˆ(φ)− qˆ(θ)]f(φ)dφ
−λp
∫ θ
θ
[qˆ(θ)− qˆ(φ)]f(φ)dφ
= u(qˆ(θ), θ)− L− pqˆ(θ)[2 + (λ− 1)F (θ)]
+p
∫ θ¯
θ
qˆ(φ)f(φ)dφ− λp
∫ θ
θ
qˆ(φ)f(φ)dφ . (A.138)
Taking the derivative of V (·; θ) with respect to λ yields
V ′(λ; θ) =
dqˆ(θ)
dλ
[
∂u(qˆ(θ), θ)
∂q
− p[2 + (λ− 1)F (θ)]
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
−pF (θ)qˆ(θ)
+ p
∫ θ¯
θ
dqˆ(φ)
dλ
f(φ)dφ+ p
∫ θ
θ
qˆ(φ)f(φ)dφ− λp
∫ θ
θ
dqˆ(φ)
dλ
f(φ)dφ. (A.139)
Note that
dqˆ(λ; θ)
dλ
=
pF (θ)
∂2u(qˆ(θ), θ)/∂q2
≤ 0 . (A.140)
The consumer’s expected utility is given by Eθ[V (λ; θ)] =
∫ θ¯
θ
V (λ; θ)f(θ)dθ. Hence, the
change in expected utility due to an increase in the consumer’s degree of loss aversion
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is given by
d
dλ
Eθ[V (λ; θ)] =
∫ θ¯
θ
V ′(λ; θ)f(θ)dθ.
Hence,
Eθ[V
′(λ)] = p
{∫ θ¯
θ
∫ θ¯
θ
dqˆ(φ)
dλ
f(φ)f(θ)dφdθ + λ
∫ θ¯
θ
∫ θ
θ
dqˆ(φ)
dλ
f(φ)f(θ)dφdθ
+
∫ θ¯
θ
∫ θ
θ
qˆ(φ)f(φ)f(θ)dφdθ −
∫ θ¯
θ
F (θ)qˆ(θ)f(θ)dθ
}
. (A.141)
By using integration by parts for all but the last term, the above expression can be
simplified to
Eθ[V
′(λ)] = p
∫ θ¯
θ
{
dqˆ(θ)
dλ
[λ− (λ− 1)F (θ)]− qˆ(θ)[2F (θ)− 1]
}
f(θ)dθ . (A.142)
Thus, the consumer’s expected utility is non-increasing in his degree of loss aversion if∫ θ¯
θ
qˆ(θ)[2F (θ)− 1]f(θ)dθ ≥ 0 . (A.143)
Condition (A.143) is satisfied since qˆ(θ) is non-decreasing in θ. Nevertheless, we prove
this claim formally. Let θM be the median state, i.e., F (θM) = 1/2. By splitting the
integral of (A.143) into two parts, the states below the median and the states above
the median, we obtain∫ θ¯
θ
qˆ(θ)[2F (θ)− 1]f(θ)dθ =
∫ θM
θ
qˆ(θ)[2F (θ)− 1]f(θ)dθ +
∫ θ¯
θM
qˆ(θ)[2F (θ)− 1]f(θ)dθ . (A.144)
Since qˆ(θ) is non-decreasing, the above expression is at least as great as
∫ θM
θ
qˆ(θM)[2F (θ)− 1]f(θ)dθ +
∫ θ¯
θM
qˆ(θM)[2F (θ)− 1]f(θ)dθ
= qˆ(θM)
[∫ θ¯
θM
[2F (θ)− 1]f(θ)dθ −
∫ θM
θ
[1− 2F (θ)]f(θ)dθ
]
. (A.145)
By using integration by parts one can show that∫ θM
θ
[1− 2F (θ)]f(θ)dθ =
∫ θM
θ
2F (θ)f(θ)dθ, (A.146)
and ∫ θ¯
θM
[2F (θ)− 1]f(θ)dθ =
∫ θM
θ
2[1− F (θ)]f(θ)dθ. (A.147)
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Hence, the right-hand side of (A.145) is non-negative if
∫ θ¯
θM
f(θ)dθ −
∫ θ¯
θ
F (θ)f(θ)dθ ≥ 0, (A.148)
which holds true since 1/2 ≥ 1/2.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition IV.4: Irrespectively of the rival’s tariff offer, if the sorting
constraint is satisfied it is optimal for a firm to choose pj such that Sj(pj) is maximized.
Put differently, the firm will choose the method of generating vj that maximizes its (per
customer) profits. Thus, if no type λ ∈ {λ1, λ2} has an incentive to mimic the other
type, it is an equilibrium that the firms offer the same tariffs as in the full information
case. Obviously, in case (ii) where c ≤ Σ(λ1) < Σ(λ2), both firms offer a flat-rate tariff
to consumers. In this case, a flat-rate tariff maximizes S1(p) as well as S2(p). Moreover,
the generated joint surplus is the same for both types of loss averse consumers. Since
the brand preferences are i.i.d. across the λ1 and λ2 types, in any equilibrium each
firm offers a single flat-rate tariff to consumers.
In the remaining part of the proof we show hat in the case where Σ(λ1) < c ≤ Σ(λ2)
neither type λ1 has an incentive to choose the tariff (0, L
F ) nor does type λ2 have an
incentive to choose the tariff (0, LF ).
Claim: vˆ1 ≥ vˆ2.
Proof: Let S∗j ≡ maxp{Sj(p)}. Note that S1(0) = S2(0) = S
∗
2 . The firm’s per customer
profit from type j = 1, 2 when offering utility v is
pij(v) = S
∗
j − v . (A.149)
Thus, for any v it holds that pi1(v) ≥ pi2(v), since S
∗
1 − v ≥ S
∗
2 − v. The equilibrium
utilities are characterized by pij(vˆj) = Φ(vˆj). Hence, we obtain the following relations:
Φ(vˆ1) = pi1(vˆ1) ≥ pi2(vˆ1) (A.150)
pi1(vˆ2) ≥ pi2(vˆ2) = Φ(vˆ2) . (A.151)
Suppose, in contradiction, vˆ1 < vˆ2. This immediately implies that pij(vˆ1) > pij(vˆ2).
Hence,
Φ(vˆ1) = pi1(vˆ1) > pi1(vˆ2) ≥ pi2(vˆ2) = Φ(vˆ2) . (A.152)
Since Φ′(v) ≥ 0 the above formula holds only if vˆ1 > vˆ2, a contradiction. Q.E.D.
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Since vˆ1 ≥ vˆ2 and the expected utility from a flat-rate tariff being independent of
λ, one can conclude that a consumer of type λ1 has no incentive to choose the tariff
(0, LF ) that is designed for consumers of type λ2. Finally, we show that type λ2 has
no incentive to mimic type λ1. Let v
DEV
2 denote the expected utility of a consumer of
type λ2 who accepts the tariff (pˆ, Lˆ) designed for type λ1.
Claim: vDEV2 < vˆ2.
Proof: The expected utility of type λ2 from the tariff (pˆ, Lˆ) equals the generated joint
surplus minus the profits of the firm he purchases from. Thus,
vDEV2 = S2(pˆ)− Lˆ− (pˆ− c)
∫ θ¯
θ
qˆ2(θ; pˆ)f(θ)dθ, (A.153)
where qˆ2(θ; p) denotes the demand of type λ2 in the personal equilibrium. Inserting
the explicit formula of Lˆ into (A.153) yields
vDEV2 = S2(pˆ)− Φ(vˆ1)− (cˆ− p)
∫ θ¯
θ
[qˆ1(θ; pˆ)− qˆ2(θ; pˆ)]f(θ)dθ. (A.154)
Note that qˆ1(θ, pˆ) > qˆ2(θ, pˆ) for all θ ∈ Θ, since dqˆ/dλ < 0 if p > 0. By Proposition 3,
c > pˆ hence
vDEV2 < S2(pˆ)− Φ(vˆ1). (A.155)
The expected utility of a consumer of type λ2 when choosing the tariff that is designed
for him can be expressed as follows,
vˆ2 = S
∗
2 − Φ(vˆ2). (A.156)
Hence, a deviation is not utility improving if
S∗2 − Φ(vˆ2) ≥ S2(pˆ)− Φ(vˆ1) (A.157)
⇐⇒ [S∗2 − S2(pˆ)] + [Φ(vˆ1)− Φ(vˆ2)] ≥ 0 . (A.158)
The above inequality is satisfied since Φ′(·) ≥ 0 and vˆ1 ≥ vˆ2. Q.E.D.
Thus, if the firms offer the optimal tariffs of the full information case, each type of
loss averse consumer selects the tariff that is designed for him, which completes the
proof.
Q.E.D.
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4.2. Examples of Discrete Choice Models
Hotelling Model with Linear Transport Cost. Suppose consumers’ ideal
brands are uniformly distributed on the unit interval [0, 1]. The brands of the two firms,
A and B, are located at the two extreme points, brand A at zero and brand B at one. A
consumer with ideal brand x ∈ [0, 1] has brand preferences ζ = (0,−tx,−t(1−x)). The
parameter t > 0 is a consumer’s “transport cost” per unit distance between his ideal
brand and the brand he purchases from. For the Hotelling specification the market
share function takes the following form,
m(vA, vB) = min
{
1
2t
(t+ vA − vB),
vA
t
}
. (A.159)
The market share function has to be modified if vA and vB differ by so much that
m(·) /∈ [0, 1] (this never happens in equilibrium). Moreover, the Hotelling model has
the well-known drawback that market shares are kinked. If, however, the transport
cost is sufficiently low then one can focus on the case where the market share function
is given by the first term of the above expression and thus well behaved. Formally, for
t ≤ (2/3)S∗2 it suffices to analyze firms’ profit maximization problem for
3
m(vA, vB) = [1/(2t)](t+ vA − vB). (A.160)
Hence, ∂m(vA, vB)/∂vA = (2t)−1 which immediately implies that
Φ(v) ≡
m(v, v)
∂m(v, v)/∂vA
= t. (A.161)
Obviously, Φ(·) is non-decreasing. Note that
∂m(vA, vB)/∂vA
m(vA, vB)
= (t+ vA − vB)−1. (A.162)
It can easily be seen that the above fraction is increasing in vB. Thus, the Hotelling
model satisfies all imposed assumptions if the transport cost is sufficiently low. One
can check that the collusive utility level exists. To calculate the collusive utility level
one has to use the market share function given in (A.159).
Logit Demand Model. An obvious drawback of the Hotelling specification is that
a firm does not compete with the rival and the outside option at the same time. A
model that accounts for this simultaneous competition on two fronts is the logit demand
model. Here, a consumer’s brand preferences ζ i for i = 0, A,B are i.i.d. according to
3See Lemma 1 of Armstrong and Vickers (2001).
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the double exponential distribution with mean zero and variance µ2pi2/6, where pi (here)
denotes the circular constant. Thus, the cumulative distribution function is
G(ζ i) = exp
{
− exp[−(γ + ζ i/µ)]
}
, (A.163)
where γ is the Euler–Mascheroni constant and µ is a positive constant. With this
specification, the market share of firm A is given by (see Anderson et al. 1992)
m(vA, vB) =
exp[vA/µ]
exp[vA/µ] + exp[vB/µ] + 1
. (A.164)
The parameter µ captures the degree of heterogeneity among consumers with respect
to their brand preferences. Put differently, µ measures the degree of product differen-
tiation. A lower value of µ corresponds to a more competitive market. For µ→∞ the
firms are local monopolists. Taking the partial derivative of (A.164) with respect to
vA yields
∂m(vA, vB)
∂vA
=
exp[vA/µ]{exp[vB/µ] + 1}
µ{exp[vA/µ] + exp[vB/µ] + 1}2
. (A.165)
Thus,
m(vA, vB)
∂m(vA, vB)/∂vA
=
µ{exp[vA/µ] + exp[vB/µ] + 1}
exp[vB/µ] + 1
. (A.166)
Evaluating the above expression at vA = vB = v leads to
Φ(v) = µ
2 exp[v/µ] + 1
exp[v/µ] + 1
. (A.167)
Taking the derivative of Φ(·) with respect to v yields
Φ′(v) =
exp[v/µ]
(exp[v/µ] + 1)2
> 0. (A.168)
Moreover, the derivative of [∂m(vA, vB)/∂vA][m(vA, vB)]−1 with respect to vB
amounts to
d
dvB
[
∂m(vA, vB)/∂vA
m(vA, vB)
]
=
1
µ2
exp[vB/µ]{exp[vB/µ] + 1}
µ{exp[vB/µ] + exp[vB/µ] + 1}2
> 0. (A.169)
The collusive utility level v˜ maximizesm(v, v)pi(v). Note thatm(v, v)→ 0 for v → −∞
and pi(v) ≤ 0 if v ≥ maxp{S(p)}. Thus, the collusive utility exists, since m(v, v)pi(v)
is continuously differentiable.
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